People v. Arnold
| Decision Date | 04 June 2002 |
| Citation | 745 N.Y.S.2d 782,98 N.Y.2d 63,772 N.E.2d 1140 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. ANDRE ARNOLD, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Legal Aid Society, New York City (Camilla B. Taylor and Andrew C. Fine of counsel), for appellant.
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York City (Madeleine Guilmain and Donna Krone of counsel), for respondent.
At issue on this appeal is whether a trial court, in the exercise of discretion, can call its own witness after both the People and the defense have rested. Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude that it was error for the court to do so.
On May 12, 1998, a team from the Manhattan North Narcotics Zone that included Detective Rodriguez and Police Officer Hernandez went to an apartment in Manhattan to execute a search warrant. Detective Rodriguez had called the Police Department's Emergency Services Unit (ESU) to assist the team in gaining entry to the apartment through a heavily reinforced door. Once at the location, ESU broke down the door, entered the apartment and "secured" the premises by handcuffing—hands behind their backs—the three people there, including defendant. The narcotics officers then entered the apartment. They reported that in addition to the discovery of 174 vials of crack cocaine and $1279 in cash on the floor near defendant, a search of defendant yielded 70 packets of heroin, $922 in cash and a loaded handgun tucked in the back of his waistband. Defendant was charged with criminal possession of drugs and a weapon.
At a bench trial, defendant maintained he was framed by the narcotics officers who he claimed planted the drugs, cash and gun on his person. Defendant's theory was that if those items were actually on his person when the police entered the apartment, ESU would have discovered them when they cuffed him. The People contended that, although it was the function of ESU to secure the premises, they did not always frisk or search those they handcuffed. After both sides rested, the Trial Judge called as a court witness, over defendant's objection, an ESU member, Sergeant Miller, who had been at the scene.
Supreme Court convicted defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the Trial Judge's decision to call Sergeant Miller as a witness was permissible "for the purpose of clarifying testimony and satisfying itself as to the truth in its role as the trier of fact" (284 AD2d 143, 144, citing People v Kovzelove, 242 AD2d 477 [1st Dept], lv denied 91 NY2d 875 [1997]). We now reverse.
At trial, the People called as witnesses narcotics officers Detective Rodriguez and Officer Hernandez. Detective Rodriguez testified that when he and the ESU team arrived at the premises, he showed them the apartment door and then waited in the hall while ESU entered and secured the premises. He did not see what ESU did while inside. Detective Rodriguez testified that after ESU turned the scene over to the narcotics team, he searched one of the other suspects in the apartment while Officer Hernandez searched defendant. Officer Hernandez testified that, when he entered the apartment, he did not believe that the occupants had been searched by ESU prior to being handcuffed. Moreover, it was his understanding that ESU, when securing a premises, did not ordinarily frisk or search individuals before handcuffing them. Officer Hernandez also testified that upon searching defendant, he recovered the heroin and cash in addition to the handgun concealed under defendant's clothing at the small of his back. The People did not call Sergeant Miller from ESU, although he was included on their witness list. Immediately after the People rested, defense counsel requested that Sergeant Miller be made available as a defense witness later in the day. Defendant then took the stand. He testified that he resided on an upper floor of the building and that, on the day he was arrested, he was carrying about $2500 in cash, $1500 of which he intended to give to a real estate broker as a deposit on a new apartment. Before going to meet the broker, however, he stopped at the downstairs apartment to lend money to his friend who lived there. While waiting for his friend to come home, two other individuals, defendant's girlfriend and another neighbor, arrived at the apartment.1 Defendant testified that, after entering, ESU officers patted him down, searched him and then placed him in handcuffs. Defendant also testified that, when Officer Hernandez entered the apartment, he asked the ESU officers whether the prisoners had been searched and was told that they had been. Defendant claimed that it was not until he was placed in a police van that Officer Hernandez told him that police had found drugs and a gun in the apartment. Defendant told Officer Hernandez that it was not his apartment and those items were not his.
After defendant testified, the following exchange took place:
When trial resumed for the afternoon session, defense counsel, apparently after speaking to Sergeant Miller, rested without calling any further witnesses. After discussing a motion to dismiss and the details of summation, the court inquired:
Defense counsel placed an objection on the record. Testifying as a court witness, Sergeant Miller stated that he could not recall events on the day of defendant's arrest. However, he testified that when securing premises, ESU did not always frisk or search individuals before handcuffing them, and there was no determining factor for when a frisk was done. During the People's summation, the prosecutor summarized Sergeant Miller's testimony as "at most the ESU Unit would have performed a pat down" but that the sergeant had no recollection of whether the defendant was searched at all on the day of his arrest.
Although this Court has on several occasions examined whether a court's questioning of a witness called by counsel constituted error, we have not previously considered the situation where a trial judge calls its own witness. Nonetheless, the same principles apply. Trial judges have wide discretion in directing the presentation of evidence but must exercise that discretion appropriately and without prejudice to the parties (see CPL 260.30).
In our adversarial system of justice, the roles of the parties and the decision-maker are, in theory, separate and well defined (1 LaFave, Israel and King, Criminal Procedure § 1.4 [c], at 173 [2d ed]). In actuality, however, our system has evolved into what commentators have called a "modified" or "regulated" adversarial system (id. at 174). As a practical matter, trial courts sometimes must take a more active role in the presentation of evidence in order to clarify a confusing issue or to avoid misleading the trier of fact (see People v Moulton, 43 NY2d 944, 945 [1978]; People v Jamison, 47 NY2d 882, 883 [1979]). Typically, these cases arise in the context of jury trials.
While "neither the nature of our adversary system nor the constitutional requirement of a fair trial preclude a trial court from assuming an active role in the truth-seeking process," the court's discretion is not unfettered (Jamison, 47 NY2d at 883). The overarching principle restraining the court's discretion is that it is the function of the judge to protect the record at trial, not to make it (see People v Yut Wai Tom, 53 NY2d 44, 58 [1981]). Although the law will allow a...
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