People v. Altantawi
| Decision Date | 26 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | SC: 160436,COA: 346775 |
| Citation | 954 N.W.2d 518 (Mem) |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Muhammad ALTANTAWI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
On April 21, 2020, the Court ordered oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the September 5, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1) and in light of the prosecutor's concession that the juvenile defendant was subjected to a "custodial interrogation" without being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), we VACATE our order dated April 21, 2020. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE Part III.B. of the judgment of the Court of Appeals addressing the Miranda issue, and we VACATE that part of the November 20, 2018 order of the Oakland Circuit Court that denied the defendant's motion to suppress his statements to the police. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
The Court's order today vacates the lower court judgments simply "in light of the prosecutor's concession" that defendant was in custody for the purposes of Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). As a result of the concession, the prosecutor submits that the statements defendant made during his interrogation without being advised of his Miranda warnings should not be used against him at trial. However, the order does not purport to determine whether that the concession is legally correct and, instead, it simply wipes the proverbial slate clean for future proceedings. I write to explain why I believe that, in resolving the case in this manner, the Court has relinquished its responsibility to independently evaluate and adjudicate this case in light of the alleged error now raised on appeal. And it has chosen a poor vehicle for doing so, as I do not believe that there was any plausible error below. Instead, I would request supplemental briefing on whether the case has become moot and whether the lower court judgments should be vacated.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, a prosecutor's confession of error "does not relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function," and while the opinion of the prosecutor is entitled to some weight, "our judicial obligations compel us to examine independently the errors confessed." Young v. United States , 315 U.S. 257, 258-259, 62 S.Ct. 510, 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942). The public interest in the "proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties." Id. at 259, 62 S.Ct. 510. See also Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40, 58, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) ( ) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has engaged in a "now well entrenched" practice of summarily disposing of such cases by what is known as a "GVR": the Court grants certiorari, vacates the lower court judgment, and remands. Lawrence v. Chater , 516 U.S. 163, 183, 116 S.Ct. 604, 133 L.Ed.2d 545 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court has asserted the authority to order such relief under 28 USC 2106, which "appears" to give the Supreme Court the "broad power" to vacate and remand any judgment for further proceedings. Lawrence , 516 U.S. at 166, 116 S.Ct. 604 (opinion of the Court). 1 A GVR does not require a finding that error occurred and therefore does not create any precedent. See id. at 171, 116 S.Ct. 604 (); Casey v. United States , 343 U.S. 808, 808, 72 S.Ct. 999, 96 L.Ed. 1317 (1952) (). But, to reconcile these orders with the obligation to independently consider the legal issue, the Supreme Court accepts only legally "plausible confessions of error ...." Lawrence , 516 U.S. at 171, 116 S.Ct. 604.
Justice Scalia and other members of the Supreme Court have criticized the GVR process. See Nunez v. United States , 554 U.S. 911, 912, 128 S.Ct. 2990, 171 L.Ed.2d 879 (2008) (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (). They contend that the "facially unlimited statutory text" of 28 USC 2106 remains "subject to the implicit limitations imposed by traditional practice and by the nature of the appellate system created by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Lawrence , 516 U.S. at 178, 116 S.Ct. 604 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). The lower courts, "staffed by judges whose manner of appointment and tenure of office are the same as our own," are "not the creatures and agents of this body," unlike "masters, whose work we may reject and send back for redoing at our own pleasure." Id. at 178-179, 116 S.Ct. 604. Moreover, according to this line of thought, the routine acceptance of confessions fits poorly within our adversary system, can smack of gamesmanship, and provides dubious value in determining the existence of legal errors in complicated areas of law. 2
I agree with this critique and find it applicable to confessions made in our Court. 3 MCR 7.305(H)(1) provides that the Court may "grant or deny the application for leave to appeal, enter a final decision, direct argument on the application, or issue a peremptory order." As with 28 USC 2106, this court rule is subject to the implicit limitations of the appellate system created by our Constitution. As in the federal court system, judges across Michigan's judiciary are appointed and elected in the same manner as justices of this Court. Compare Const. 1963, art. 6, §§ 2, 8, 12, 16, and 23. More generally, we have forcefully rejected the notion that the parties’ stipulations of law bind the Court, as this result would be contrary to the judicial obligation "to determine the applicable law in each case." In re Finlay Estate , 430 Mich. 590, 595, 424 N.W.2d 272 (1988). I believe that this obligation flows to cases involving confessions of error—automatic acceptance of confessions would be tantamount to allowing the parties to stipulate the law, even if the resolution does not create binding precedent going forward. For these reasons, I believe that our Court also has the duty to "examine independently the errors confessed" and make a determination on the merits of an error in order to avoid leaving the "proper administration of the criminal law ... to the stipulation of parties." Young , 315 U.S. at 258-259, 62 S.Ct. 510.
In the present case, I respectfully submit that the majority has abdicated this responsibility by simply vacating the lower court judgments and remanding without any analysis of the legal issue at stake. The Court's action falls short of even the GVR standard, as there is no pretense that the confession is plausible. I would not undo the judgment of the Court of Appeals without either resolving the merits or explaining why some other applicable legal principle (such as mootness) requires vacatur.
Even if I were inclined to acquiesce in this general GVR practice, I would refrain from it here because I am not convinced there was any plausible error in the Court of Appeals’ judgment that defendant was not in custody. 4 See Lawrence , 516 U.S. at 171, 116 S.Ct. 604 (). To determine whether a defendant was in custody at the time of an interview, the Court must determine whether a "reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave" and then whether "the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda ." Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). In making this assessment, the court must examine "all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Relevant factors include "the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning." Id. (citations omitted). If the defendant is a juvenile, the child's age is also a relevant factor in the custody analysis. JDB v. North Carolina , 564 U.S. 261, 271-272, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011).
For the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals’ majority, nearly all the non-age-related factors favor a finding that a reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt free to leave the interview. The interview took place in an open, familiar location in defendant's home—the dining room table. 5 The interview did not last long, only 38 minutes. 6 While the officers did not tell defendant that he was free to leave, they did ask permission from defendant's father to interview defendant. 7 They also did not threaten defendant but generally talked in a conversational tone and implored him to tell the truth. 8 Defendant was not physically restrained in any way, and he was released after questioning. 9 Finally, in considering defendant's age, it is true that defendant was a 16-year-old minor at...
To continue reading
Request your trial