People ex rel. C.F.
| Decision Date | 26 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11CA0928.,11CA0928. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellant, In the Interest of C.F., a Child, Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel H. May, District Attorney, Deborah F. Pearson, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Petitioner–Appellant.
No Appearance for Respondent–Appellee.
Opinion by Judge J. JONES.
¶ 1 The People appeal the district court's rulings that the prosecution had not proved that C. F., a juvenile, had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offenses of: (1) falsely reporting an explosive, weapon, or harmful substance, see§ 18–8–110, C.R.S.2011; and (2) interfering with the staff, faculty, or students of an educational institution, see§ 18–9–109(2), C.R.S.2011. Because the district court's rulings were premised on legal interpretations of the language in the statutes under which C.F. was charged, and the People challenge those interpretations, we have jurisdiction under section 16–12–102(1), C.R.S.2011.1 We approve the district court's rulings.
¶ 2 Over a three-day period, C.F. telephoned an elementary school (once) and combined middle school and high school (twice), leaving messages recorded by the schools' voice mail systems:
• On Wednesday, November 24, 2010, at about 7:34 p.m., C.F. called Cresson Elementary School in Cripple Creek, Colorado, saying:
• Later on November 24, 2010, C.F. called Cripple Creek/Victor High School, saying:
• On Saturday, November 27, 2010, C.F. again called Cripple Creek/Victor High School, saying: He then provided an address in Victor, said, “This is [C.W.] calling,” mentioned other members of the W. family, and recited the W.s' telephone number.
¶ 3 Because C.F. left the messages during the Thanksgiving holiday break, when no one was at the schools, school administrators did not hear them until Monday, November 29. They contacted police. After deciding that the threats were credible, administrators evacuated the schools. Police officers searched the schools for explosives, but found none.
¶ 4 Following an investigation, local police determined that C.F. had made the phone calls. The People initiated a delinquency proceeding against C.F., alleging violations of the statutes identified above.2
¶ 5 The first three charges alleged violations of section 18–8–110, which provides:
Any person who reports to any other person that a bomb or other explosive, any chemical or biological agent, any poison or weapon, or any harmful radioactive substance has been placed in any public or private place or vehicle designed for the transportation of persons or property, knowing that the report is false, commits a class 6 felony.
¶ 6 Two other charges alleged violations of subsection (2) of section 18–9–109. Because the entire text of section 18–9–109 is relevant to our interpretation of subsection (2), we recite all of that section.
(1) No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution, willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees:
(a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises;
(b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution;
(c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities.
(2) No person shall, on the premises of any educational institution or at or in any building or other facility being used by any educational institution, willfully impede the staff or faculty of such institution in the lawful performance of their duties or willfullyimpede a student of the institution in the lawful pursuit of his educational activities through the use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation or when force and violence are present or threatened.
(3) No person shall willfully refuse or fail to leave the property of or any building or other facility used by any educational institution upon being requested to do so by the chief administrative officer, his designee charged with maintaining order on the school premises and in its facilities, or a dean of such educational institution, if such person is committing, threatens to commit, or incites others to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution.
(4) It shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant was exercising his right to lawful assembly and peaceful and orderly petition for the redress of grievances, including any labor dispute between an educational institution and its employees, any contractor or subcontractor, or any employee thereof.
(5) Any person who violates any of the provisions of this section, except subsection (6) of this section, commits a class 3 misdemeanor.
(6) (a) A person shall not knowingly make or convey to another person a credible threat to cause death or to cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon against:
(I) A person the actor knows or believes to be a student, school official, or employee of an educational institution; or
(II) An invitee who is on the premises of an educational institution.
(b) For purposes of this subsection (6), “credible threat” means a threat or physical action that would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of bodily injury with a deadly weapon or death.
(c) A person who violates this subsection (6) commits a class 1 misdemeanor.
¶ 7 At trial, C.F. essentially conceded that he had made the calls and did not dispute the substance of what he had said. He argued, however, that, as to the charges based on section 18–8–110, the prosecution was required to prove that he had reported that a bomb had “been placed” at the schools, and he had not said that in any of the calls. As to the charges based on section 18–9–109(2), C.F. argued that the prosecution was required to prove he was “on the premises of” the schools when he acted, and that there was no evidence that he was on school premises when he made the calls.
¶ 8 The prosecution disagreed with C.F.'s arguments, for reasons we discuss below. The court, however, agreed with C.F.'s interpretations of the statutes. The court, acting as the fact finder, then found that (1) the prosecution had failed to prove an element of the charges under section 18–8–110 because there was “no evidence and I don't believe it is a reasonable inference” that C.F. had reported that a bomb had been placed at the schools; and (2) the prosecution had failed to prove violations of section 18–9–109(2) because there was no evidence that C.F. was at the schools when he interfered with school operations. Accordingly, the district court acquitted C.F. of all charges.
¶ 9 The People's challenges to the district court's rulings present questions of statutory interpretation. We review such questions de novo. People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Colo.2011); People in Interest of C.A.J., 148 P.3d at 437 ( section 18–9–109(2)).
¶ 10 Our primary tasks in interpreting a statute are to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent. People v. Laeke, 2012 CO 13, ¶ 11, 271 P.3d 1111;Smith, 254 P.3d at 1161. To do this, we look first to the language of the statute, giving the words and phrases therein their plain and ordinary meanings. Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo.2010). But we must view the language in context: therefore, “[w]e must read the statute as a whole, construing each provision consistently and in harmony with the overall statutory design, if possible.” Whitaker v. People, 48 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo.2002); accord Smith, 254 P.3d at 1161. If, after doing this, we determine that the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written, without resorting to other rules of statutory construction. Smith, 230 P.3d at 1189;American Numismatic Ass'n v. Cipoletti, 254 P.3d 1169, 1171 (Colo.App.2011). If, however, we determine that the relevant language is ambiguous in some material respect, we may look to extrinsic evidence of legislative intent, including prior law, legislative history, the consequences of a particular construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County Conservancy Dist., 88 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Colo.2004); L & R Exploration Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 533 (Colo.App.2011); see§ 2–4–203, C.R.S.2011.
¶ 11 In challenging the district court's ruling with respect to section 18–8–110, the People assert that “the statute does not require that the [defendant] said that the bomb had been placed.” If, by this, the People mean that the statute does not require proof that the defendant reported that a bomb (or other prohibited item or substance) has been placed, we disagree. The statute requires that the People prove that the defendant reported that the bomb (or other prohibited item or substance) “has been placed in any public or private place or vehicle designed for the transportation of persons or property....” 3 As a grammatical matter, therefore, the report must indicate that the bomb (or other prohibited item or substance) is, at the time of the report, in the public or private place or vehicle.4 Thus, contrary to the People's assertion, not every bomb threat comes within the ambit of section 18–8–110. In effect, the People ask us to ignore...
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