People v. Adamowicz

• Decision Date: 06 April 2023
• Docket Number: 330612
• Parties: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEX JAY ADAMOWICZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEX JAY ADAMOWICZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 330612

Court of Appeals of Michigan

April 6, 2023

Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2014-251162-FC

On Second Remand

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and MURRAY and RIORDAN, JJ.

MURRAY, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Almost six years ago, in the original appeal in this matter, People v Adamowicz, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 22, 2017 (Docket No. 330612), we rejected defendant's argument that his mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder was unconstitutional under Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-478; 132 S.Ct. 2455; 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), because he was 21 when he committed the murder. The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on that argument, but vacated the opinion in part and remanded on defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial error arguments. People v Adamowicz, 503 Mich. 880 (2018). After a remand to the trial court, we again rejected defendant's ineffective assistance and prosecutorial error arguments, as did the Supreme Court. See People v Adamowicz, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 3, 2020 (Docket No. 330612), lv den but remanded on other grounds ___Mich ___; 982 N.W.2d 176 (2022).

Given this procedural history, one would have thought defendant's constitutional challenge to his sentence was concluded in 2018 and could go no further in state court, as is typically the case when an application for leave to appeal a decision of this Court is denied, either in whole or in part, by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Grievance Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich. 235, 279 n2; 612 N.W.2d 120 (2000) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring) ("any argument that the decision did not become final because of the partial remand is undercut by Johnson. There, this Court did not revisit the merits of the issue for which leave was denied. We did offer a discussion of that issue, but only to refute the dissent's contention in that case that the Court of Appeals initial error was reason not to follow the law of the case doctrine. We held that our denial of leave on the issue foreclosed further review of that issue. The partial remand did not change that finality"), citing Johnson v White, 430 Mich. 47, 53-58; 420 N.W.2d 87 (1988).

But not so here. For today, in this second remand, we are asked to decide an issue that defendant argued and lost before this Court in 2017, and before the Supreme Court in 2018, which played no part in our decision after remand. See People v Adamowicz, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 3, 2020 (Docket No. 330612). Nevertheless, the issue having been revitalized, we turn to its resolution. We affirm.

II. THE FACTS OF THE MURDER

The facts surrounding the murder defendant committed were provided in a previous opinion by this Court:

This case arises from the death of John Watson at the Tivoli Apartments in Walled Lake. Watson and defendant lived in the same building. In the early morning hours of April 12, 2014, Watson entered defendant's apartment to drink and smoke "weed." According to defendant, Watson became agitated. When defendant asked Watson to leave and threatened to call the police, an altercation ensued, which ended with defendant cutting Watson's throat. Watson died from the injury.

Defendant covered Watson's body with blankets and moved him from the couch to a closet in the apartment. He also attempted to clean the blood spatter from the walls and the couch. Defendant continued to live in the apartment until May 11, 2014, when defendant's mother, Marie Holley, discovered Watson's body. That day, the two drove to the Wixom Police Station. While at the station, defendant spoke with Walled Lake Police Detective Andrew Noble and confessed to killing Watson, but maintained that he did so in self-defense. [People v Adamowicz, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 22, 2017 (Docket No. 330612), p 1 (footnote omitted), rev'd and vacated in part by 503 Mich. 880 (2018).]

III. A MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE FOR A 21-YEAR OLD WHO COMMITS FIRST DEGREE MURDER IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As then Justice CLEMENT predicted just last year, "in the coming years we will hear cases arguing that we should extend Miller's protection to those in their early twenties as well." People v Parks, 510 Mich. 225, 298; N.W.2d (2022) (Docket No. 162086) (CLEMENT, J., dissenting). It didn't take that long. Indeed, the Court's remand order requires us to consider defendant's constitutional argument in light of Parks, in which the Court held that "mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder to a sentence of life without parole violates the principle of proportionality derived from the Michigan Constitution, and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16." Id. at 268 (opinion of the Court) (citations omitted). The Court concluded that "no meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18; to treat those two classes of defendants differently in our sentencing scheme is disproportionate to the point of being cruel under our Constitution." Id. at 266 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Not surprisingly, the main focus of defendant's argument is that because the scientific information relied upon by Parks to hold that 18-year-olds cannot be constitutionally subjected to a sentence of mandatory life without parole states that a brain of an adult aged between 21-25 is subject to the same developmental phases, his sentence should be declared unconstitutional. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that under the Michigan Constitution it was not cruel or unusual punishment to sentence defendant, who indisputably was 21 at the time he committed first-degree premeditated murder, to the mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole that the Legislature determined is warranted for this crime. Our conclusion is based upon a binding Michigan Supreme Court decision, as well as an examination of the factors set forth in Parks.^[1]

"A facial challenge involves a claim that 'there is no set of circumstances under which the enactment is constitutionally valid,' People v Wilder, 307 Mich.App. 546, 556; 861 N.W.2d 645 (2014), while an as-applied challenge 'considers the specific application of a facially valid law to individual facts,' Promote the Vote v Secretary of State, 333 Mich.App. 93, 117; 958 N.W.2d 861 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted)." People v Jarrell, ___Mich App___, ___; ___N.W.2d (2022) (Docket No. 356070); slip op at 9.

In addressing the facial challenge, we first recognize that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole imposed upon an adult for the crime of first-degree murder. In People v Hall, 396 Mich. 650, 657658; 242 N.W.2d 377 (1976), the Court explicitly held that under the factors enunciated in People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167; 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972), such a sentence did not violate the cruel or unusual clause of the state Constitution:

The mandatory life sentence (without possibility of parole, MCL 769.9) was expressly excluded from discussion in People v Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 690; 199 N.W.2d 202 (1972). Defendant cites no authority for his proposition that a mandatory life sentence violates defendant's due process and equal protection rights. As for the cruel and unusual punishment claim, under Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, the punishment exacted is proportionate to the crime. Defendant has not contended that Michigan's punishment for felony murder is widely divergent from any sister jurisdiction. The third Lorentzen factor, rehabilitation, was not the only allowable consideration for the legislature to consider in setting punishment.

'(S)ociety's need to deter similar proscribed behavior in others, and the need to prevent the individual offender from causing further injury to society * * *' were also recognized. [Lorentzen,] 387 Mich. at 180. In any event rehabilitation and release are still possible, since defendant still has available to him commutation of sentence by the Governor to a parolable offense or outright pardon. Const 1963, art 5, § 14; People v Freleigh, 334 Mich. 306; 54 N.W.2d 599 (1952). A mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole for this crime does not shock the conscience.

Hall has not been reversed or modified since its issuance. We are therefore bound to apply its holding and that holding precludes defendant's argument. Associated Builders & Contractors v Lansing, 499 Mich. 177, 191; 880 N.W.2d 765 (2016). Importantly, the Parks Court conceded that it was not altering the holding in Hall to the extent it applied to defendants over the age of 18. Parks, 510 Mich. at 255 n 9 ("our opinion today does not affect Hall's holding as to those older than 18."). Remarkably, defendant's brief contains no citation to Hall, despite the duty to raise controlling case law. See MRPC 3.3(a)(3). This failure is not excused by the fact that the remand order directs us to re-consider defendant's arguments in light of Parks, since, as we just noted, Parks recognized Hall as still controlling for those over the age of 18, which includes defendant.

Though we conclude that Hall resolves the issue in this Court, given the remand order, we turn our attention to defendant's arguments in light of Parks. In Parks, the Court, citing Lorentzen and People v Bullock, 440 Mich. 15; 485 N.W.2d 866 (1992), looked to four factors in determining whether mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole for 18-year-olds convicted of first-degree murder, was...