Winston v. Polis

• Citation: 2021 COA 90,496 P.3d 813
• Decision Date: 01 July 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 21CA0079
• Parties: Gary WINSTON, John Peckham, Matthew Aldaz, William Stevenson, and Dean Carbajal, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jared POLIS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Colorado

496 P.3d 813

2021 COA 90

Gary WINSTON, John Peckham, Matthew Aldaz, William Stevenson, and Dean Carbajal, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Jared POLIS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado, Defendant-Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0079

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division VII.

Announced July 1, 2021

Mark Silverstein, Rebecca Wallace, Sara R. Neel, Denver, Colorado; Maxted Law, LLC, David Maxted, Rachel Z. Geiman, Denver, Colorado; Holland, Holland Edwards & Grossman, LLC, John Holland, Anna Holland Edwards, Erica Grossman, Rachel Kennedy, Dan Weiss, Denver, Colorado; Laura Rovner, Nicole B. Godfrey, Denver, Colorado; Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Mari Newman, Darold W. Killmer, Andy McNulty, Liana Orshan, Reid Allison, Denver, Colorado; Finger Law P.C., Bill Finger, Evergreen, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant T. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitor General, LeeAnn Morrill, First Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Jozwiak, Fellow Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

Opinion by JUDGE FOX

¶ 1 Gary Winston, John Peckham, Matthew Aldaz, William Stevenson, and Dean Carbajal (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal the trial court's dismissal of their class action suit against Governor Jared Polis. Plaintiffs are (or were) confined¹ in Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) facilities, and their amended complaint alleges that the Governor has failed to protect them from the threat of COVID-19, thereby violating article II, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by concluding that (1) the Governor is not a proper defendant to their claim; (2) the separation of powers doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction to order injunctive or declarative relief; and (3) they were not entitled to mandamus relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2).

¶ 2 We conclude that, under Raven v. Polis , 2021 CO 8, ¶ 1, 479 P.3d 918, the Governor is a proper defendant in this case. Further, we conclude that the separation of powers doctrine does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶ 3 Plaintiffs assert that their medical vulnerabilities place them at high risk of death or serious illness from COVID-19. They also allege that the current conditions in Colorado prisons are unconstitutional due to the excessive risk of harm posed by COVID-19. In particular, they claim that Colorado prisons cannot provide "the necessary physical distancing and hygiene required to mitigate the risk of [COVID-19] transmission" and lack "adequate medical facilities to treat serious COVID-19 cases."

¶ 4 In May 2020, Plaintiffs sued the Governor and CDOC Executive Director Dean Williams, seeking declaratory relief and an injunction requiring them to, among other things, implement various health and safety measures and reduce the population in CDOC custody. After reaching an agreement with the CDOC to alleviate some of the alleged risks, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to seek a declaration that the Governor's "inaction violates" the Colorado Constitution and an injunction compelling the Governor to reduce the prison population or "[t]ake other measures to cure the Constitutional violations." Alternatively, Plaintiffs asked the court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Governor "to exercise his powers under ... [section] 24-33.5-704[, C.R.S. 2020,] to correct the unconstitutional conditions and fulfill his emergency response duties." The Governor quickly moved to dismiss, arguing that (1) he is an improper defendant because he does not manage the day-to-day operations of CDOC facilities; (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the Governor to exercise his discretionary powers; and (3) mandamus relief is not available to compel discretionary actions.

¶ 5 The trial court agreed with the Governor and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the Governor was not a proper party and dismissed under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). It also ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because, under the separation of powers doctrine, it could not order the Governor to release prisoners or take any other particular action that lies "within the Governor's sound discretion and exclusive authority." The trial court also ruled that it could not grant Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief because, unlike other cases where Colorado courts have reviewed the constitutionality of executive actions, "[t]he Court does not have the power to declare the Governor's alleged failure to act unconstitutional."

