Paulucci v. William Morris Agency, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 January 1997
• Docket Number: Civil No. 3-96-843.
• Citation: 952 F.Supp. 1335
• Parties: Jeno F. PAULUCCI, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM MORRIS AGENCY, INC., and Robert I. Pack, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

952 F.Supp. 1335

Jeno F. PAULUCCI, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM MORRIS AGENCY, INC., and Robert I. Pack, Defendants.

Civil No. 3-96-843.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Third Division.

January 9, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

George Gregory Eck, Robert J. Borhart, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, MN, for Jeno F. Paulucci.

William Leroy Sippel, Jonathan C. Miesen, Doherty Rumble & Butler, St. Paul, MN, Duane Ward Krohnke, Eric Edwin Jorstad, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, MN, Roger M. Adelman, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Washington, DC, Roger C. Simmons, Gordon & Simmons, Frederick, MD, for Robert I. Pack.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MAGNUSON, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Robert Pack's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, as well as Plaintiff Jeno Paulucci's Motion for Replevin and for Costs and Reasonable Attorneys' Fees. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant Pack's Motion to Dismiss. Further, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's Motion for Replevin and for Costs and Reasonable Attorneys' Fees.

BACKGROUND

In 1995, Jeno Paulucci ("Paulucci") directed James Tills ("Tills"), Vice President of Public Relations for Luigino's, Inc., Paulucci's Minnesota corporation, to locate an author to assist Paulucci in writing his autobiography. Tills contacted the William Morris Agency ("Morris Agency"), a New York corporation. Paulucci, now a Florida resident, entered into a contract with the author recommended by the Morris Agency, Robert Pack ("Pack"), a Maryland resident. The contract, dated August 20, 1995, but signed by Pack on November 25, 1995, provided, in part, that Pack would collaborate with and assist Paulucci in preparing a 100,000 word manuscript "within a year of signing" and that Paulucci would pay Pack the sum of $150,000 pursuant to an agreed-upon payment schedule. The contract contained a Minnesota choice-of-laws provision.

Pack researched and began writing the manuscript. Pack met with Paulucci in Florida at least once; however, Pack's main contacts were with Tills in Minnesota. Pack and Tills communicated frequently by telephone, letter, and facsimile. Paulucci claims that he made scheduled payments under the contract and sent irreplaceable personal records to Pack. Paulucci further alleges that Pack refused to cooperate and even published a defamatory letter regarding Paulucci. Paulucci maintains that he attempted to rectify the situation with Pack through the Morris Agency without success. Pack allegedly has refused to deliver the first half of the manuscript and has refused to return Paulucci's personal property and monies paid.

Paulucci filed a five-count Complaint against the Morris Agency and Pack, alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) libel; and (5) conversion and request for replevin. Paulucci voluntarily dismissed the action against Defendant Morris Agency pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), thereby leaving Pack as the sole, individual defendant. The parties now bring various motions before the Court. Defendant Pack moves the Court to dismiss the Complaint arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to the alleged breach of contract, fraud, and libel counts. Plaintiff moves for replevin of his personal possessions from Defendant Pack and for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The Court addresses each motion in turn.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant Pack's Motion to Dismiss

a. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

For the purposes of Pack's Motion to Dismiss, the Court takes all facts alleged in the Complaint as true. See Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990). Further, the Court must construe the allegations in the Complaint and reasonable inferences arising from the Complaint favorably to Paulucci. See Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986). A motion to dismiss will be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Although the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of jurisdiction falls upon Paulucci, a nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1991). Jurisdiction need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence until trial or until the Court holds an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 1387; Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). If the Court does not hold a hearing and instead relies on pleadings and affidavits, the Court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of that party. See id.; Woodke v. Dahm, 873 F.Supp. 179, 192 (N.D.Iowa 1995). The Court applies those standards in the following discussion.

A federal court employs a two-step inquiry in determining whether it has jurisdiction over a nonresident party. First, the court must decide whether the facts satisfy the forum state's long-arm statute. If the statute has been satisfied, then the court must address whether the facts show that the nonresident has minimum contacts with the forum state such that the court's exercise of jurisdiction would be fair and in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1991); Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006, 106 S.Ct. 528, 88 L.Ed.2d 460 (1985).

Minnesota's long-arm statute, Minnesota Statutes § 543.19, extends jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause. See Soo Line, 950 F.2d at 528; Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn.1992). The longarm statute, however, provides explicit exceptions to this general proposition for defamation and privacy actions. Minn.Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(d); see Wheeler v. Teufel, 443 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (holding that the court had no personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 543.19, subd. 1(d) over nonresident for defamation claim). In other words, the statute provides an obstacle greater than due process to a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defamation and privacy actions. With respect to the defamation claim pleaded here, the Court must determine whether the Plaintiff's defamation claim satisfies the Minnesota long-arm statute. With respect to all other claims averred in the Complaint, the Court's inquiry is limited to determining whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process. The following discussion first addresses the due process analysis of the nondefamation claims, followed by specific analysis of the defamation claim under the Minnesota long-arm statute.

Under the Due Process Clause, the constitutional touchstone is whether Defendant has established sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota such that the exercise of jurisdiction here does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). In determining minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). There must be "some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75, 105 S.Ct. at 2183 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). The Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Minnesota require consideration of the following five factors in determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in any case comports with due process: (1) the quantity of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the state's interest in providing a forum; and (5) the convenience of the parties. See Soo Line, 950 F.2d at 529; Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir.1965); National City Bank v. Ceresota Mill Ltd. Partnership, 488 N.W.2d 248, 252-53 (Minn.1992). The first three factors are the most important. See National City Bank, 488 N.W.2d at 253.

With respect to the manuscript-writing contract, Pack engaged in numerous contacts with Minnesota, particularly for the purpose of communicating with Paulucci's Minnesota-based agent, James Tills. In certain cases, even "[a] single transaction with the forum state can be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Krambeer v. Eisenberg, 923 F.Supp. 1170, 1174 (D.Minn.1996) (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957)); see Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn.1978). Here, Pack maintained personal contact with Tills in Minnesota via the exchange of numerous telephone calls, mailings and facsimiles for the purpose of entering into and fulfilling his contractual obligations. While it is true that Pack has never been in Minnesota, his physical presence is not required for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, so long as his conduct was "`purposefully directed' toward residents of another State." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citations omitted) (holding that lack of physical presence in the forum is not fatal to jurisdiction). Although...