People v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 12 June 2001
• Citation: 96 N.Y.2d 358,753 N.E.2d 846,729 N.Y.S.2d 51
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. MARLON ARNOLD, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

96 N.Y.2d 358

753 N.E.2d 846

729 N.Y.S.2d 51

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. MARLON ARNOLD, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued April 25, 2001.

Decided June 12, 2001.

Howard R. Relin, District Attorney of Monroe County, Rochester (Stephen K. Lindley of counsel), for appellant.

Edward J. Nowak, Public Defender of Monroe County, Rochester (Stephen J. Bird of counsel), for respondent.

Judges SMITH, LEVINE, CIPARICK, WESLEY, ROSENBLATT and GRAFFEO concur.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge KAYE.

A basic premise of our criminal justice system is that a defendant has the right to trial by an impartial jury. This appeal requires us to consider, once again, what it means for a juror to be impartial, and what is required to insure the impartiality of the jury.

Defendant was convicted of assault for stabbing his former girlfriend. His defense at trial was that he had acted in self-defense after she had attacked him with a razor blade. During voir dire, defense counsel asked a panel of prospective jurors if anyone was "thinking in the back of your mind maybe this is not the case that I ought to be sitting on because of my own personal background, my own personal experience, my own personal feelings about certain situations." Prospective Juror Number 4, who had a bachelor's degree in sociology and had minored in women's studies, answered, "Yes," stating that she had done "a lot of research" on domestic violence and battered women's syndrome. She added, "I have a problem with that." Defense counsel then asked whether if, in the jury room, "would you be saying, well, I minored in this in college, and I've done all of this research and in effect become another witness in the case, an expert if you will, on that area with the other jurors. Do you think that might be a problem?" The prospective juror answered, "I think so." Counsel then asked whether she would feel more comfortable sitting on another kind of case, such as a bank robbery. She responded, "I think I would."

Later in the voir dire, defense counsel asked the entire panel whether they could follow the law as instructed by the court, and whether they agreed that they would not use this case as a "referendum" on crime, domestic abuse or violence in the streets. Without stating how, the transcript reads, "Prospective jurors indicating yes."

Defense counsel moved to excuse Prospective Juror Number 4 for cause, arguing she had indicated that she could not be fair in this case because of her background in women's studies. Counsel noted she did not give an unequivocal assurance that she could be fair, and added the juror had admitted the possibility that, because of her background, she might become an "unsworn witness in the jury room." The prosecutor opposed the challenge, arguing that although the prospective juror said that she would "feel more comfortable with another kind of case," and that she had "experience with issues concerning conjugal violence and women's studies," she did not say that she "wouldn't be able to listen to the law and would be unfair." The prosecutor contended that the juror "can be advised as to what she can or cannot do."

The trial court denied the challenge for cause, after which defense counsel used a peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror Number 4. During the course of the voir dire, defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges.

A divided Appellate Division reversed. The majority reasoned that once "the prospective juror expressed doubt regarding her ability to be impartial or indicated that she might be an unsworn expert witness in the jury room, it was incumbent upon the court to ascertain that her prior state of mind would not influence her verdict and that she would render an impartial verdict based on the evidence." (272 AD2d 857, 858.) In addition, the majority noted that "the later general acknowledgment by all prospective jurors that they would follow the law" did not establish "the impartiality of the prospective juror in question." Two Justices dissented, arguing that the prospective juror indicated no "predisposition to rule a certain way," and also "indicated that she would base her decision on the evidence alone and that she would follow the law as instructed by the court." (272 AD2d, at 858-859.) A Judge of this Court granted leave, and we affirm.

Analysis

One of the important rights afforded a criminal defendant under our system of justice is the right to a fair trial before an unbiased fact finder. But ours is a human process, and just as there are no "perfect" trials, there are no "perfect" juries.

