People v. Agramonte

• Decision Date: 02 April 1996
• Parties: , 665 N.E.2d 164 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Ricardo AGRAMONTE, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Rashid RAHMAN, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 594

642 N.Y.S.2d 594

87 N.Y.2d 765, 665 N.E.2d 164

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Ricardo AGRAMONTE, Respondent.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Rashid RAHMAN, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 2, 1996.

[87 N.Y.2d 766] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Linda Breen and

[665 N.E.2d 165] Roseann B. MacKechnie, of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled action

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Linda Breen and Roseann B. MacKechnie, of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

[87 N.Y.2d 767] Kimberlianne Podlas, New York City, and Daniel L. Greenberg, for respondent in the first and second above-entitled actions.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Chief Judge.

These two appeals by the People involve deviations from the statutory requirements that a deliberating jury be sequestered (CPL 310.10) and that alternate jurors "be kept separate and apart from the regular jurors" once deliberations have begun (CPL 270.30). We conclude that these two statutory violations are unpreserved as a matter of law absent timely objection by defendants.

People v. Agramonte

On the evening of March 3, 1990, defendant and three unapprehended accomplices entered the home of Pasqual Rodriguez, an acquaintance of defendant's, under the guise of purchasing jewelry. Once inside, they strangled and stabbed Rodriguez to death, repeatedly stabbed Rodriguez's wife, and stole the couple's money and jewelry.

During defendant's trial, after deliberations had commenced, the trial court delivered the following instruction prior to sending the jurors to dinner:

Now, I have some special instructions for you as far as what you can do next. I am going to send the 15 of you to eat, and you will be eating together with the Court Officers. So, at this point I want the 12 jurors that are deliberating to stop deliberating. You may not at all discuss during dinner the case at all. Because, firstly, the three alternates will be with you eating and the Court Officers will be with you. Thirdly, there will be people wherever you go to eat, waiter and waitresses. The minute the 12 of you come back to this courthouse after dinner and are put back into the jury room, start to deliberate, the three alternates will be put into another room. Don't the three of you talk about the case. And have a good dinner.

At no point did defendant object to the court's announced intention to send the alternate and regular jurors to dinner together. Defendant was ultimately convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree, one count of attempted murder in the second degree, one count of robbery in the first degree and two counts of assault in the first degree.

Relying on our decisions in People v. Santana, 78 N.Y.2d 1027, 576 N.Y.S.2d 208, 582 N.E.2d 591 and People v. Coons, 75 N.Y.2d 796, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94, 551 N.E.2d 587, the Appellate Division deemed the error reviewable as a matter of law despite defendant's failure to object and reversed the convictions, finding that the trial court had violated CPL 270.30 and 310.10 by allowing the alternate jurors to dine with the regular jurors after deliberations had begun.

People v. Rahman

There was testimony at defendant Rahman's trial that during the early morning hours of December 3, 1987, defendant argued with Tabu Stokes in a nightclub in Brooklyn. About 20 minutes later, defendant fired several shots at Stokes, killing him.

During trial, the court interrupted the jury's deliberations to send them to dinner and instructed them as follows:

I think it is a good time for dinner. We're going to send you out for dinner now. You'll come back and continue your deliberations for awhile after dinner * * *. Have a good dinner. Don't discuss the case, of course, during your dinner. The alternates will join you for dinner.

Defendant registered no protest. He was convicted of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial. It too found the error reviewable as a matter of law notwithstanding the absence of an objection and concluded that permitting the alternate jurors to dine with the regular jurors after deliberations had commenced violated CPL 270.30 and 310.10.

Analysis

The Criminal Procedure Law provides for mandatory sequestration of a deliberating jury. Under CPL 310.10, jurors "must be continuously kept together under the supervision of a court officer or court officers" once they have retired to deliberate. Such court officers, moreover, "may not speak to or communicate with [the jurors] or permit any other person to do so" except where authorized by the court or when performing administerial duties (CPL 310.10). ^*

CPL 270.30 authorizes the selection of alternate jurors who may be substituted for any regular juror unable to continue serving (see also, CPL 270.35). Once the jury has retired to deliberate, CPL 270.30 dictates that the court must either discharge the alternate jurors after obtaining the consent of defendant and the People or "direct the alternate jurors not to discuss the case and must further direct that they be kept separate and apart from the regular jurors."

In the two cases now before us, during deliberations the alternate jurors were sent to dinner with the regular jurors. As the People concede, this breached both the directive in CPL 270.30 that the alternate and regular jurors be kept "separate and apart" and the sequestration requirement of CPL 310.10. Defendants urge that, because these statutory violations have been classified as affecting "the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law" (People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898, affd. 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281), reversal of their convictions was appropriate.

As we explained in the seminal Patterson case, certain deviations from mandated procedural, structural and process-oriented standards affect "the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law" and present a question of law even without a timely objection (People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d at 295, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898; see also, People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 21, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919). Only fundamental defects in judicial proceedings, however, fall within this very narrow category of so-called "mode of proceedings" errors (see, People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d at 295, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898; People v. Bradner, 107 N.Y. 1, 4-5, 13 N.E. 87). Thus, where "the error complained of goes to the essential validity of the proceedings conducted below" such that "the entire trial is irreparably tainted," it need not be preserved to present a question of law reviewable by this Court (People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d at 295-296, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898; see, e.g., People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 280, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189; People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 311-312, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984, 487 N.E.2d 894; People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110, 213 N.E.2d 445; Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 138).

In People v. Coons, 75 N.Y.2d 796, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94, 551 N.E.2d 587, w...