People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court of Twentieth Judicial Dist., 25570

Decision Date06 November 1972
Docket NumberNo. 25570,25570
Citation180 Colo. 107,502 P.2d 420
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado ex rel. Duke W. DUNBAR, Attorney General, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF the TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT and the Honorable Howard O. Ashton, a Judge thereof, Respondents.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Aurel M. Kelly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioners.

Rollie R. Rogers, Colo. State Public Defender, J. D. MacFarlane, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, T. Michael Dutton, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for respondents.

KELLEY, Justice.

The People of the State of Colorado on the relation of the Attorney General petitioned this court to issue an order, pursuant to C.A.R. 21, directing the District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District and the Honorable Howard O. Ashton, a judge thereof, respondents, to show cause why a motion based on Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 35(a), filed in respondent court by Vernon Sides in Criminal Action No. 3315, should not be summarily dismissed without a hearing.

We issued the rule because of the question of jurisdiction in the respondent court. Also, we are advised, there are at least eight other cases in which felons under sentence of life imprisonment have been granted credit for jail time after executive commutation of their sentences. Consequently, we deem the matter to be of great public concern. We now make the rule absolute.

Between December 2, 1958, and October 23, 1959, Vernon Sides was charged, tried and convicted by a jury and sentenced to imprisonment 'for the balance of his natural life' for murder in the first degree, all in conformance with C.R.S.1963, 40--2--3(1).

On March 13, 1972, the Governor of the State of Colorado commuted Sides' sentence to a minimum of thirty years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

On April 24, 1972, Sides, pro se, filed a motion to amend his life sentence in Criminal Action No. 3315, alleging the sentence was illegal and asking that the respondent court grant him credit for eleven months and five days which he spent in the county jail between his arrest and the imposition of sentence. Sides' petition is based on our decision in People v. Jones, Colo., 489 P.2d 596 (1971). The Public Defender represents the respondents here as attorney for Sides.

In his motion Sides stated:

'2. That when he commuted defendant's sentence, the Governor did not know nor have access to records that would reveal the amount of time that defendant spent in custody in the Boulder County Jail, and no provision was made to credit said jail time against the 30 year minimum sentence set by the Governor.'

The Public Defender further contends that the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the validity of Sides' sentence and to determine whether or not the District Court has jurisdiction to entertain the defendant's motion. The Attorney General maintains that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Rule 35(a) motion under the facts of this case. We agree with the Attorney General.

The record of the proceedings in the District Court, copy of which was attached to the Attorney General's petition, shows that the defendant Sides was regularly charged with first-degree murder and that the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged and fixed the penalty at life imprisonment. The minimum sentence was for the defendant's natural life and the maximum sentence was the same.

The jurisdiction of the trial court, so far as we are here concerned, lies within Rule 35(a)...

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18 cases
  • Winston v. Polis
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • July 1, 2021
    ...the Governor has the exclusive power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Dist. Ct. , 180 Colo. 107, 111, 502 P.2d 420, 422 (1972). ¶ 13 But "[t]he Colorado Constitution tasks the judicial branch with construing the meaning of constitution......
  • County Com'n of Mercer County v. Dodrill, 18867
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 19, 1989
    ...power to grant reprieves, and the highest courts in those jurisdictions have upheld such power. People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court, 180 Colo. 107, 111, 502 P.2d 420, 422 (1972); Ex parte Hyde, 140 Fla. 494, 498, 192 So. 159, 161 (1939); People ex rel. Gregory v. Pate, 31 Ill.2d 592, 59......
  • People v. Herrera
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • October 29, 1973
    ...conviction--the power of commutation. Nowhere does the constitution vest the power of commutation in the courts. 2 In People. v. District Court, Colo., 502 P.2d 420, we observed that the governor has the Exclusive power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction. We affir......
  • McDonnell v. Juvenile Court in and for Second Judicial Dist., 93SA175
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1993
    ...restrictions on the Executive Department. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387 (Colo.1983); People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court, 180 Colo. 107, 502 P.2d 420 (1972). The province of the Executive Branch is to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Colorado Gen. Assembly v. ......
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