People ex rel. Robertson v. New York State Div. of Parole
| Decision Date | 23 April 1984 |
| Citation | 124 Misc.2d 61,475 N.Y.S.2d 754 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Reginald ROBERTSON, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE; Superintendent, Queensboro Correctional Facility, Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
The Attorney General moves this court for an order modifying a prior order rendered on March 13, 1984.
The court grants review of this application.
An examination of the facts establishes that the petitioner, Reginald Robertson, originally brought two habeas corpus proceedings for the purpose of challenging his present incarceration. He alleges that he was denied due process of law in regards to his parole hearings and also did not receive a timely final parole revocation hearing.
Petitioner, in his original moving papers, contends that he was arrested on criminal charges on January 9, 1981 and a parole warrant was lodged against him on May 5, 1981. He alleges that his arrest was based upon the fact that he had brought an action against the New York City Police Department for violation of his civil rights.
An analysis of petitioner's supporting papers establishes that he was represented in his various parole actions by several different attorneys, to wit: Andrew H. Eibel, John Kurkemelis, Corinne Edelbaum, and a fourth attorney, Victor Knapp. The last two attorneys are presently bringing habeas corpus actions on petitioner's behalf. In a decision rendered on March 13, 1984, this court was unable to determine the factual background of this case since there were conflicting claims as to representation, hearing dates and the adjournments of same. Under these circumstances, affidavits were insufficient to resolve the issues and the court in its decision set the matter down "for a hearing to determine who was representing petitioner and to determine whether petitioner's rights have been violated and whether he is being illegally detained."
The Attorney General now seeks a modification of the court's ruling. He argues that the recent Appellate Division case of People ex rel. Diamond v. Flood, App.Div., 473 N.Y.S.2d 558 stands for the proposition that all preliminary issues of fact should be resolved by a hearing officer and not by the court.
In considering this application, this court starts off with the view that a parole proceeding is a creature of statute; its purposes, procedures and goals are set forth in the Executive Law of this State. The harsh reality of each parole issue is the fact that one person has been deprived of his liberty through the allegations of another, who is the agent of the State. These allegations are simply that a parolee has violated the conditions of his parole. Consequently, the Executive Law sets down definite time limits for resolving the issue of whether or not said conditions were violated. These time limits are set forth in the Executive Law, § 259-i. Such statutory periods are to be strictly construed (People ex rel. Levy v. Dalsheim, 66 A.D.2d 827, 411 N.Y.S.2d 343, affd. 48 N.Y.2d 1019, 425 N.Y.S.2d 802, 402 N.E.2d 141).
In addition to statutory rights, the Supreme Court has held that even though a parole hearing is administrative in nature, a petitioner is still entitled to the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484). The minimum requirements set forth in that case held...
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