People v. $31,500 U.S. Currency

• Decision Date: 03 March 1995
• Docket Number: THIRTY-ONE,No. C017650,C017650
• Citation: 32 Cal.App.4th 1442,38 Cal.Rptr.2d 836
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IN U.S. CURRENCY, Defendant; Ruben Parra Ruiz et al., Claimants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 836

38 Cal.Rptr.2d 836

32 Cal.App.4th 1442

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IN U.S. CURRENCY, Defendant Ruben Parra Ruiz et al., Claimants and Respondents.

No. C017650.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

March 3, 1995.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 29, 1995.

[32 Cal.App.4th 1445] John D. Phillips, Dist. Atty., and Phillip R. Urie, Deputy Dist. Atty., for plaintiff and appellant.

Frear Stephen Schmid, San Francisco, for claimants and respondents.

SIMS, Acting Presiding Justice.

In this civil asset forfeiture proceeding for forfeiture of property connected with drug trafficking (Health & Saf.Code, § 11470 et seq.), ¹ the People appeal from summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of claimants Ruben Parra Ruiz and Abelardo Parra Ruiz. The People contend the trial court erred in determining a criminal conviction for drug trafficking was a prerequisite to forfeiture. We agree and shall reverse the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 29, 1993, police made a traffic stop of claimants' car for a defective windshield. Since neither claimant had a driver's license, the police had the car towed (Veh.Code, § 22651, subd. (p)). An inventory of the car disclosed four ounces of marijuana, $31,500 cash, and a cellular phone. The officer issued Abelardo Ruiz a citation for possession of marijuana and released him.

On June 1, 1993, claimants were served with notice of nonjudicial forfeiture proceedings for the cash and cellular phone. Ruben Parra Ruiz timely filed a "claim opposing forfeiture" of the cash under section 11488.5. Abelardo Parra Ruiz filed a claim for the cellular phone. Consequently, on June 22, 1993, the People filed a complaint for forfeiture in the trial court.

In December 1993, claimants filed a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, which was heard by the trial court on January 6, 1994. Claimants made two arguments. First, they argued that effective January 1, 1994, California's statutory asset forfeiture law lapsed by virtue of a self-sunsetting clause in the statutes ("the 1988 Statutes"), such that there is no more asset forfeiture law in California. Second, they argued in the alternative that assuming the sunsetting of the 1988 Statutes effected a revival of previously enacted statutes ("the 1987 Statutes"), the 1987 Statutes required a criminal conviction for drug trafficking as a prerequisite to forfeiture of a person's property.

Claimants submitted declarations, and the People did not dispute, that there have been no criminal charges or conviction for drug trafficking in this case.

The trial court rejected the argument that sunset of the 1988 Statutes left California with no asset forfeiture law. The trial court concluded that upon lapse of the 1988 Statutes the operative provision was one of two versions contained in the 1987 Statutes, which required a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to forfeiture.

Since there was no criminal conviction in this case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of claimants. The court also granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of claimants because the complaint made no allegation of a criminal conviction. On January 12, 1994, the court entered judgment directing the return of the money to Ruben Parra Ruiz and the return of the cellular phone to Abelardo Parra Ruiz. On January 12, 1994, the People filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

The People contend the trial court erred in determining a criminal conviction for drug trafficking was a prerequisite for forfeiture of property. We agree.

I. History of Forfeiture Statutes

Because this case raises questions as to the effect of changes in the law, we will trace the pertinent history of the statutes at issue.

The pertinent history for our purposes involves the enactments of 1987, 1988, and 1994. Although the seizure of property in this case occurred in 1993, at a time when the 1988 Statutes were in effect, lapse of the 1988 Statutes in January 1994 raises questions as to what law, if any, replaced the 1988 Statutes.

The particular provision of concern in this case is section 11488.4, which addresses the question whether a criminal conviction is a prerequisite to forfeiture of property. ² Various versions of section 11488.4 have been enacted over the past several years. As will appear, only one of the various versions of section 11488.4 required a criminal conviction of a drug-trafficking offense as a prerequisite to forfeiture of cash exceeding $25,000, and that version never became operative. ³

As a road map to our discussion, the various versions of section 11488.4 as pertinent to the property at issue in this case may be summarized as follows:

1987 Statutes

Section 4 (pre"1989) --no conviction required

Section 5 (post"1989) --conviction required

1988 Statutes --no conviction required

1994 Statutes --no conviction required

As will appear in our discussion, the only version of section 11488.4 requiring a criminal conviction never became operative. ⁴

A. 1987

The 1987 Statutes ⁵ contained two versions of certain asset forfeiture provisions (including section 11488.4), one version to be operative until January 1, 1989, and the other version to become operative on January 1, 1989. Thus, section 4 of the 1987 Statutes set forth one version of section 11488.4 (hereafter "section 4 (1987)" ⁶), which by its own terms would expire on January 1, 1989, unless the Legislature extended or deleted that date. Section 5 of the 1987 Statutes set forth a second version of section 11488.4 (hereafter "section 5 (1987)"), which provided: "(k) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1989." (Stats.1987, ch. 924. § 5, p. 3118.)

