People v. Argyris

• Decision Date: 25 November 2014
• Citation: 27 N.E.3d 425,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 08220,3 N.Y.S.3d 711,24 N.Y.3d 1138
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Costandino ARGYRIS, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John A. DiSalvo, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Eric R. Johnson, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

24 N.Y.3d 1138

27 N.E.3d 425

3 N.Y.S.3d 711

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 08220

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent

v.Costandino ARGYRIS, Appellant.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent

v.John A. DiSalvo, Appellant.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent

v.Eric R. Johnson, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 25, 2014.

Steven R. Kartagener, New York City, for appellants in the first and second above-entitled actions.

Fiandach & Fiandach, Rochester (Edward L. Fiandach of counsel), for appellant in the third above-entitled action.

Barket, Marion, Epstein & Kearon, LLP, Garden City (Donna Aldea of counsel), and Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Robert J. Masters of counsel), for respondent in the first and second above-entitled actions.

R. Michael Tantillo, District Attorney, Canandaigua, for respondent in the third above-entitled action.

OPINION OF THE COURTMEMORANDUM .

In People v. Argyris and People v. DiSalvo, the orders of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. In People v. Johnson, the order of County Court should be reversed, the suppression motion granted and the accusatory instrument dismissed.

Regardless of whether we apply a totality of the circumstances test or the Aguilar–Spinelli standard (see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 [1969] ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 [1964] ), there is record support for the lower courts' findings that the stops were lawful in People v. Argyris and People v. Di–Salvo. The police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants' vehicle based on the contents of a 911 call from an anonymous individual and the confirmatory observations of the police. Specifically, because sufficient information in the record supports the lower courts' determination that the tip was reliable under the totality of the circumstances, satisfied the two-pronged Aguilar–Spinelli test for the reliability of hearsay tips in this particular context and contained sufficient information about defendants' unlawful possession of a weapon to create reasonable suspicion, the lawfulness of the stop of defendants' vehicle is beyond further review. Furthermore, under these circumstances, the absence of predictive information in the tip was not fatal to its reliability (compare People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496, 499, 814 N.Y.S.2d 567, 847 N.E.2d 1141 [2006], with Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1688–1692, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 [2014] ). On this record, the lower courts did not err in concluding that the police's other actions were lawful (see People v. Brnja, 50 N.Y.2d 366, 372, 429 N.Y.S.2d 173, 406 N.E.2d 1066 [1980] ).

In People v. Johnson, whether evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances or under the Aguilar–Spinelli framework, the reliability of the tip was not established. The caller's cursory allegation that the driver of the car was either sick or intoxicated, without more, did not supply the sheriff's deputy who stopped the car with reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated (see generally People v. De Bour [La Pene ], 40 N.Y.2d 210, 225, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 [1976] ; cf. Navarette, 572 U.S. at ––––, 134 S.Ct. at 1690–1692 ). Although the deputy observed defendant commit a minor traffic infraction, this did not authorize the vehicle stop because he was outside his geographical jurisdiction at the time of the infraction (see CPL 140.10[2][a] ), and defendant's actions in committing the violation did not elevate the deputy's suspicion sufficiently to justify the stop of defendant's car. The issue of whether suppression should be denied on the theory that the deputy's violation of the statutory limits on his jurisdiction does not warrant suppression is not before us.

SMITH, J. (concurring).

Four Judges agree that we should affirm in the first two of these cases and reverse in the third, but we disagree on the rationale. The issue that divides us is whether to apply the Aguilar –Spinelli test to stops that require only reasonable suspicion. We have never done so before, and I think we should not do so now, because the Aguilar –Spinelli test needlessly complicates and confuses the analysis of reasonable suspicion issues.

Under the rule established by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), whether information supplied by an informant to the police is sufficient to provide probable cause for a search or a seizure is decided by the application of a two-pronged test: Courts must evaluate both the basis of the informant's knowledge and the reliability or veracity of the informant himself (see People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 402–403, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439 [1985] ). The United States Supreme Court, finding the test too rigid, abandoned it in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) in favor of “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis” (id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317 )—a polysyllabic way of saying that courts look at all the facts and see if they add up to probable cause. But our Court has rejected the Gates approach and continues to apply the Aguilar –Spinelli rule to probable cause issues (Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406–407, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439 ; People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 639, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55, 524 N.E.2d 409 [1988] ).

