People ex rel. Henderson v. Onahan

• Citation: 170 Ill. 449,48 N.E. 1003
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. HENDERSON v. ONAHAN et al.
• Decision Date: 22 December 1897
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

170 Ill. 449

48 N.E. 1003

PEOPLE ex rel. HENDERSON

v.ONAHAN et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1897.

Error to superior court, Cook county; Farlin Q. Ball, Judge.

Information in the nature of quo warranto, on the relation of John G. Henderson, against William J. Onahan and others. From a judgment for defendants, the people bring error. Affirmed.

The title of the act relied upon is ‘An act to amend an act, entitled,’ etc. (Laws 1897, p. 243); and the first section of the new act expressly provides ‘that an act entitled ‘An act to authorize judges of courts of record to appoint jury commissioners and prescribing their powers and duties,’ approved June 15, 1887, be amended so as to read as follows.'Charles S. Deneen, State's Atty. (Adolph Moses, of counsel), for plaintiffs in error.

Robert E. Jenkins and Robert S. Iles, for defendants in error.

CARTER, J.

The plaintiffs in error filed an information in the nature of a quo warranto in the superior court of Cook county, against the defendants in error, alleging that the defendants had intruded into, held, and executed, and still held and executed, without warrant or right, the office of jury commissioners, and calling upon them (the defendants) to show by what warrant they claimed to hold and execute said office. The defendants, in their plea, set forth that on the first Monday of July, 1897, the judges of the several courts of record of Cook county (a county containing more than 100,000 inhabitants) met together, and chose them (the defendants) to be jury commissioners of said county, by virtue of an act of the legislature entitled ‘An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act to authorize judges of courts of record to appoint jury commissioners, and prescribe their powers and duties,’' approved June 9, 1897; that, having been so chosen, they duly qualified and entered upon the discharge of the duties of such office. The court overruled the demurrer of plaintiffs in error to the plea, and held that said appointment under said statute and the qualification of defendants in error showed sufficient warrant and authority to hold and perform the duties of said office. This writ of error was then sued out.

The only question raised or involved in the case is the constitutionality of the statute. Counsel for plaintiffs in error contend that the act violates section 22 of article 4, and section 29 of article 6, of the constitution. Section 22, so far as claimed to apply here, provides: ‘The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: For * * * regulating the practice in courts of justice; * * * summoning and impaneling grand or petit juries.’ And said section 29 provides that ‘all laws relating to courts shall be general, and of uniform operation; and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and effect of the process, judgments and decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform.’ If the act violates either of said provisions of the constitution, it is, of course, void.

The first section of the act provides, in substance, that in every county which now has, or which may hereafter have, more than 100,000 inhabitants, the judges of the several courts of record of such county, or a majority of them, shall choose three competent and discreet electors, who shall be known as jury commissioners; provides for their qualification, and for removals and the filling of vacancies. Section 2 provides that said commissioners shall, upon entering upon their duties, and every four years thereafter, prepare a list of all electors between the ages of 21 and 60 years possessing the necessary legal qualifications for jury duty, to be known as the ‘jury list,’ which list may be revised annually in their discretion; provides also for entering upon books to be kept the names of each person on the list, his age, occupation, residence, whether a householder residing with his family, and whether or not a freeholder. Section 3 gives the commissioners power to appoint, with approval of said judges, a deputy in each precinct, to furnish lists of qualified electors, and also other required information; to summon and examine electors as to their qualifications for jury duty; and to administer oaths in discharge of their duties. Section 4 provides that the commissioners shall from time to time select from the jury list the requisite number of names, each name to be written upon a separate ticket, with the age, place of residence, and occupation, and shall place them in a box to be kept for that purpose, to be known as the jury box, and which box shall at all times contain not less than 15,000 names. In like manner a grand jury box shall be kept, the names to be selected from the jury list, and deposited in like manner in such box, and the number to be at all times not less than 1,000. The jurors who are thus selected, and whose names are placed in those boxes, are to be, as near as may be, residents of different parts of the county, and of different occupations. One or more of the judges of the court must certify to the clerk of the court the number of jurors required for each term, and the clerk shall, in the presence of at least two of the commissioners and their clerk, if they have any, draw at random from said jury box, after the same shall have been well shaken, the necessary number of names, and certify them to the sheriff, to be summoned according to law; and, if more jurors are needed, they are to be drawn and summoned forth-with in the same manner. Section 5 provides that the grand jurors shall be drawn and summoned in like manner, and that at the end of each term of court the commissioners shall check off from the jury list all who have served, and their names shall not again be placed in either jury box until all others on the list shall have served or been found disqualified or exempt. The names of all who are qualified and have been excused shall be again placed in the jury box. Section 6 provides for the compensation and payment of the commissioners and their assistants.

It must be conceded that if the effect of this statute is to regulate the practice of courts in counties of over 100,000 inhabitants, or to affect such courts in any way, so that their organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, or practice shall no longer be uniform with that of other courts in the state of the same class or grade, the statute is void, and must be so declared, even although we should hold it not to be local or special law prohibited by section 22 of article 4 of the constitution; for it is the clear purpose of section 29 of article 6 to require and maintain uniformity in the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all courts of the same class or grade in the state so far as regulated by law, and in the force and effect of their process, judgments, and decrees. It is, of course, true that the construction of this section might be affected by other provisions of the constitution where statutes are enacted under them, such as section 20 of article 6, providing for the establishment of probate courts in each county having a population of over 50,000 (Klokke v. Dodge, 103 Ill. 125), and possibly in some respects by the provisions relating to the courts of Cook county. Thus, it was said in Knickerbocker v. People, 102 Ill. on page 226, that section 29 ‘must be so construed as to harmonize with and give effect to the 20th section, in the sense we have construed it.’ And in reference to section 29 it was further said: ‘It is manifest that the introductory clause of that section cannot be given effect according to the literal meaning of the broad terms in which it is conceived. To do so would lead to the most absurd consequences, and would be in direct conflict with the decisions of the court. The words are: ‘All laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation.’ Notwithstanding this provision, the legislature is constantly in the habit of passing special laws fixing the commencement and the length of the terms of particular courts, which are manifestly laws relating to courts; and such acts, though neither uniform in their operation nor general, within the sense of the constitution, are universally recognized as constitutional and valid. In discussing this matter, it was said, in Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274: ‘Constitutions, like all other laws, must have a reasonable and practical interpretation. To give this language a literal application would require all courts in the state to meet on the same day, and the terms to be of the same length. This could not have been intended, because is must have been apparent to the framers of that instrument that such a thing could never be carried into effect.’ As there held, the general terms employed in the introductory clause of that section are limited by what follows, which requires that all laws which relate to the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of courts shall be general and of uniform application, applying to all courts of the same class or grade.

The first question presented, then, is this: Does the act in question relate to or affect the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, or practice of courts in counties containing 100,000 inhabitants? If it does, the act is void, because it violates said section 29. It is not contended that the organization or jurisdiction of such courts is in any way affected by this statute, but the argument of plaintiffs in error tends to the conclusion that the powers, proceedings, and practice of the court are changed, or materially affected. It is not contended that the statute takes away any of the common-law powers of the courts to summon and impanel juries, but the argument on this branch of the case is that certain new powers are conferred by ...