People ex rel. Hunter v. District Court In and For Twentieth Judicial Dist., 81SA211
Decision Date | 14 September 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 81SA211,81SA211 |
Citation | 634 P.2d 44 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado ex rel. Alexander M. HUNTER, District Attorney, Twentieth Judicial District, State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT In and For the TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Rex H. Scott, Chief Judge of the District Court In and For the Twentieth Judicial District, State of Colorado, Respondent. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Alexander M. Hunter, Dist. Atty., Dennis B. Wanebo, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., John E. Maas, Jr., Deputy Dist. Atty., Boulder, for petitioner.
I. Melvin Tatsumi, Boulder, for respondent.
In this original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, we issued a rule to show cause why relief in the nature of mandamus requested by the district attorney should not be granted. We now make the rule absolute.
Larry J. Dirgo was charged by information in the District Court of Boulder County with the offense of criminal mischief in violation of section 18-4-501, C.R.S. 1973 . The offense charged was a class 4 felony since the aggregate damage to the personal and real property involved was alleged to be $100.00 or more. The case was set for a jury trial on May 14, 1981. On the day before the trial the defendant Dirgo moved the court for a trial to a jury of one person. His motion was based upon section 18-1-406(4), C.R.S. 1973 which provides:
"(4) Except as to class 1 felonies, the defendant in any felony or misdemeanor case may, with the approval of the court, elect, at any time before verdict, to be tried by a number of jurors less than the number to which he would otherwise be entitled."
The statutorily prescribed jury to which one accused of a felony is entitled is a jury of twelve persons. Section 18-1-406(1), C.R.S. 1973 . The district court, although expressing doubts about the wisdom of the procedure, concluded that the statute permitted a jury of one person and therefore the court granted Dirgo's motion. The district attorney sought relief from this order and we issued our rule to show cause.
It is fundamental that one accused of a felony is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. U.S.Const. amend. VI; Colo.Const. art. II, sections 16 and 23; section 16-10-101, C.R.S. 1973 . It is also clear that the accused may waive his constitutional right to a jury. Garcia v. People, Colo., 615 P.2d 698 (1980). See also Rice v. People, 193 Colo. 270, 565 P.2d 940 (1977).
The preliminary question for determination is whether under section 18-1-406(4) above set forth, one accused of a felony, other than a class 1 felony, may, with the approval of the court, elect to be tried by a number of jurors less than the number to which he would otherwise be entitled.
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), the validity of a Florida statute 1 was challenged, which provided for a jury of six in all criminal cases except capital cases where a jury of twelve was constitutionally mandated. The Supreme Court held as follows:
"...
It is thus not constitutionally impermissible under the United States Constitution to impanel a jury of six rather than twelve to try a felony case other than a capital case.
We find no language in the Colorado Constitution 2 which mandates that one accused of a felony may not elect to be tried by a jury numbering less than twelve persons. The enactment of the statute under consideration, section 18-1-406(4), C.R.S. 1973 , is a recognition that public policy does not demand a jury of twelve in non-capital felony cases. Reinforced by the rationale of Williams, supra, we hold that one accused of a felony, other than a capital offense, may at his election, subject to the statutorily required approval of the court, be tried to a jury of less than twelve persons.
We next consider the validity of the trial court's determination that the defendant could be tried by a jury of one. We hold that the court's ruling was erroneous.
Initially, we observe that section 18-1-406(4) does not speak in terms of a single juror, but rather of a "number of jurors less than the number to which he would otherwise be entitled." (Emphasis added.) More importantly, the term "jury" connotes a deliberative body of persons. The word "jury" has been defined as:
"A body of men sworn to give a verdict upon some matter submitted to them; ... a body of men selected according to law, impaneled and sworn to inquire into and try any matter of fact, and to give their verdict according to the evidence legally produced." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1966.
See also Black's Law Dictionary 993 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); Williams, supra; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965).
In Williams, supra, the Supreme Court speaking to the size of a jury stated:
(Emphasis added.)
It is thus obvious that a jury may not be composed of a single person. If the accused desires a one person determination of his guilt or innocence, he may waive the jury and be tried by the court.
We are thus left with the question of what minimum number of persons may compose a constitutional jury in a non-capital felony case if a defendant elects under the statute to be tried by a jury of less than the number to which he is entitled. We are guided in our determination by the decision in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 98 S.Ct. 1029, 55 L.Ed.2d 234 (1978). In that case the petitioner was accused of a misdemeanor which under the Georgia statute was triable by a jury of five persons. He contended he was entitled to a jury of twelve. The Supreme Court held that...
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