Rosas v. State
| Decision Date | 23 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A05A1367.,A05A1367. |
| Parties | ROSAS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Allen M. Trapp, Carrollton, Jr., for Appellant.
Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Jeffery W. Hunt, Raymond C. Mayer, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
Julio Rosas was traveling in an automobile driven by Juan Garcia Vazquez when they were stopped for a traffic violation by a Carroll County deputy sheriff. The deputy asked Rosas and Vazquez a few questions, obtained their driver's licenses, went back to his patrol car and ran a radio check, returned to their car, asked them to step out of it, and obtained consent to search the vehicle. Approximately 11 pounds of methamphetamine having a street value of about $1 million was found during the search. Rosas contends that the consent to search was the product of an illegal detention because it was obtained after the traffic stop had been transformed into an investigation for contraband unsupported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. The trial court disagreed with this contention and denied Rosas's motion to suppress. We affirm.
Where, as here, the evidence relating to a motion to suppress is uncontroverted and no question regarding witness credibility is presented, an appellate court conducts a de novo review of the trial court's application of law to the undisputed facts.1
Evidence introduced at the motion to suppress (and trial) showed the following: On January 4, 2003, Rosas and Vazquez were traveling eastbound on Interstate 20 in a late-model two-door Honda when they were stopped by Carroll County Deputy Sheriff Chad Sheriff after he had observed the Honda following the vehicle in front of it too closely. During the search of the Honda, a large quantity of methamphetamine was found. Rosas and Vazquez were charged with trafficking in pure methamphetamine. During their joint trial, the charge was reduced to simple possession of the drug because the state's chemical analysis of the drug showed that it was a mixture. Both Rosas and Vazquez were convicted.
The traffic stop was recorded on videotape. It shows that Sheriff stopped the Honda at about 8:19 a.m. He exited his patrol car, approached the passenger side of the Honda, explained the reason for the stop, asked Rosas and Vazquez if they were tired, and suggested that they allow more space between the Honda and the next vehicle on the road. Sheriff then asked for driver's licenses and proof of insurance. He also inquired into the ownership of the car, whether Rosas and Vazquez were friends, and how long they had been driving. At about 8:21, Sheriff returned to his patrol car and ran the radio check. At 8:27, while still in his patrol car, he announced his intent to search the vehicle. At 8:29, he returned to the Honda, and asked Rosas and Vazquez to step out of the car.
While still in possession of their driver's licenses, Sheriff began questioning them about an airplane flight from Mexico City to Atlanta. At 8:31, Carroll County Sheriff's Department Sergeant Cliff Meyer appeared on the scene. Sheriff thereupon asked for and obtained permission to search the car. At 8:32, the search began.
Testimony provided by Sheriff further explained the circumstances surrounding the stop and search. According to Sheriff, the Honda slowed down and began following the vehicle in front of it at a safe distance as soon as the driver of the Honda noticed Sheriff. Before effecting the stop, Sheriff followed the Honda for about one and one-half to two miles. The car had a California license plate. He did not observe any other traffic violations. After stopping the Honda, Sheriff ascertained that Vazquez was operating the car and that Rosas was seated in the front passenger seat. Vazquez produced a State of Washington driver's license and an insurance card showing that the Honda belonged to an absent third party. Rosas produced a California driver's license. Rosas and Vazquez informed Sheriff that before arriving in Georgia, they had been sleeping in a rest area at the Georgia-Alabama state line. Sheriff also observed a blanket and pillow on the back seat and fast food wrappers on the floorboard, indicating to Sheriff that Rosas and Vazquez "intended to stay on the road, taking turns driving." Sheriff additionally observed that the armrest in the back seat of the relatively new car on the driver's side appeared to have been removed and reattached improperly. In addition, Sheriff testified that Rosas and Vazquez would not maintain eye contact with him, and that they both appeared unusually nervous.
Sheriff then returned to his patrol car to run a radio check on both Rosas and Vazquez Rosas through a federal database known as the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) in El Paso, Texas. Sheriff testified that he ran this check through EPIC because it enabled him to obtain information on offenses such as drug smuggling and car theft, and he suspected "that there was a crime happening beyond a traffic stop." Therefore, Sheriff opted not to run a license check on Rosas and Vazquez through the local dispatcher. Sheriff acknowledged that one of the things that aroused his suspicions was the fact that the individuals he had stopped were Hispanic. By contacting EPIC, Sheriff discovered that there were no outstanding warrants on either Rosas or Vazquez and that, during the past year, Vazquez had flown round trip from Atlanta to Mexico City once. That heightened Sheriff's suspicions. After getting out of the car, Vazquez consented to the search. In conducting the search, Sheriff found the methamphetamine in packages in the fender wells of the car underneath the rear-seat armrests.
Sergeant Meyer testified that one of the modern trends in drug trafficking is the use of two-door vehicles with large rear-quarter panels that create spacious hidden compartments overlaid by removable molding, so that drugs can be transported in the cars' interiors. The Honda was such a vehicle.
Based on Sheriff's testimony, and taking notice of certain trends in drug trafficking cases based on its knowledge of facts in cases in its jurisdiction, the court identified essentially five indicators that Sheriff had observed which, in the court's opinion, provided reasonable suspicion: (1) the Honda belonged to a third party, and drug traffickers often drive vehicles that belong to others; (2) the Honda bore a California license plate, and California is a source state for drug smuggling; (3) drug traffickers often drive continuously on the road making only minimal stops for food and rest; (4) the armrest on the relatively new car had been tampered with; and (5) Rosas and Vazquez were unusually nervous.
Three sequential questions present themselves: (a) Was the deputy justified in stopping Rosas and Vazquez?2 (b) If so, did the facts observed by the officer during the stop give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity other than the traffic violation? (c) If not, was the consent to search the product of an illegal detention?
(a) The deputy was justified in stopping Rosas and Vazquez.
The legality of the stop itself is measured by "an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time[.]"3 The validity of the stop, thus, depends "on what the driver was doing and what that reasonably conveyed to the officer, not on what else the officer thought might be occurring."4 Unquestionably, therefore, Sheriff was authorized to stop and detain Rosas and Vazquez initially because he saw the Honda following the vehicle ahead of it too closely.5
(b) We conclude that the facts observed by Sheriff during the stop gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity other than the traffic violation and, therefore, authorized him to detain and question Rosas and Vazquez for reasons unrelated to the stop.
An officer who questions and detains a suspect for reasons other than those connected with the original purpose of the stop exceeds the scope of permissible investigation unless he has reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. This reasonable suspicion must be based on more than a subjective, general suspicion or hunch. The detention must be justified by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the detention. . . .6
7 8 Whether a given set of facts rises to the level of reasonable suspicion is a legal question.9
We have consistently held that "nervousness alone" is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate illicit drug activity.10 Nor have we found reasonable suspicion in cases in which, in addition to nervousness: a car was being operated along an interstate highway commonly used for transportation of drugs (Montero v. State11); the driver and passenger were operating a car that had been rented to an absent third party (Simmons v. State12); none of the occupants of the car produced any proof of ownership, and the back seat passenger was clutching a black bag (State v. Blair13); various statements given by the occupants of the car contained no meaningful inconsistencies (Migliore v. State14); the defendant was driving a rental car, he had made a long trip into Georgia from another state only to stay a few hours, and there was a plastic garbage bag in the backseat (Berry v. State15); and the defendant was driving a rental car, was traveling from Florida, and had no luggage (Payne v. State1...
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