People ex rel. Adams Elec. Co-op. v. Village of Camp Point

• Citation: 221 Ill.Dec. 641,286 Ill.App.3d 247,675 N.E.2d 1371
• Decision Date: 17 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 4-96-0548,4-96-0548
• Parties: , 221 Ill.Dec. 641 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. ADAMS ELECTRICAL COOPERATIVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Nancy Law Anderson, Plaintiff, v. The VILLAGE OF CAMP POINT, a Municipal Corporation, George E. Schrage III, County Clerk of Adams County, Illinois, and Howard Wear, Jr., County Treasurer and Collector of Adams County, Illinois, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1371

675 N.E.2d 1371

286 Ill.App.3d 247, 221 Ill.Dec. 641

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. ADAMS ELECTRICAL COOPERATIVE, Plaintiff-Appellant and Nancy Law Anderson, Plaintiff, v. The VILLAGE OF CAMP POINT, a Municipal Corporation, George E. Schrage III, County Clerk of Adams County, Illinois, and Howard Wear, Jr., County Treasurer and Collector of Adams County, Illinois, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 4-96-0548.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Jan. 17, 1997.

Karen L. Kendall, Timothy L. Bertschy, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Craig L. Unrath (argued), Cheryl G. Bluth, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, for Adams Electrical Cooperative.

Thomas J. Ortbal (argued), Hutmacher, Rapp & Ortbal, P.C., Quincy, for Village of Camp Point.

Justice McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Adams Electrical Cooperative (Co-op) appeals from a summary judgment entered in the circuit court of Adams County in favor of defendants Village of Camp Point (Village); George E. Schrage III, county clerk of Adams County; and Howard Wear, Jr., county treasurer and collector of Adams County. Co-op sought a declaratory judgment that the real estate that was the subject of this litigation was not now and had never been located within the territorial limits of the Village and (2) in a quo warranto action, asserted that the Village was exercising power and authority by assessing ad valorem real estate property taxes over the subject property without a legally sufficient annexation ordinance.

The issues are whether (1) any genuine issue of material fact remains in this case concerning the real estate property taxing authority such that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the Village; and (2) even if no genuine issue of material fact remained, should summary judgment have been granted in favor of taxpayer Co-op instead of the Village. We affirm.

On April 14, 1993, Co-op and Nancy Law Anderson filed (1) an application for leave of court to file proceeding in quo warranto instanter, and (2) a complaint for declaratory judgment and other relief. On April 23, 1993, the trial court granted the application for leave to file a complaint in quo warranto instanter. Pursuant to the stipulation and agreement of the parties, the petition was voluntarily dismissed as to Anderson on July 25, 1994.

The complaint alleged that on March 11, 1992, the Co-op was notified by the Village that the following described property, owned by Co-op, (1) was within the Village's territorial limits, (2) had not been assessed for real estate taxes under the Village's levy, and (3) records were being corrected to reflect the inclusion of the property within the Village's territorial boundaries:

"All that part of the Southeast Quarter of Section Twenty-six (26), bounded and described as follows, to wit: Beginning at a stone at the Southeast corner of said Quarter Section, running thence North to a stone at the Northeast corner of said Quarter Section, thence West twenty-two hundred seventy-four and five tenths (2274.5) feet, more or less, thence South two hundred ninety-five (295) feet, more or less, to the right-of-way of the Wabash Railway Company, thence Southeasterly along said right-of-way two hundred twenty-nine and six tenths (229.6) feet, more or less, thence South to the South line of said Section, and thence East Twenty hundred eighty-one (2081) feet, more or less, to the place of beginning, except that part now occupied as a State Highway Route 31 and Federal 24, all in Township One (1) North of the Base Line, and in Range Six (6) West of the Fourth Principal Meridian, situated in the County of Adams, in the State of Illinois."

The Co-op challenged the Village's authority to so act.

After the Village filed an answer to the complaint in this case, the Co-op filed a motion for summary judgment. In its response to the motion for summary judgment, the Village requested the entry of summary judgment in its favor. The supporting documents for these pleadings will be discussed as necessary later in this disposition.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Village. In its order, the trial court found there was no genuine issue of material fact, and any factual issues that did exist were unimportant to the disposition of this case. The trial court found, as a matter of law, the Village's ordinance No. 1 included the subject real estate.

