People ex rel. Saline Cnty. v. Wallace

• Decision Date: 18 February 1920
• Docket Number: No. 13155.,13155.
• Citation: 291 Ill. 465,126 N.E. 175
• Parties: PEOPLE, for Use of SALINE COUNTY, v. WALLACE, County Collector.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

291 Ill. 465

126 N.E. 175

PEOPLE, for Use of SALINE COUNTY,

v.WALLACE, County Collector.

No. 13155.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 18, 1920.

Mandamus by the People, for the use of Saline County, against Guy M. Wallace, County Collector. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Saline County; A. W. Lewis, Judge.

Miley & Combe, of Harrisburg, for appellant.

James B. Lewis, of Harrisburg, for appellee.

THOMPSON, J.

Appellant is the county treasurer and ex officio county collector of Saline county, a county in this state of the first class and under township organization. Under authority given him by section 21 of the Fees and Salaries Act (Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 1516) he has retained from the taxes collected by him as county collector commissions amounting to $11,360.93. In 1917 the Legislature abolished the office of town collector, and provided that all the duties of town collector should be performed by the county collector. Laws of 1917, p. 792. Section 243 of the Revenue Act, as amended in 1917, provides that--

‘The county collector shall on the first day of April and the first day of each and every month thereafter, pay over to the other proper authorities or persons the amounts in his hands and payable to them as taxes, not theretofore paid over: Provided, that in counties under township organization, where no town collectors are elected, no fees or commissions shall be deducted by the county collector from taxes collected by him and heretofore authorized to be collected by town collectors, and all such taxes collected shall be paid over in full to the proper authorities or persons authorized by law to receive the same.’ Laws of 1917, p. 654.

Because of the uncertainty thus created as to his legal rights to retain, as county collector, the commission allowed him by said section 21 of the Fees and Salaries Act, appellant has refused, and still does refuse, to pay into the county treasury said sum retained by him. In order to determine the legal rights of the parties concerned, mandamus proceedings were brought to compel appellant to pay said money into the county treasury. The circuit court of Saline county overruled the demurrer filed by appellant to the petition for the writ of mandamus. Appellant elected to stand by his demurrer, and a judgment nil dicit was entered, ordering the issuance of the writ as prayed. From this judgment appellant prayed and perfected his appeal to this court.

[1] The only question presented for our consideration is the construction or interpretation of section 243 of the Revenue Act. In the interpretation and construction of statutes the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. All rules for the interpretation and construction of statutes of doubtful meaning have for their sole object the discovery of legislative intent, and they are valuable only in so far as in their application they enable us the better to ascertain and give effect to that intent. If a statute is susceptible of more than one construction, it should be given the construction that will effect its proper intent rather than one that will defeat it. People v. Price, 257 Ill. 587, 101 N. E. 196, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1154. When the intent and purpose of the Legislature can be collected from the statute, words may be modified, altered, or supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with such intention, although in so doing particular provisions may not be read or construed according to their literal reading. Public Utilities Com. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 267 Ill. 528, 108 N. E. 716, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 528. It often happens that the true intention of the lawmaking body, though obvious, is not expressed by the language employed in a statute when that language is given its literal meaning. In such cases the carrying out of the legislative intention, which, as we have seen, is the prime and sole object of all rules of construction, can only be accomplished by departure from the literal interpretation of the language employed; hence the courts are not always confined to the literal meaning of a statute. The real purpose and intent of the Legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words. 25 R. C. L. 967. It is a principle of construction that statutes must be interpreted according to their intention and meaning, and not always according to the letter. That which is within the intention is within the statute, though not within the letter, and that which may be within the letter is not within the statute unless within the intention. Canal Com'rs v. Sanitary District, 184 Ill. 597, 56 N. E. 953. It is a well-established rule in the construction of statutes that where great inconvenience or absurd consequences are to result from a particular construction, that construction should be avoided, unless the meaning of the Legislature be plain and manifest. People v. Harrison, 191 Ill. 257, 61 N. E. 99. When the literal enforcement of a statute would result in great injustice and lead to consequences which the Legislature could not have contemplated, the courts are bound to presume that such consequences were not intended, and...