People in Interest of M.C.

• Decision Date: 30 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87SC379,87SC379
• Citation: 774 P.2d 857
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, In the Interest of, M.C., Minor Child, Petitioner, and Concerning V.C., Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 857

774 P.2d 857

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, In the Interest of,

M.C., Minor Child, Petitioner,

and Concerning

V.C., Respondent.

No. 87SC379.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

May 30, 1989.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender Victor E. Reyes, Deputy Colorado State Public Defender, Pueblo, for petitioner.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., John Milton Hutchins, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul H. Chan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent.

KIRSHBAUM, Justice.

Petitioner, M.C., seeks certiorari review of a judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate illegal sentence. ¹ 750 P.2d 69. The Court of Appeals concluded that M.C.'s rights to equal protection of the law as guaranteed by article II, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution were not violated by the disposition ordered in this juvenile proceeding. We affirm, but for reasons differing from those articulated by the Court of Appeals.

I

In August 1985, a petition in delinquency was filed against M.C. containing one count, which alleged that M.C. had committed the felony offense of second degree burglary, in violation of section 18-4-203, 8B C.R.S. (1978 & 1985 Supp.). In January 1986, an amended petition in delinquency was filed against M.C. The amended petition contained a second count alleging commission of the second class petty offense of possession of not more than one ounce of marijuana, in violation of section 18-18-106(1), 8B C.R.S. (1985 Supp.). On March 27, 1986, M.C., then eighteen years old, entered a plea of guilty to the marijuana possession count. The second degree burglary allegations were then dismissed, and the trial court entered the order of disposition which underlies this proceeding.

The trial court's dispositional order contains several provisions. The trial court committed M.C. to the Department of Institutions for a period of two years, stayed execution of that sentence, and granted M.C. probation for an indefinite period not to exceed two years. The trial court also ordered M.C. to serve forty-five days at the Pueblo Youth Center, but suspended the sentence on the condition that in the event any term or condition of probation was violated, M.C. would "serve time in detention for each violation." ²

M.C. was seventeen at the time he committed the acts underlying his adjudication as a delinquent. He was eighteen when the dispositional order was entered on March 27, 1986. At that time, an adult convicted of the offense of possession of not more than one ounce of marijuana was subject to a maximum penalty of a $100 fine. § 18-18-106(1), 8 C.R.S. (1985 Supp.). At the dispositional hearing, M.C. argued that he was subject to the sentencing provisions applicable to adults and that any sentence to the Department of Institutions would violate his constitutional rights to equal protection of the law. M.C. reasserted this position in a Crim.P. 35(c) motion filed subsequent to the entry of the dispositional order, citing People in Interest of A.L., 713 P.2d 934 (Colo.App.1985), in support of his argument. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, expressly refusing to follow A.L.

II

At the time the order of disposition was entered, the Children's Code expressly authorized a trial court to adopt one or more of several dispositional provisions. Sections 19-3-113(1)(a) & (c), 8 C.R.S. (1978 & 1985 Supp.), ³ contained the following pertinent provisions:

Delinquent child--disposition--restitution--parental liability. (1) If a child has been adjudicated as being delinquent, the court shall enter a decree of disposition containing any required provision and one or more of the following provisions which the court finds appropriate:

(a) The court may make any disposition, or combination of dispositions when appropriate, provided under section 19-3-112(1) or (4) or subsection (3) of this section;

....

(c) The court may commit a person eighteen years of age or over to the department of institutions if he is adjudicated delinquent for an act committed prior to his eighteenth birthday or upon revocation of probation.

Relevant portions of section 19-3-112, 8 C.R.S. (1978 & 1985 Supp.), ⁴ contained the following provisions:

Child needing oversight--disposition. (1) When a child has been adjudicated as needing oversight, the court shall enter a decree of disposition containing one or more of the following provisions which the court find appropriate:

(a) The court may place the child on probation or under protective supervision in the legal custody of one or both parents or the guardian under such conditions as the court may impose.

In addition, section 19-3-117, 8 C.R.S. (1978), ⁵ contained the following provisions regarding the granting of probation:

Probation--terms--release--revocation. (1) The terms and conditions of probation shall be specified by rules or orders of the court. The court, as a condition of probation for a child who is fourteen years of age or older but less than eighteen years of age on the date of the dispositional hearing, has the power to impose a commitment, placement, or detention. The aggregate length of any such commitment, placement, or detention, whether continuous or at designated intervals, shall not exceed forty-five days. Each child placed on probation shall be given a written statement of the terms and conditions of his probation and shall have such terms and conditions fully explained to him.

(2)(a) The court shall review the terms and conditions of probation and the progress of each child placed on probation at least once every six months.

(b) The court may release a child from probation or modify the terms and conditions of his probation at any time, but any child who has complied satisfactorily with the terms and conditions of his probation for a period of two years shall be released from probation, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be terminated.

The structure of the trial court's decree of disposition suggests that it was based in part on section 19-3-117(1). However, that section authorized a "commitment, placement, or detention" for an aggregate length of time not to exceed forty-five days only for children less than eighteen years of age on the date of the dispositional hearing. M.C. was not such a person on March 27, 1986. The only provisions of section 19-3-117 applicable to M.C. were subsections (2)(a) and (b), requiring the trial court periodically to review the progress of any child placed on probation and requiring the termination of probation at the end of a period of two years.

Section 19-3-113(1)(c) did authorize a trial court "to commit" a person eighteen years of age or over to the Department of Institutions. Section 19-3-112(1)(a) authorized the placement of a child on probation. M.C. challenges only the portions of the decree of disposition which were based on these statutory provisions. ⁶

M.C. argues that every child has a constitutionally protected liberty interest. M.C. then asserts that this interest is impermissibly restricted by a statutory scheme permitting one class of persons--those who are eighteen years of age or older when penalties are imposed for offenses committed when they were also eighteen years of age or older--to pay a fine upon conviction of possession of marijuana while permitting another class of persons--those who are eighteen years of age or older when penalties are imposed for commission of the same offense when they were under eighteen years of age--to be sentenced to the Department of Institutions or placed on probation for a period of two years. M.C. suggests that our decisions in People v. Wilhelm, 676 P.2d 702 (Colo.1984), and People v. McKenzie, 169 Colo. 521, 458 P.2d 232 (1969), wherein we concluded that constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law are violated when two statutes authorize different punishments for the same criminal conduct, support his argument.

We do not find M.C.'s arguments persuasive. Initially, it must be noted that, unlike the circumstances in Wilhelm and McKenzie, we are not dealing with two criminal statutes. The elaborate dispositional structure of the Children's Code is designed to further the purposes of that statute, stated in section 19-1-102(1), 8 C.R.S. (1978 & 1985 Supp.), ⁷ as follows:

Legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly declares that the purposes of this title are:

(a) To secure for each child subject to these provisions such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of society;

(b) To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible, including improvement of home environment;

(c) To remove a child from the custody of his parents only when his welfare and safety or the protection of the public would otherwise be endangered and, in either instance, for the courts to proceed with all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best interests of the child; and

(d) To secure for any child removed from the custody of his parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in becoming a responsible and productive member of society.

In recognition of the benevolent purposes of the act, we have consistently recognized that the proceedings authorized thereunder are civil rather than criminal in nature. S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 88 (Colo.1988); S.A.S. v. People, 623 P.2d 58, 60 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 433, 586 P.2d 46, 47-48 (1978); People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 444, 435 P.2d 763, 766 (1967).

Criminal codes are designed for quite different purposes. It is of course true that many of the procedural protections afforded persons accused of criminal...