II. The Governor is a Proper Defendant

¶ 6 The parties agree that Plaintiffs preserved their argument that the Governor is a proper defendant in this case. We review de novo a trial court's dismissal of an action under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs , 2021 COA 32, ¶ 7, ––– P.3d ––––. We accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead sufficient facts that, if taken as true, suggest plausible grounds to support a claim for relief. Id. ; see also Warne v. Hall , 2016 CO 50, ¶¶ 9, 24, 373 P.3d 588.

¶ 7 Plaintiffs argue, the Governor now concedes, and we agree that the Governor is a proper defendant. In Raven v. Polis — issued five weeks after the trial court's order — the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Governor is a proper named defendant in a lawsuit challenging the confinement conditions at CDOC facilities. 2021 CO 8, ¶ 5, 479 P.3d 918. Specifically, the Raven court held that, "[b]ecause the Governor ‘has final authority to order the executive directors of all state agencies to commence or cease any action on behalf of the state,’ " he was a proper named defendant in that case. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 18 (quoting Sportsmen's Wildlife Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Interior , 949 F. Supp. 1510, 1515 (D. Colo. 1996) ).

¶ 8 The analysis in Raven applies equally here. Plaintiffs challenge their conditions of confinement at CDOC facilities — an executive agency under the Governor's control — and thus the Governor is a proper defendant for the claim asserted. Id. at ¶ 18. Accordingly, we conclude that — not having had the benefit of Raven — the trial court erred by holding that the Governor was not a proper defendant. Id.

III. The Separation of Powers Doctrine Does Not Deprive the Trial Court of Jurisdiction to Hear Plaintiffs’ Claim

A. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶ 9 The parties agree that Plaintiffs generally preserved their constitutional claim against the Governor; however, the Governor argues that Plaintiffs did not raise their argument regarding the Governor's alleged failure to prioritize prisoners for vaccine eligibility before the trial court. We need not consider this dispute because the issue was not raised in the amended complaint and, as discussed below, the trial court has jurisdiction to consider whether the current conditions in the CDOC violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Colorado Constitution even if it cannot direct the Governor to implement a particular remedy.

¶ 10 We apply a mixed standard of review to motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union , 2016 COA 72, ¶ 6, 382 P.3d 1249. We review the trial court's factual findings for clear error; they are binding unless so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record. Id. The court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, id. , including questions of law involving the separation of powers doctrine. Hickerson v. Vessels , 2014 CO 2, ¶ 10, 316 P.3d 620.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 11 " Article III of the Colorado Constitution prevents one branch of government from exercising powers that the constitution makes the exclusive domain of another branch." Crowe v. Tull , 126 P.3d 196, 205 (Colo. 2006). However, "[t]he separation-of-powers doctrine ‘does not require a complete division of authority among the three branches, [and] the powers exercised by different branches of government necessarily overlap.’ " Id. (quoting Dee Enters. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 89 P.3d 430, 433 (Colo. App. 2003) ).

¶ 12 Under the separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary cannot command Governors to do anything that lies exclusively within their sound discretion. See In re Legis. Reapportionment , 150 Colo. 380, 382, 374 P.2d 66, 67 (1962). As relevant here, the Governor has the exclusive power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Dist. Ct. , 180 Colo. 107, 111, 502 P.2d 420, 422 (1972).

¶ 13 But "[t]he Colorado Constitution tasks the judicial branch with construing the meaning of constitutional language," Lobato v. State , 2013 CO 30, ¶ 17, 304 P.3d 1132, and Colorado courts can determine whether the Governor violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights and order the Governor to comply with the Constitution. See, e.g. , Ritchie v. Polis , 2020 CO 69, ¶ 1, 467 P.3d 339 (holding that the Colorado Disaster Emergency Act (CDEA), §§ 24-33.5-701 to - 716, C.R.S. 2020, does not authorize the Governor to suspend a constitutional requirement). Similarly, in Goebel v. Colorado Department of Institutions , 764 P.2d 785, 800 (Colo. 1988), the Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial-court-ordered implementation of a remedial plan to address the needs of mental health patients under the state's care would not violate the constitutional mandate of separation of powers where "the court would simply be interpreting the [law], determining the requirements of that [law], and directing the defendants to spend the funds appropriated by the legislature in accordance with those requirements." See also United...