Section 4 (1987) (the pre-1989 version) provided that cash in an amount equal to or exceeding $25,000 was forfeitable even though the there was no criminal conviction for drug trafficking. ⁷ The People were merely required to prove in the forfeiture proceeding that the money was connected to drug trafficking as defined in the statutes. (Stats.1987, ch. 924, § 4, p. 3115.)

Section 5 (1987) (the post-1989 version) required a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to forfeiture. ⁸ However, Section 5 (1987) did not go into effect on January 1, 1989, as originally intended, because the Legislature made some changes in the 1988 session.

B. 1988

In 1988, the Legislature made various amendments to the asset forfeiture laws. (Stats.1988, ch. 1492.) ⁹ Among those changes, the 1988 Statutes: (1) temporarily amended Section 4 (1987), and (2) repealed Section 5 (1987). (Stats.1988, ch. 1492, §§ 9-10, pp. 5288, 5291.) The 1988 Statutes by their own terms were temporary provisions to be effective only from January 1, 1989 (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)) until January 1, 1994, at which time the asset forfeiture sections "as they read on December 31, 1988" would be revived. ¹⁰

The 1988 Statutes did not require a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to forfeiture of any property (though the People had to prove a connection between the property and drug trafficking). (Stats.1988, ch. 1492, § 9, p. 5290.) Thus, section 11488.4, subdivision (i), provided in part: "... [p] A judgment of forfeiture does not require as a condition precedent thereto, that any defendant be convicted of an offense which made the property subject to forfeiture provided that the [facts giving rise to the forfeiture][ ¹¹] occurred within five years of the seizure of the property or within five years of the notification of intention to seek forfeiture...." (Stats.1988, ch. 1492, § 9, p. 5290.)

To reiterate, the 1988 Statutes expired by their own terms on January 1, 1994, one week before the trial court ruled in this case. Expiration of the 1988 Statutes raised questions as to what law, if any, replaced the 1988 Statutes.

C. 1994

On August 19, 1994, a new bill (Assem. Bill No. 114 (1993-1994 Reg.Sess.) was signed into law, effective immediately as an urgency measure, with the express intent of reducing the confusion over the state of asset forfeiture law. ¹² (Stats.1994, ch. 314, § 26. ¹³ )

The 1994 law revives the 1988 Statutes (which expired on January 1, 1994) for pending cases only. Thus, section 22 of the 1994 Statutes enacted section 11494, which provides: "In the case of any property seized or forfeiture proceeding initiated before January 1, 1994, the proceeding to forfeit the property and the distribution of any forfeited property shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in effect on December 31, 1993 [the 1988 Statutes], as if those sections had not been repealed, replaced, or amended." (Stats.1994, ch. 314, § 22.)

The 1994 law expressly repealed both of the 1987 versions of section 11488.4--section 4 (1987) and section 5 (1987). (Stats.1994, ch. 314, §§ 11-12.)

The 1994 law added a new section 11488.4, which provides that for future property seizures a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to forfeiture of cash in the amount of $25,000 or more (§ 11488.4, subd. (i)(4); Stats.1994, ch. 314, § 13), though a conviction is required for other specified types of property (§ 11488.4, subd. (i)(3); Stats.1994, ch. 314, § 13). ¹⁴ The 1994 provision for future cases is thus similar to section 4 (1987).

II. Pursuant To The 1994 Law, The 1988 Statutes Apply To This Case

The People contend this appeal is to be decided under the 1994 law, which makes the 1988 Statutes applicable to pending cases where the property was seized and the forfeiture proceedings were commenced before January 1, 1994. We agree.

The forfeiture at issue here is a statutory, not a common law, right. (People v. One 1953 Buick (1962) 57 Cal.2d 358, 365, 19 Cal.Rptr. 488, 369 P.2d 16.) In cases involving statutory, as opposed to common law, rights and remedies, the reviewing court must dispose of the case under the statute in force when its decision is rendered. (Beckman v....