People v. Allen

• Decision Date: 15 June 1976
• Citation: 386 N.Y.S.2d 404,352 N.E.2d 591,39 N.Y.2d 916
• Parties: , 352 N.E.2d 591 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gary ALLEN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 404

386 N.Y.S.2d 404

39 N.Y.2d 916, 352 N.E.2d 591

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gary ALLEN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 15, 1976.

Robert H. Claridge and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.

Nicholas Ferraro, Dist. Atty. (Michael T. Ridge, Richmond Hill, of counsel), for respondent.

MEMORANDUM.

Order of the Appellate Term reversed and a new trial ordered.

Upon learning from court documents that defendant wished to represent himself without a lawyer, the trial court asked defendant whether he understood the charges against him. When defendant replied that he did, the court directed the People to proceed.

This summary and perfunctory disposition of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel was insufficient to form the basis for a waiver. Such a waiver must be knowing and intelligent (see Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464--465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Matter of Lawrence S., 29 N.Y.2d 206, 208--209, 325 N.Y.S.2d 921, 275 N.E.2d 577; People v. Seaton, 19 N.Y.2d 404, 406, 280 N.Y.S.2d 370, 227 N.E.2d 294). It is the responsibility of the trial court to satisfy itself, through an examination of the defendant appropriate to the circumstances, that the waiver was knowing and intelligent (People v. Seaton, supra, at p. 406, 280 N.Y.S.2d 370, 227 N.E.2d 294).

The purported 'waiver' of the constitutional right to counsel in this case may also be analyzed as an assertion of the constitutional right to represent oneself. The result is the same. To establish a valid assertion of the right to represent oneself, the trial court must satisfy itself that the accompanying waiver of the right to counsel was competent, intelligent, and voluntary (People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351, 353, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614, 334 N.E.2d 572; People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 324 N.E.2d 322). The trial court's single perfunctory question hardly discharged that responsibility.

Defendant contends that, if the order of the Appellate Term be reversed, the indictment should be dismissed since he has served his sentence. The Criminal Procedure law provides that, upon reversal for error or defect which resulted in prejudice to a defendant or deprived him of a fair trial, a new trial must be ordered (CPL 470.20, subd. 1; 470.40, subd. 1). Cases in which the charges have been dismissed after a reversal because the defendant has served his sentence involved relatively minor crimes and offenses (People v. Simmons, 32 N.Y.2d 250, 344 N.Y.S.2d 897, 298 N.E.2d 76 (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle) People v. Scala, 26 N.Y.2d 753, 309 N.Y.S.2d 200, 257 N.E.2d 648 (petit larceny);...