People v. Aguilera
| Decision Date | 22 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Indictment No. 70950-22 |
| Citation | 2023 NY Slip Op 50238 (U) |
| Parties | The People of the State of New York v. Arlin Aguilera, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Unpublished Opinion
ADA Stephanie Dellinger Nassau County District Attorney's Office Taryn Shechter, Esq. Attorney for Defendant
Defendant was indicted for aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, aggravated vehicular assault, vehicular assault in the first degree, vehicular assault in the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree, two counts of assault in the second degree, three counts of assault in the third degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree, two counts of driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, and speeding. The People allege that on December 11, 2021, at 10:54 p.m., on Peninsula Boulevard in Nassau County, defendant drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated and at an excessive rate of speed, and crashed into another vehicle, causing the death of one person, serious physical injury to another person, and physical injury to three other people.
Defendant has now filed an omnibus motion seeking 1) dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the evidence was legally insufficient, and the prosecution impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings; 2) suppression of statements made by defendant; 3) suppression of physical evidence; and 4) a Sandoval/Molineux hearing.
In support of his motion to dismiss, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he committed reckless driving as defined in section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, or that he operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused death and injuries to other persons as a result of his intoxicated condition, or that he caused death and injuries to other persons by acting recklessly as that term is defined in section 15.05 of the Penal Law. Defendant further argues that the prosecution impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding by failing to present evidence that one of the testifying police officers made some observations of defendant that were not indicative of intoxication, by failing to present a less inculpatory interpretation of the evidence obtained from the event data recorder in defendant's vehicle, and by failing to present evidence that the other vehicle failed to stop at a stop sign at another intersection prior to the crash.
The People argue that the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish the charges in the indictment. They argue that the evidence established that defendant acted recklessly by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and driving in a residential area at speeds in excess of 70 miles per hour, in a 30-miles-per-hour zone, at nighttime, on a wet roadway. And as a result of his intoxication and reckless driving, he caused death and injuries to the occupants of another vehicle. The People also argue that they did not impair the integrity of the grand jury proceedings and that they were not obligated to present the evidence defendant claims was exculpatory.
In his reply, defendant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he operated his motor vehicle in a manner that caused death and injuries to other people as a result of his intoxicated condition, and that his alleged intoxication affected his ability to perceive and react to his surroundings as he drove. Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence that he consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his actions could result in the death of another person, because there was no evidence that he knew that the speed limit at the location of the crash was 30 miles per hour. Defendant further contends that the People's failure to present potentially exculpatory evidence or a favorable interpretation of the evidence deprived the grand jury of the means to rebut the presumption that as a result of his intoxication he operated the vehicle in a manner that caused death or serious physical injury.
"To dismiss an indictment based on insufficient evidence before a Grand Jury, a reviewing court must consider 'whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant conviction by a petit jury.'" People v Bello, 92 N.Y.2d 523, 525 (1998), quoting People v Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 114 1986); see also People v Castaldo 146 A.D.3d 797 (2d Dept 2017). Legally sufficient evidence means "competent evidence which, if accepted as true would establish every element of an offense charged." CPL § 70.10(1); see also Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 525-526. "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 526. "The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to 'whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes,' and whether 'the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference.'" Id. quoting People v Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976, 979 (1987). Upon a review of a grand jury proceeding for legal sufficiency, that the grand jurors could have drawn "other, innocent inferences" from the proven facts is irrelevant to the court's inquiry, provided they could have rationally drawn the guilty inference. Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 526; see also People v Jiminez, 148 A.D.3d 723 (2d Dept 2017).
A person commits the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide when he engages in reckless driving as defined by section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, and causes the death of one person and serious physical injury to at least one other person. Penal Law § 125.14 (5). Similarly, a person commits the crime of aggravated vehicular assault when he engages in reckless driving as defined by section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, commits the crime of vehicular assault in the second degree, and causes serious physical injury to more than one other person. Penal Law § 120.04-a (4). Both vehicular manslaughter in the second degree and vehicular assault in the second degree have as an element that defendant operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. Penal Law §§ 125.12(1); 120.03(1). In addition, if the People establish that the person operating the vehicle caused the death or serious physical injury while intoxicated, then "there shall be a rebuttable presumption" that as a result of such intoxication the person operated the vehicle in a manner that caused the death or serious physical injury. Penal Law §§ 120.03; 120.04-a; 125.12; 125.14.
Defendant is also charged with manslaughter in the second degree assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree, and reckless endangerment in the second degree, for which the People are required to prove that defendant acted with the culpable mental state of recklessness. Penal Law §§ 120.00(2); 120.05 (4); 120.20; 125.15 (1). "A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists." Penal Law § 15.05(3). "The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." Id. A person also acts recklessly when he creates such a risk but is unaware of that risk solely by reason of his voluntary intoxication. See id.
"Reckless driving," as defined in section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, is distinct from the culpable mental state of recklessness. A person commits the crime of reckless driving when he operates a motor vehicle "in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway." VTL § 1212. "[D]espite the name of the charge, the culpable mental state of recklessness, as set forth in Penal Law § 15.05(3), is not an 'element' of the offense of reckless driving.'" People v Badke, 21 Misc.3d 471, 479 (Suffolk County Ct 2008), quoting People v Ackroyd, 144 Misc.2d 149, 154 (Supreme Court, Albany County, 1989); see also People v Walton, 70 A.D.3d 871, 874-875 (2d Dept 2010) (); CJI2d(NY) VTL § 1212, https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/3-VTL/VTL_1212/1212.pdf (last accessed). Where a defendant is charged with reckless driving or reckless driving is an element of another crime, the People must prove the defendant engaged in some conduct more egregious than a simple traffic infraction. S ee People v. Goldblatt, 98 A.D.3d 817, 819 (3d Dept 2012). But they are not required to prove he acted with the culpable mental state of recklessness, just that he operated a motor vehicle in a manner that unreasonably interfered with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangered users of the public highway. See, e.g., CJI2d(NY) Penal Law 125.14(4), https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/2-PenalLaw/125/125-14%284%29.pdf (last accessed).
The culpable mental state of recklessness, by contrast, is similar to the culpable mental state of criminal negligence and the two differ only in that "recklessness requires that the defendant be 'aware of' and 'consciously disregard' the risk while criminal negligence is met when the defendant negligently fails to perceive the risk." People v Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677, 684 (2013). In the context of automobile accidents, both mental states require that the...
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