Paul v. Uniroyal Plastics Co.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. OT-88-17,OT-88-17
• Citation: 62 Ohio App.3d 277,575 N.E.2d 484
• Parties: PAUL, Appellant, v. UNIROYAL PLASTICS COMPANY, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 277

62 Ohio App.3d 277

575 N.E.2d 484

PAUL, Appellant, v. UNIROYAL PLASTICS COMPANY, INC., Appellee.

No. OT-88-17.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Ottawa County.

Decided Dec. 2, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

An occupier of premises owes an invitee a duty to use reasonable care to protect the invitee from harm due to dangers, unknown to the invitee, of which the occupier is or should be aware. Where the invitee encounters a danger on the premises which pose a risk of which the invitee is aware and which he appreciates, and proceeds nevertheless and is injured, the occupier is not liable for such injury.

Mark F. Vitou, Toledo, for appellant.

Susan B. Nelson and James R. Jeffery, Toledo, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the court on appeal from the March 18, 1988 judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Uniroyal Plastics Company.

Appellant, Merle Paul, Jr., initiated this action to recover for injuries which he suffered as a result of a fall that occurred on appellee's premises. The accident occurred on April 8, 1986, when appellant, an experienced truck driver, was delivering cargo to appellee's plant. While appellant was attempting to open the jammed trailer doors of his truck, he fell and suffered extensive injuries. Appellant alleges that appellee was negligent in failing to maintain the parking lot surface and thereby avoiding the possibility that trailer doors could jam. Appellee responds that it did not have, nor should it have had, any reason to know that the condition of the parking lot caused trailer doors to jam. Furthermore, appellee argues that appellant was fully aware of the risk he was exposed to.

The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with appellee's contentions. Thereupon, appellant filed this timely appeal and asserts the following sole assignment of error:

"The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee's motion for summary judgment as a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the means chosen by plaintiff-appellant in dislodging the doors of his tractor-trailer."

Summary judgment is a procedural device engineered to expeditiously and economically dispose of legal claims which have no factual foundation. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554-2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 276. Underpinning this device is a belief that litigation should be promptly terminated whenever there is nothing to try. Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 24 O.O.3d 1, 2, 433 N.E.2d 615, 616. This case presents a prime example of when summary judgment is the proper course of action.

Today, the standard for rendering summary judgment is equated with that used for directed verdict: whether there is but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict when the evidence is construed most strongly in the non-moving party's favor. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273-274; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212-213; and Keister v. Park Centre Lanes (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 19, 21, 3 OBR 20, 22, 443 N.E.2d 532, 535. Furthermore, unique to summary judgment is the question of whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact which must be decided by the jury. Rayburn v. J.C. Penney Outlet Store (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 463, 464, 3 OBR 544, 545, 445 N.E.2d 1167, 1169.

Generally, the complexity of a summary judgment motion lies not in application of these standards, but in determining whether each party has produced sufficient evidence to substantiate its contentions. In this case, appellant argues that the issue is the inferences to be drawn from the facts. However, the real issue is whether appellant presented sufficient evidence to support his claims.

Under Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party has the burden to persuade the court that no genuine issue of material fact exists and, therefore, that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 330, 106 S.Ct. at 2556, 91 L.Ed.2d at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, the moving party need only identify, by specific reference to the record and not in conclusory terms, those aspects of the non-moving party's claim that are unsupported by the evidence or supported by insufficient evidence. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273- The moving party need not introduce affirmative evidence to refute the non-moving party's claims. Instead, if the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, he may merely point to the lack of sufficient evidence in the record to support the non-moving party's claim. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274-275.

In response to the motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rely on his pleadings if he bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-2554, 91 L.Ed.2d at 275. Instead, the non-moving party must produce evidence, in some form permitted by Civ.R. 56(C), sufficient to justify the court's conclusion that a reasonable jury could properly render a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 255-256, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-2514, 91 L.Ed.2d at 216-217. The non-moving party need not try his case at this level, but he must produce more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support his claims. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d at 214. Furthermore, if the moving party has demonstrated that the non-moving party's claim is factually implausible, then the non-moving party must produce more persuasive evidence to support his claim. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (1986), 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552. The non-moving party may not rely on isolated facts to support his claim. Rather, he must show that the evidence as a whole substantiates his claim. Id. If the non-moving party has not had sufficient opportunity to discover relevant facts, he may rely upon Civ.R. 56(F) to obtain more time to do so.

It is axiomatic that when the court considers the evidence presented with regard to summary judgment, it should not attempt to usurp the jury's role of assessing credibility, weighing the evidence, or drawing inferences. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 242, 106 S.Ct. at 2507, 91 L.Ed.2d at 207-208. Rather, the court's function is to consider the evidence, in light of each party's evidentiary burden, to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the non-moving party's position that a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Id. If the evidence is sufficient, then a genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved by a jury. Assessing the sufficiency of the evidence involves a qualitative, as well as a quantitative, analysis. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., supra, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-1356, 89 L.Ed.2d at 552. Therefore, in addition to considering the amount of evidence presented on an issue, the court must consider whether the evidence makes a party's claim plausible.

Thus, if the court is satisfied, after construing the evidence most strongly against the moving party, that there is no genuine issue of a material fact, that a reasonable jury could not render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor, and, therefore, that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court...