People v. Arroyo, Docket No. 72103

• Decision Date: 07 January 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 72103
• Citation: 360 N.W.2d 185,138 Mich.App. 246
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur R. ARROYO, Defendant-Appellant. 138 Mich.App. 246, 360 N.W.2d 185
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 185

360 N.W.2d 185

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur R. ARROYO, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 72103.

138 Mich.App. 246, 360 N.W.2d 185

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 6, 1984.

Decided Sept. 21, 1984.

Released for Publication Jan. 7, 1985.

[138 MICHAPP 248] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William F. Delhey, Pros. Atty., and David A. King, First Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Dale J. Crowe, Ann Arbor, for defendant-appellant.

Before GRIBBS, P.J., and BRONSON and SHEPHERD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

After a bench trial, defendant was found legally sane and convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, M.C.L. Sec. 750.110; M.S.A. Sec. 28.305, and arson of a building, M.C.L. Sec. 750.73; M.S.A. Sec. 28.268. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and he appeals by leave granted. We affirm.

On November 27, 1981, defendant broke into the Economics Building on the campus of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. On December 24, 1981, defendant again entered the building and set fire to it. Defendant was taken into custody by the [138 MICHAPP 249] Ann Arbor police on the breaking and entering charge at the United States Secret Service Office in San Diego, California, on February 11, 1982. He had voluntarily responded to a request to come to that office to discuss alleged threats he had made against the President of the United States.

Defendant waived extradition and he was transported back to Ann Arbor by commercial airflight on February 12, 1982. During the trip, he signed a Miranda waiver and confessed to both the breaking and entering and the arson of the Economics Building. A Walker hearing was held on August 4 and September 7, 1982, to determine the voluntariness of the confession. The court ruled that defendant's confessions were made after a voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.

At trial defendant raised the defense of insanity, with the opposing sides presenting their own expert witnesses. Defendant was found sane by the trial court. After trial, the court denied defendant's motion for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on new evidence that defendant alleged would discredit the testimony of the State Fire Marshal with respect to the arson. Defendant raises several issues on appeal, none of which require reversal.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in determining that defendant's out-of-court statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court set forth the Fifth Amendment procedural safeguards which must be employed to protect an accused's rights against self-incrimination when he is subjected to custodial interrogation.

Prior to the admission of a defendant's statements at trial, the prosecutor must first make an affirmative showing that such warnings were given [138 MICHAPP 250] and that the waiver was properly obtained. People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965). The gist of Miranda, supra, is that, although a defendant's statement may not be "involuntary" when judged by traditional coercion standards, "the process of in-custody interrogation", without appropriate safeguards, contains "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely". In this case, the trial court ruled that defendant's confession was "voluntarily made" to the detectives "who obviously had attempted to do everything in their power to protect the man's rights".

Defendant argues on appeal that his confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed because it was a product of psychological coercion. The standard applied by this Court requires that the entire record be reviewed and an independent determination made to establish the voluntariness of defendant's confession. People v. Rowen, 111 Mich.App. 76, 314 N.W.2d 526 (1981). The trial court's ruling on voluntariness should be affirmed unless clear error appears, such that this Court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. People v. Price, 112 Mich.App. 791, 317 N.W.2d 249 (1982), lv. den. 414 Mich. 946 (1982). Moreover, if the evidence is conflicting and the determination of voluntariness is largely dependent on the credibility of the witnesses, this Court should defer to the trial court's finding. People v. Anglin, 111 Mich.App. 268, 314 N.W.2d 581 (1981).

Defendant's arrest and the events which were the subject of the Walker hearing occurred as follows. On February 11, 1982, defendant voluntarily went to the United States Secret Service Office in San Diego, California, for questioning regarding [138 MICHAPP 251] alleged threats against the President of the United States. In that office, while in custody of the Secret Service, two officers from the Ann Arbor Police Department arrived. They informed him that they had a warrant for his arrest on a breaking and entering charge.

The defendant told the officers he did not wish to make any statement, and Detective Roderick of the Ann Arbor police told him he would not ask him any questions about the actual incident, but that he needed to know what he wanted to do about extradition. The defendant stated that he would like to talk to an attorney about extradition and the detectives arranged to take him to the San Diego County Felony Arraignment Court, where he spoke privately with a public defender on duty. He was then arraigned by a San Diego County Judge and, at that time, formally waived extradition.

The detectives then asked defendant if there was anything else he wanted to discuss privately with the attorney before he was lodged in the county jail overnight until their departure. Defendant replied that he did not want to talk to the attorney about anything else, but asked the detectives to get his belongings from the rented room where he had been staying. Defendant specifically requested that the officers bring him his rosary and Bible, and signed a consent form to allow the search.

While he was lodged in the San Diego County Jail, defendant called his parents and apparently asked them to get him an attorney. His father told him they did not have enough money. He also called a friend, Michael O'Connor, in Ann Arbor, but defendant could not remember the substance of the conversation. O'Connor testified that he warned defendant that he should not speak to [138 MICHAPP 252] anyone or say anything about what had happened without legal counsel. After talking to defendant, O'Connor contacted an attorney in Ann Arbor on defendant's behalf.

On February 12, 1982, the attorney engaged by O'Connor, Molly Reno, telephoned the Ann Arbor Police Department and asked to speak with either Detective Branson or Roderick. When she was unable to reach them, she told the person answering the telephone in the detective bureau that she would be representing defendant and that she did not want him questioned without her being present.

That same day, the detectives checked defendant out of the San Diego Jail and boarded a commercial airflight for the return trip to Ann Arbor. The trip was to Detroit by way of Dallas, and took 18 to 19 hours. It appears undisputed that the detectives had no knowledge of Ms. Reno's actions in Ann Arbor before they left San Diego or during the course of the flight. The defendant was given his Bible and rosary either on the way to the airport or after he boarded the plane. In the early part of the flight, he sat between the detectives and prayed his rosary. Also during the first couple of hours of the flight, the detectives and defendant ate dinner and discussed general subjects.

Both detectives stated that after dinner defendant suddenly asked if the detectives wanted to talk about the case. Defendant could not recall making such a statement. At that point Detective Roderick told defendant that some of his friends in Ann Arbor with whom the detectives had talked about the breaking and entering were concerned about how defendant viewed them in light of the fact that they had talked to the police. The detectives told him that his friends could not condone what he had done, but that they still considered [138 MICHAPP 253] themselves his friends. Then Detective Branson talked to defendant about his Catholicism, about religious confession and about getting things off his chest. The detectives went on to tell defendant that they thought he was one of those kind of people who felt remorse over what had happened. Branson testified that defendant began to cry near the end of his talk. Defendant testified that he told the detectives "I did it" before he began to cry. The detectives then went over the Miranda warnings, item by item, with defendant. Defendant signed the legal pad containing the warnings, and both detectives also signed.

Defendant then admitted responsibility for the breaking and entering as well as the arson. Branson testified that the preliminary discussions leading up to the Miranda warnings and the confession took about 15 to 20 minutes. Coupled with the confession itself, the entire conversation consumed about 45 minutes.

At the conclusion of this discussion, there was no further questioning about the two crimes for the remainder of the trip. It was not until the detectives arrived back at their office in Ann Arbor on February 13, 1982, that they received a letter from Ms. Reno advising them that she did not want the detectives to discuss the case with defendant. Detective Roderick called Ms. Reno and informed her that defendant had given them a statement on the plane. Ms. Reno immediately went to the station to talk with defendant and appeared the following day at arraignment for the defendant. She later withdrew from the case, due to a potential conflict in representing him.

Defendant analogizes the facts of this case...