While the goal is utter impartiality, each juror inevitably brings to the jury room a lifetime of experience that will necessarily inform her assessment of the witnesses and the evidence. This is a reality we simply cannot deny. Nor would we want a jury devoid of life experience, even if that were possible, because it is precisely such experience that enables a jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the strength of arguments. What we can—and do— ask, however, is that every juror enter the trial with an open mind, that every juror not be prejudiced from the outset against any particular party, and that every juror be willing to decide the case solely on the evidence presented and the law instructed by the Trial Judge.

In order to achieve that goal, Criminal Procedure Law § 270.20 (1) (b) provides that a party may challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror "has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at trial." Upon such a challenge, a juror who has revealed doubt, because of prior knowledge or opinion, about her ability to serve impartially must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that she can be fair. While the CPL, unlike the former Code of Criminal Procedure, does not require any particular expurgatory oath or "talismanic" words (see, People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 611; People v Culhane, 33 NY2d 90, 106), jurors must clearly express that any prior experiences or opinions that reveal the potential for bias will not prevent them from reaching an impartial verdict. If there is any doubt about a prospective juror's impartiality, trial courts should err on the side of excusing the juror, since at worst the court will have "replaced one impartial juror with another" (People v Culhane, supra, at 108 n 3).

Applying that principle, this Court held in People v Johnson that the defendant's challenge for cause was improperly denied where a prospective juror stated that he would tend to favor police testimony and that he did not know whether he could evaluate police testimony fairly (94 NY2d, at 604-606). Similarly, in People v Reyes, a companion case to Johnson, we held that a prospective juror should have been excused who said that, as a parent, she would have difficultly being impartial in a drug case, that she could "only try" to be fair, and that there were "a lot of emotional things" that would color her view of the case (see, id., at 607-608). When "potential jurors themselves openly state that they doubt their own ability to be impartial in the case at hand, there is far more than a likelihood of bias, and an unequivocal assurance of impartiality must be elicited if they are to serve" (id., at 614 [emphasis in original]).

Prospective jurors who make statements that cast serious doubt on their ability to render an impartial verdict, and who have given less-than-unequivocal assurances of impartiality, must be excused (see, People v Blyden, 55 NY2d 73, 78

; see also, People v Torpey, 63 NY2d 361, 367-369). By contrast, where prospective jurors unambiguously state that, despite preexisting opinions that might indicate bias, they will decide the case impartially and based on the evidence, the trial court has discretion to deny the challenge for cause if it determines that the juror's promise to be impartial is credible (see, People v Williams, 63 NY2d 882, 884-885).

Here, as the Appellate Division correctly held, the trial court should not have seated Prospective Juror Number 4 without obtaining her unequivocal assurance that she could be fair. In response to defense counsel's questioning, the prospective juror volunteered that she did not think she should be sitting on this case because of her experience. Specifically, she stated that she had studied domestic violence extensively and that she had a "problem." Those statements revealed that, because of her background, the juror herself questioned whether she could be impartial in any domestic violence case. Thus, the juror's own statements cast serious doubt on her ability to serve. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted the challenge for cause unless the juror unequivocally indicated that she could be fair despite her background.

Furthermore, we agree with the Appellate Division that the collective acknowledgment by the entire jury panel that they would follow the Judge's instructions and would not use this case as a "referendum" on crime or domestic violence was insufficient to constitute an unequivocal declaration of impartiality from Prospective Juror Number 4. The group answer by the entire panel did not address her personal attitudes, nor did it force her to confront the crucial question whether she could be fair to this defendant in light of her expressed predisposition. Indeed, nothing less than a personal, unequivocal assurance of impartiality can cure a juror's prior indication that she is predisposed against a particular defendant or particular type of case.

Defendant also contends that further inquiry was required of Prospective Juror Number 4 after she admitted that, because of her knowledge on domestic violence issues, she might, in the jury room, become an unsworn "expert" witness on the subject. This too is a recurring issue and a matter of serious concern....