Penley v. Honda Motor Company

• Decision Date: 11 August 1999
• Docket Number: 98-00131
• Parties: GAYLE PENLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, Vs. HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., HONDA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., JOE'S CYCLE SHOP, INC., d/b/a JOE'S CYCLE AND MARINE, Defendants-Appellees. C.A.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Filed
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

GAYLE PENLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vs.

HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., HONDA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., JOE'S CYCLE SHOP, INC., d/b/a JOE'S CYCLE AND MARINE, Defendants-Appellees

C.A. No. 02A01-9805-CV-00131

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

Filed August 11, 1999

FROM THE CHESTER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

Chester Circuit No. 4196

THE HONORABLE WHIT LAFON, JUDGE

This is a product liability action. Plaintiff/Appellant, Gayle Penley (Penley), appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees, Honda Motor Company, Ltd., Honda R&D Co., Ltd., American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and Joe's Cycle Shop, Inc. d/b/a Joe's Cycle and Marine (collectively hereinafter "Honda").

Kenneth W. Hooks, Keith Belt, Pittman, Hooks, Dutton & Hollis of Birmingham, Alabama

William H. Haltom, Jr., of Memphis, For Appellant

R. Dale Bay, Susan R. High-McAuley, John R. Tarpley, Lewis, King, Krieg, Waldrop & Catron, P.C., of Nashville, For Appellees

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Charles S. Harrell, Assistant Attorney General, For State of Tennessee

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

Opinion filed:

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR:

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE, DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE

On June 8, 1996, Penley was injured while riding an all terrain vehicle (ATV) owned by William and Ann Morris (Morris). The ATV in question was originally purchased by Mt. Moriah Sports and Trucks on May 23, 1987 from Joe's Cycle Shop. On June 6, 1997, Penley filed suit against Honda and the Morrises(FN1) alleging strict liability, negligence, failure to warn, and breach of express warranties and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. On July 21, 1998, Honda filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Penley failed to bring her action within the 10 year statute of repose set by the Tennessee Products Liability Act (TPLA), T.C.A. 29-28-103.

On March 16, 1998, pursuant to leave of court, Penley filed an amended complaint alleging that she was disabled and of unsound mind for twenty (20) days following the accident, and that such disability tolled the statute of repose. Along with the amended complaint, Penley also filed an affidavit from her treating physician which stated that she was "incapable of working, tending to personal business, or taking care of herself" and was "mentally and physically disabled." After a hearing, the trial court granted Honda's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the action is time barred by the statute of repose set out in T.C.A. 29-28-103 (Supp. 1998).

Penley appeals and presents the issue for review of whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Honda presents an additional issue of whether the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id.

Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court. Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).

In this case, it is undisputed that the Honda vehicle involved in Penley's injury was first purchased for use on May 23, 1987, that Penley's injury occurred on June 8, 1996, and this suit was filed June 6, 1997. The action against Honda is controlled by the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 as codified in T.C.A. 29-28-101 - 29-28-108 (1980 and Supp. 1998).See T.C.A. 29-28-102(5) (6). Time limitations for filing such actions are provided for in T.C.A. 29-28-103(a):

29_28_103. Limitation of actions - Exception. - (a) Any action against a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or property caused by its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition must be brought within the period fixed by 28_3_104, 28_3_105, 28_3_202 and 47_2_725, but notwithstanding any exceptions to these provisions it must be brought within six (6) years of the date of injury, in any event, the action must be brought within ten (10) years from the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption, or within one (1) year after the expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the shorter, except in the case of injury to minors whose action must be brought within a period of one (1) year after attaining the age of majority, whichever occurs sooner.

Penley asserts that the ten-year limitations period set out in T.C.A. 29-28-103(a) is extended by virtue of her twenty day incapacity dating from the time of injury pursuant to T.C.A. 28-1-106 (1980) which provides:

28_1_106. Persons under disability on accrual of right. - If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either within the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or his representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceed three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability.

Although there may be a factual dispute as to whether Penley was, in fact, incapacitated under the provisions of T.C.A. 28-1-106, we are required to take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and thus assume for the purposes of summary judgment that Penley was so incapacitated. See Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997).

Penley argues that these two statutes read together tolled the statute of repose and allowed her an extra twenty days, until June 12, 1997, to file suit. Honda counters that the TPLA means exactly what it says, that actions brought after ten years from purchase are absolutely barred.

This appears to be an issue of first impression in this state. The ten-year period provided for in T.C.A. 29-28-103(a) is a statute of repose. Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co., 924 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. App. 1995). In Wyatt, the Court discussed the operation and effect of a statute of repose:

Courts in Tennessee have consistently pointed out the distinction between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. The former has been described as affecting only a party's remedy for a cause of action, while the running of a statute of repose has been said to "nullif[y] both the remedy and the right." Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tenn. App. 1993); Via v. General Elec. Co., 799 F. Supp. 837, 839 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). Generally speaking, the critical distinction in classifying a statute as one of repose or one of limitations is the event or occurrence designated as the "triggering event," i.e., the event that starts the "clock" running on the time allowed for the filing of suit. In a traditional statute of limitations, the triggering event is typically the accrual of the action, i.e., when all the elements of the action, including injury or damages, have coalesced, resulting in a legally cognizable claim. A statute of repose, on the other hand, typically describes the triggering event as something other than accrual, prompting courts to note that such statutes are "entirely unrelated to the accrual of any action . . ." Watts v. Putnam Co., 525 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tenn. 1975); Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1995).

Because a statute of repose sets the triggering event as something other than accrual, it can have the effect of barring a plaintiff's claim before it accrues, most typically before the plaintiff becomes aware of his or her injury. See Cronin, 906 S.W.2d at 913; Bruce, 894 S.W.2d at 276 ("A statute of repose is a substantive provision because it expressly qualifies the right which the statute creates by barring a right of action even before the injury has occurred if the injury occurs subsequent to the prescribed time period."). This possibility has prompted courts to hold that statutes of repose affect the substantive right of a party to bring suit, as well as the remedy. Id.

Wyatt, 924 S.W.2d at 102.

The legislature enacted the TPLA's statute of repose after determining that the rising number of products liability actions had dramatically increased the price of liability insurance for companies. The statute of repose was enacted with the following purpose:

[T]o provide a reasonable time within which action may be commenced against manufactures, and/or sellers while limiting the time to a specific period of time for which product liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims. . . .

1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 468-69.

Penley first asserts that her disability existed at the time her cause of action accrued, see Foster v. Albright, 631 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tenn. App. 1982) (plaintiff disabled simultaneously with injury is considered to lack capacity at the time the cause of action accrued), and that the clear language of T.C.A. 28-1-106 tolls the ten-year statute. She argues that the disability statute "represents a long-standing policy to protect...