"Merely because the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment alleging that no genuine issue of material fact existed does not obligate the trial court to grant summary judgment. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Washburn (1989), 183 Ill.App.3d 978, 981 , 539 N.E.2d 1278, 1280, rev'd on other grounds (1990), 137 Ill.2d 312 , 561 N.E.2d 29.

'The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact (Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill.2d 229, 240 [95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867] ), and summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c)). Although summary judgment is an expeditious method of disposing of a lawsuit, it should only be allowed when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. (Purtill, 111 Ill.2d at 240 [95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867].)' (Colvin v. Hobart Brothers (1993), 156 Ill.2d 166, 169-70 [189 Ill.Dec. 407, 620 N.E.2d 375].)

On appeal, the reviewing court's role is to consider anew the facts and law relating to the case and determine whether the trial court was correct in finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed, and if none exists, whether the judgment was correctly entered as a matter of law. University of Illinois v. Continental Casualty Co. (1992), 234 Ill.App.3d 340, 343, 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1341." Kellner v. Bartman, 250 Ill.App.3d 1030, 1033, 189 Ill.Dec. 639, 641, 620 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1993).

Where the record presents a question of law only, summary judgment is an appropriate remedy. Marshall v. City of Centralia, 143 Ill.2d 1, 6, 155 Ill.Dec. 802, 804, 570 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1991); Westwood Forum, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 261 Ill.App.3d 911, 916, 199 Ill.Dec. 800, 804, 634 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (1994).

In its complaint, Co-op admitted the Village is a municipality organized under "An Act to incorporate the town of Camp Point, Adams [C]ounty" (1857 Act) (1857 Ill.Laws 539). Co-op also admitted that on February 13, 1857, the Village's board of trustees adopted ordinance No. 1, entitled "An Ordinance Defining the Limits of the Village of Camp Point, Providing for Elections and Organization of the Board of Trustees." This dispute arises because of the alleged absence of any official records of ordinance No. 1. This entire case centers on which documentary evidence submitted by the parties is the best evidence of the original contents of ordinance No. 1. That is a question of law. Even if a question of fact might arguably exist because the trier of fact might accord different weight to the documentary evidence, the parties have not suggested any other evidence would be presented at trial. This case presents a question of law since these exhibits are all the facts that will be presented at trial and only one inference can be reasonably drawn from them. Jacobson v. General Finance Corp., 227 Ill.App.3d 1089, 1093, 170 Ill.Dec. 441, 444, 592 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (1992).

Section 2 of the 1857 Act incorporating the Village stated:

"The boundaries of said corporation shall be those established by the first ordinances passed by the present board of trustees of said town. Said ordinances, together with all other ordinances passed by said board, are hereby legalized, and may be read in evidence in all courts of law or equity in this state without proof." 1857 Ill.Laws 539.

According to Co-op, the only existing evidence of the Village's boundaries between 1857 and 1874 was an 1872 map (Co-op exhibit No. 7) showing the original town and various additions, none of which included the subject property. A footnote in Co-op's memorandum in support of summary judgment indicated the map was included in the 1872 plat book of Adams County on file in the Illinois State Library. The map was drawn by W.P. Campbell. Co-op exhibit No. 23 was a photocopy of a plat map of the Village by S. Farlow in 1901, which does not include the subject property within the Village.

Also included in the record are two affidavits from Anne Craig, coordinator of public services at the Illinois State Library in Springfield, Illinois, indicating that maps in the possession of Co-op's attorney were produced from (1) the Atlas Map of Adams County, Illinois, Compiled, Drawn and Published from Personal Examinations and Surveys by Andreas, Lyter & Company, Davenport, Iowa, Andreas, Lyter & Company, 1872 (Call No.: FOLI0912.773 ADAM2); and (2) Standard Atlas of Adams County, Illinois: Including a Plat Book of the Villages, Cities and Townships of the County * * * Patrons Directory, Reference Business Directory * * * Chicago: G.A. Ogle, 1901 (Call No.: FOLI0912.773 ADAM3). It is Co-op's position that these maps show the subject land as belonging to "E. Garrett" and outside the municipal limits.

"An Act to provide for annexing and excluding territory to and from cities, towns and villages, and to unite cities, towns and villages" (Annexation Act) was enacted effective July 1, 1872. 1871 Ill.Laws 264. On February 7, 1874, a referendum was passed to organize the Village under the general municipal laws of the State of Illinois for the organization of cities and villages. Section 2 of the Village's revised ordinances (passed May 4, 1874) provided that all ordinances passed by the board of the Village shall be in pursuance of and consistent with ...