In applying the Aguilar -Spinelli rule, we have moderated the rigidity of the two-pronged test by holding that evidence corroborating the informant's statements may, in some cases, satisfy either the basis-of-knowledge or the veracity/reliability prong (People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 234–235, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 406 N.E.2d 471 [1980] [basis-of-knowledge prong may be satisfied only by “confirmation of sufficient details suggestive of or directly related to the criminal activity informed about”]; People v. DiFalco, 80 N.Y.2d 693, 695, 594 N.Y.S.2d 679, 610 N.E.2d 352 [1993] [“the veracity component ... may ... be satisfied by police corroboration of details that are not, if taken separately, suggestive of criminal activity”] ). To the extent that such evidence—which does not directly prove either the basis of the informant's knowledge or his truthfulness—may satisfy either prong, the two prongs tend to merge, and the Aguilar –Spinelli rule begins to resemble the totality-of-the-circumstances test.

While we have attenuated the Aguilar –Spinelli rule in the probable cause context, we have not, so far as I know, even applied it before today where the issue was reasonable suspicion. We have decided several reasonable suspicion cases without any reference to the Aguilar –Spinelli rule (People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496, 814 N.Y.S.2d 567, 847 N.E.2d 1141 [2006] ; People v. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869, 527 N.Y.S.2d 750, 522 N.E.2d 1048 [1988] ; People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 434 N.Y.S.2d 144, 414 N.E.2d 645 [1980] ; People v. Stewart, 41 N.Y.2d 65, 390 N.Y.S.2d 870, 359 N.E.2d 379 [1976] ). In People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 375–377, 465 N.Y.S.2d 857, 452 N.E.2d 1185 (1983), we relied on the Aguilar –Spinelli rule in concluding that probable cause was lacking, but then left that rule unmentioned in upholding the search and arrest on the ground that a finding of reasonable suspicion was supported by the record (see also People v. Chase, 85 N.Y.2d 493, 501, 626 N.Y.S.2d 721, 650 N.E.2d 379 [1995] [holding probable cause to be lacking on Aguilar – Spinelli grounds; remitting the case, without further mention of Aguilar –Spinelli, for determination of the reasonable suspicion issue] ).

Today, two of my colleagues would extend the Aguilar –Spinelli standard “to the determination of the legality of investigatory stops precipitated by anonymous hearsay tips” (concurring op. of Abdus–Salaam, J. at 1143–1144, 3 N.Y.S.3d at 714, 27 N.E.3d at 428). This would mean, presumably, that in such cases a court must find that a reasonable person could suspect—though not necessarily believe it probable—that the informant had an adequate basis of knowledge and was a credible or reliable source. The second determination, the so-called “veracity” prong, seems especially hard to make in anonymous tip cases: there are obvious problems in evaluating the veracity of an informant when the police do not know who the informant is.

Judge Abdus–Salaam's opinion overcomes this and any other problems that the Aguilar –Spinelli test may present with a minute analysis of the evidence in these cases. In Argyris and Di–Salvo, Judge Abdus–Salaam would find both prongs of the test to be satisfied, relying, as to both prongs, on the content of the recorded 911 call. In Johnson, she would find that the anonymous call did not satisfy the basis-of-knowledge prong, and that no corroborating evidence supplies the deficiency; she does not discuss the veracity prong in deciding Johnson, but she could easily reach a similar conclusion on that issue for essentially the same reasons. I generally agree with the analysis of the facts in Judge Abdus–Salaam's opinion, but I do not see what is gained by dividing that analysis into two prongs. Using a totality-of-the-circumstances approach would lead us, more quickly and with less complexity, to the same place.

ABDUS–SALAAM, J. (concurring).

In considering the legality of police searches and seizures instigated by hearsay information under article I, § 12 of the Constitution of the State of New York, we have adhered to the Supreme Court's mid-twentieth-century jurisprudence on hearsay tips as laid out in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). Thus, we have held that hearsay information cannot provide a police officer with probable cause to arrest an individual unless the hearsay report reveals a reliable basis for the informant's knowledge and shows that the...