Pelletier v. Pathiraja

• Decision Date: 23 December 1986
• Citation: 519 A.2d 187
• Parties: Jean PELLETIER et ux. v. Tilac PATHIRAJA. Archer BUCKLIN et ux. v. Tilac PATHIRAJA.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 187

519 A.2d 187

Jean PELLETIER et ux. v. Tilac PATHIRAJA.

Archer BUCKLIN et ux. v. Tilac PATHIRAJA.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 2, 1986.

Decided Dec. 23, 1986.

John D. Pelletier (orally), Augusta, Peter S. Kelley, Caribou, for plaintiffs.

Gross, Minsky, Mogul & Singal, George Schelling (orally), Bangor, Christopher Nyhan, Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, SCOLNIK and CLIFFORD, JJ.

NICHOLS, Justice.

In a consolidated appeal the Plaintiffs, Jean Pelletier and Leas J. Pelletier, in one case, and the Plaintiffs, Archer Bucklin and Lena Bucklin, in another case, appeal judgments of the Superior Court (Aroostook County) dismissing their respective complaints of medical malpractice against the Defendant, Tilac Pathiraja, M.D. In each case the dismissal was rendered pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 16 and 37(b)(2)(C), for their failure to comply with an order to produce certain documents necessary for discovery procedures of the Defendant.

The Plaintiffs argue on appeal (1) that it would be unfair and a denial of due process to deny them their right to a trial on the merits, and (2) that a good faith compliance by the Plaintiffs with the requests should foreclose the sanction of dismissal.

We affirm the judgments of dismissal below.

Although these cases were pursued separately at trial, the Plaintiffs were represented by the same counsel, and their cases were consolidated for appeal. The Plaintiffs in both actions allege malpractice on the Defendant's part in November, 1983. The gravamen of both complaints was the alleged negligent diagnosis or performance of surgical procedures by the Defendant that caused pain and suffering to his patients and necessitated the need for further treatment. The spouse of each injured party also presses a derivative claim.

With his answer to the Plaintiffs' complaints, the Defendant filed requests for production of documents as well as requests that the Plaintiffs answer his interrogatories. The Defendant interrogated as to treatment given the respective Plaintiffs by subsequent physicians, and requested copies of certain medical records, office notes, operative notes and correspondence with all subsequent treating physicians.

On May 4, 1984, the Defendant filed a motion to compel answers to Defendant's interrogatories concerning both claims, pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 37. Pursuant to an order of the Superior Court, the Plaintiffs belatedly complied.

In March, 1985, the Defendant again requested the production of certain documents from the Plaintiffs. Again the Defendant successfully moved to compel production of the documents. Production was ordered within 30 days. When the demanded documents were not received by that due date, the Defendant moved to compel production, extend the discovery schedule, and in the alternative, to dismiss the claims. The Superior Court thereupon extended the discovery schedule three months to September 20, 1985, subject to dismissal for non-compliance by the Plaintiffs.

Even by the new deadline the requested data was not produced by the respective Plaintiffs. On September 25, 1985, the Defendant again moved to dismiss. The Plaintiffs responded with a motion for relief from the order compelling production of the desired documents. Hearings were held on November 7 and 8, 1985, after which the Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss.

Initially, the Plaintiffs contend the dismissal of their claim violated their right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ¹ This contention warrants little discussion. To be successful in their claim the Plaintiffs must prove that there was some judicial process to which they were entitled but were denied. However, there is no particular form of procedure required to be followed, inasmuch as due process of law is a flexible concept. Ethyl Corporation v. Adams, 375 A.2d 1065, 1072 (Me.1977). Furthermore, a state may establish reasonable procedural requirements incident to a right to an adjudication. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). Cf. Giberson v. Quinn, 445 A.2d 1007 (Me.1982). All that is constitutionally mandated is that a plaintiff be afforded a meaningful opportunity to assert his claim. Logan, 455 U.S. at 434. Cf. Peaslee v. Pedco, Inc., 414 A.2d 1206 (Me.1980). A plaintiff need not be accorded a full-blown judicial proceeding to have been afforded this right. Portland Pipe Line Corporation v. Environmental Improvement Commission et al., 307 A.2d 1 (Me.1973).

The rules and procedure applied by the Superior Court in these cases provided the Plaintiffs with all the process that was their due. The Plaintiffs' failure to make effective use of our system did not deprive them of due process of law. Indeed, to allow the judicial process to drag on indefinitely in these cases could have deprived the Defendant of the fairness and the process he was due.

The Plaintiffs' second contention is that the Superior Court abused its discretion in dismissing their complaints pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 37(b). ² Integral to their argument is the assertion that willfulness, bad faith, or fault must be found to justify a trial court's decision to dismiss an action. However, this is not the law in Maine.

M.R.Civ.P. 37(a) enables the litigant to secure an order to compel discovery. Rule 37(b) provides sanctions for a failure to comply with such orders. ³ Rule 37 is a flexible tool for the trial courts and its only literal limitation is that the exercise of discretion must be "just." ⁴ In Reeves v. Travelers Insurance Companies et al., 421 A.2d 47, 50 (Me.1980), we declared, "[I]n exercising its discretion under Rule 16(d) or 37(b)(2), the trial court must answer three questions: (1) whether to impose a sanction; (2) upon whom--party or counsel, or both--to impose the sanction; and (3) what sanction to impose." Id. at 50. As the Court noted, the answers will depend upon the particular circumstances and is dependent upon the functions to be served by the sanction. The functions to be served may be several; to penalize non-compliance, remedy the effects of non-compliance, and to serve as a deterrent. Furthermore, appellate review of the sanctions chosen under either rule applies an "abuse of discretion" standard; accordingly, we shall not lightly overrule the trial court's choice of sanctions. Id. See also Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 594, 595 (Me.1983); Lerman v. Inhabitants of City of Portland, 406 A.2d 903, 904 (Me.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 2156, 64 L.Ed.2d 790 (1980). Nevertheless, due to the severity of a dismissal or default, and the constitutional implications of such an action, we have observed that the trial court's discretion in imposing either ultimate sanction is narrow indeed and will be given close scrutiny on appeal. Fallon v. Casco-Northern Corporation, 462 A.2d 53, 56 (Me.1983); Ireland v. Galen, 401 A.2d 1002, 1004 (Me.1979).

The case before us involves an outright dismissal of a claim, which is certainly a drastic sanction, but one which has been employed before with our approval. Contrary to the Plaintiffs'...