People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Art Enterprises, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1983
• Citation: 33 Cal.3d 328,188 Cal.Rptr. 740,656 P.2d 1170
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 656 P.2d 1170 The PEOPLE ex rel. John K. VAN DE KAMP, as District Attorney, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMERICAN ART ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants and Appellants. L.A. 31520.

Page 740

188 Cal.Rptr. 740

33 Cal.3d 328, 656 P.2d 1170

The PEOPLE ex rel. John K. VAN DE KAMP, as District Attorney, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMERICAN ART ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

L.A. 31520.

Supreme Court of California.

Jan. 31, 1983.

Rehearing Denied March 2, 1983.

Brown, Weston & Sarno, David M. Brown, G. Randall Garrou and Robert A. De Piano, Beverly Hills, for defendants and appellants.

John K, Van de Kamp, Dist. Atty., Harry B. Sondheim and Dirk L. Hudson, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and respondent.

KAUS, Justice.

This case presents a narrow question of statutory interpretation: do the current provisions of the Red Light Abatement Law (Pen.Code, §§ 11225-11235) ¹--the act--authorize an award of damages against an owner of property that has been used for purposes prohibited by the act? Because such damages are not included among the sanctions specifically enumerated in the act, and because past authorities establish that the primary purpose of the act is to "reform" the property in question rather than to punish the property owner, we conclude that the act does not authorize such a damage award.

I

Defendants own a building on Lassen Street in Chatsworth, California, which was used as the headquarters of their business of publishing and distributing sexually explicit matter conceded not to be obscene. On August 22, 1972, the People filed this action, alleging that the premises were being used for the purpose of "lewdness, assignation and prostitution," and therefore constituted a nuisance under the act. (§ 11225.) ² Pursuant to the relevant remedial statutory provisions of the act, the complaint sought a permanent injunction against the prohibited activity, as well as an order closing the premises for one year and directing the sale of all furniture, fixtures and movable property used to carry out the nuisance. (§ 11230.) ³

On the basis of evidence which showed that defendants had used the premises to arrange for and direct the photographing of explicit sexual acts engaged in by paid models for purposes of publication, the trial court found that the Lassen Street building was a "nerve center" for prostitution. Nevertheless, because none of the photographed sexual acts took place at the Lassen Street premises, the court held that the building was not "used for the purpose of ... prostitution" within the meaning of the act and denied relief.

On the first appeal in this case--the one now before us is the second--the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, concluding that the trial court's findings established as a matter of law that the Lassen Street building was in fact a "building ... used for the purpose of prostitution." (People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Art Enterprises, Inc. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 523, 529, 142 Cal.Rptr. 338.) Nevertheless, since the People had conceded that the publishing business did not involve obscenity, the Court of Appeal recognized that application of the full sanctions authorized by the act would clash with settled constitutional free speech principles. It explained: "Because the publishing activity conducted at the Lassen Street building constitutes virtually the sole purpose for which the building is used and it is conceded that obscenity is not involved, closure of the building and removal of property from it is an unconstitutional prior restraint upon protected speech and press itself. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 531, 142 Cal.Rptr. 338.)

Nonetheless the Court of Appeal concluded that some sanctions authorized by the act short of closure or removal of nonobscene publications--for example, an injunction barring use of the premises to arrange acts of prostitution--could be imposed consistent with applicable constitutional guarantees. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to fashion constitutionally appropriate relief. ⁴

On remand the trial court found that intervening events had relieved it of the duty to perform the delicate surgery demanded by the Court of Appeal: the nuisance had been voluntarily abated in that defendants had moved their business activities elsewhere. Further, in July 1976 they had leased the building to an unrelated electronics firm for a five-year term with two 5-year renewal options. Concluding that the injunctive relief suggested by the Court of Appeal in the first appeal was not appropriate under the circumstances, the court imposed a damage award of $168,000--the value of one year's rent of the building[656 P.2d 1172] --against defendants because of "past acts" and the "possibility of future violations." ⁵ The court's memorandum of decision indicates that it reasoned that it was within its discretion "to award general damages in lieu of injunction" and that the statutory authorization for a one-year closure made the one-year rent figure an appropriate monetary sanction. ⁶

On this appeal defendants contend that the damage award is not authorized by the statute.

