Payne v. State, A00A0021.
| Decision Date | 30 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. A00A0021.,A00A0021. |
| Parties | PAYNE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Rodney M. Keys, Albany, for appellant.
J. Brown Moseley, District Attorney, Victoria Spear-Darrisaw, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
After Andre Payne was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, he was sentenced to a $200,000 fine and 25 years to serve, 15 years in the penitentiary and the remainder on probation. Contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the cocaine that he alleges was seized in an illegal search, Payne appeals.
Payne contends the trial court erred by finding that he had consented to the search of his car because his consent was not voluntary, but was coerced. Payne maintains that he refused to consent to the search on three or four occasions and further contends that the deputy lacked articulable suspicion sufficient to warrant Payne's detention or arrest. For the reasons stated below, we must reverse Payne's conviction.
1. In Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 440 S.E.2d 646 (1994), our Supreme Court reiterated an appellate court's responsibilities when reviewing a motion to suppress.
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's order concerning a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court should be guided by three principles with regard to the interpretation of the trial court's judgment of the facts. First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge "hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support it." State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535, 536, 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974). Second, the trial court's decision with regard to the "questions of fact and credibility ... must be accepted unless clearly erroneous." Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 844, 213 S.E.2d 689 (1975). (Emphasis supplied.) Third the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 47, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974).
Id. at 54(1), 440 S.E.2d 646. In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, an appellate court's responsibility is to ensure that there was a substantial basis for the decision. Morgan v. State, 195 Ga.App. 732, 735(3), 394 S.E.2d 639 (1990). As the evidence at the suppression hearing was undisputed and no question existed about the witness' credibility, we will conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the uncontested facts. Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 259(1), 497 S.E.2d 790 (1998).
2. The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including those that involve only a brief detention of the person short of a traditional arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Fourth Amendment rights, however, may be waived by voluntarily consenting to search, and a valid consent to search eliminates the need for both probable cause and a search warrant. Walton v. State, 194 Ga.App. 490, 492(2), 390 S.E.2d 896 (1990). When the State relies upon consent, it has the burden of showing that the consent was voluntary, and not the result of express or implied duress or coercion. Lombardo v. State, 187 Ga.App. 440, 441(1), 370 S.E.2d 503 (1988).
3. The officer had probable cause to stop and detain Payne initially because he saw Payne following the vehicle ahead of him too closely. See Verhoeff v. State, 184 Ga. App. 501, 503(2), 362 S.E.2d 85 (1987). At least three kinds of police-citizen encounters are authorized: "verbal encounters involving no coercion or detention; brief `stops' or `seizures' which must be accompanied by a reasonable suspicion; and `arrests' which must be supported by probable cause." Id. This determination, however, does not end our inquiry because the contraband was not discovered through this stop of the vehicle. Instead, the State contends that the contraband was discovered through a legitimate consent search.
4. Viewed most favorably to uphold the trial court's ruling on the motion, the evidence, and in particular a videotape of the incident, shows that Payne was traveling on a highway in Mitchell County about 1:30 in the afternoon when he was stopped by a deputy sheriff for following too closely. Although initially and promptly deciding to give Payne a warning ticket, the deputy then asked Payne whether weapons, contraband, marijuana, and cocaine were in his car. Payne apparently denied having any of these things.
After the deputy asked, "Do you have any objection for me searching your car real quick for any marijuana or cocaine," the following discussion occurred, which we quote at length for context:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nunnally v. the State.
...mouth,” did not constitute a particularized and objective basis for officers to suspect that motorist possessed contraband); Payne v. State, 244 Ga.App. 734, 739–743(4, 5), 536 S.E.2d 791 (2000) (deputy's testimony—that the stopped driver, inter alia, was nervous, had “shaking” hands, dropp......
-
Exum v. Melton
... ... Melton, M.D., Melton's professional corporation, and South Georgia Medical Center in the State Court of Lowndes County. Within two weeks, service of process on Melton was attempted at his office ... ...
-
State v. Allen
...constitute a particularized and objective basis for officers to suspect that motorist possessed contraband); Payne v. State, 244 Ga.App. 734, 739–743(4)(5), 536 S.E.2d 791 (2000) (deputy's testimony—that the stopped driver, inter alia, was nervous, had “shaking” hands, dropped items from hi......
-
Rosas v. State
...bag in the backseat (Berry v. State15); and the defendant was driving a rental car, was traveling from Florida, and had no luggage (Payne v. State16). Factors such as these have been described as "frequent occurrences in our highly mobile society[,]"17 and, for the most part, mirror those p......