II

The Red Light Abatement Law declares that every building used for the purpose of prostitution "is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated and prevented ...." (Italics added.) (§ 11225.) Section 11226 authorizes the district attorney to bring an action to abate, prevent and perpetually enjoin such nuisances. In addition, section 11230 provides, as an additional remedy, for the removal and sale of all fixtures and movable property on the premises used in aiding or abetting the nuisance and for the closure of the building for up to one year. Section 11231, in turn, provides that if property is removed and sold pursuant to section 11230, the proceeds of the sale shall be applied to (1) the fees and costs of the removal and sale, (2) the expenses involved in "closing and keeping closed the building," and (3) the payment of plaintiff's costs in the action. The balance of the proceeds are to be paid to the owner of the property. ⁷ None of the provisions of the act, however, purports to authorize the imposition of a fine or monetary damage award as an alternative to abatement, closure of the premises or removal and sale of property.

In this case the trial court obviously felt that injunctive relief was no longer warranted in light of the lease of the Lassen Street building. ⁸ Nevertheless, the court was understandably dissatisfied with a resolution which permitted the culpable owners of the building to escape any sanction. Thus, it devised a monetary fine--equivalent to one year's rent--as a substitute for the statutorily authorized one year's closure.

As we have seen, however, the act does not authorize a monetary fine or damage award. Although the statute does authorize a variety of sanctions to cover the costs of closing the property and the costs of prosecution, those remedies are explicitly in rem--the statute only permits these sums to be satisfied from the sale of property. ⁹ This is consistent with the primary object of an abatement action--to "reform" the property and insure that the nuisance is abated, not to punish for past acts. (See, e.g., People ex. rel. Sorenson v. Randolph (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 183, 188-189, 160 Cal.Rptr. 69; People ex. rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 556, 563, 117 Cal.Rptr. 24.) ¹⁰ To read the statute as authorizing a damage award or penalty to be levied directly against the property owner would be to ignore the clear words of the statute and the apparent intent of the Legislature. ¹¹

The People assert that a monetary award is appropriate because "presumably the nuisance continues at another location." As the Court of Appeal explained in People ex rel. Bradford v. Burch, supra, 46 Cal.App. 391, 394, 189 P. 716, however, "[A]n action under the 'Red-light Abatement Act' is not one for the abatement of prostitution ... but one for the abatement of a public nuisance committed or maintained by the habitual practicing in a building or in or on any premises of acts of prostitution ...." (Italics added.) The statute authorizes a court to act with respect to particular property, not to impose sanctions for the prohibited activities in general.

Of course, if defendants use another location for the purpose of committing a nuisance within the meaning of the act, the People may bring a new action to abate it at that location. In any such action, section 11227 authorizes a trial court to issue a temporary injunction to abate the nuisance if its existence is shown "either by verified complaint or affidavit." Under the current provisions of the act, however, the damage award imposed in this case was improper.

The dissenting opinion, while acknowledging that there is nothing in the statute which explicitly authorizes the $168,000 "penalty" (dis. opn., post, p. 747), argues that we should uphold the award as a proper exercise of the trial court's general equitable power. However, it is well settled that " '[c]ourts will not impose penalties for noncompliance with statutory provisions in addition to those that are provided expressly or by necessary implication.' " (General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle (1960) 54 Cal.2d 101, 111, 4 Cal.Rptr. 496, 351 P.2d 768; City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey (1959) 52 Cal.2d 267, 276, 339 P.2d 851; Grant v. Weatherholt (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 34, 43, 266 P.2d 185; see also People ex rel. Mosk v. Barenfeld (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 166, 177, 21 Cal.Rptr. 501; Oddo v. Hedde (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 375, 383, 225 P.2d 929; County of Alameda v. Freitas (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 653, 654-655, 48 P.2d 165; Fresno Loan & Thrift v. Roberts (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d Supp. 899, 902, 25 Cal.Rptr. 624.) Indeed, in People v. Superior Court (Jayhill ) (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283, 107 Cal.Rptr. 192, 507 P.2d 1400--the case relied on by the dissent to support such an exercise of equitable power--we specifically rejected a similar contention; in that case we held that while a trial court could order restitution to defrauded customers of door-to-door encyclopedia...