People v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 28 April 2014
• Docket Number: E058100
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TOY LATESE BAILEY, Defendant and Appellant.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TOY LATESE BAILEY, Defendant and Appellant.

E058100

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

Filed: April 28, 2014

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super.Ct.No. FSB1104924)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Kyle S. Brodie, Judge. Affirmed in part, remanded with directions in part.

Jean Matulis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant Toy Latese Bailey pled guilty to transportation of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)); possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)); and resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)). In return, defendant was placed on probation for a period of 36 months with various terms and conditions. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion; and (2) the matter must be remanded because the trial court failed to calculate and award applicable presentence custody credits. We agree that the matter must be remanded to allow the court to calculate defendant's presentence custody credits.

I

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

On July 20, 2011, at around 3:00 p.m., Redlands Police Officer Daniel Sardegna and his partner were on duty when they initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by defendant for speeding and illegally tinted windows. When Officer Sardegna approached the vehicle, the officer could not see inside the vehicle. Defendant rolled down her window to her neckline, and Officer Sardegna asked defendant to roll it down further so he could safely see where her hands were placed. Defendant initially failed to comply but eventually did so.

Officer Sardegna asked defendant for her identification and vehicle registration. Defendant provided the officer with her vehicle registration and then began to look for her identification. Defendant fumbled in her purse, which was located on the front passenger seat; the center console; and then in the car's glove box in an attempt to locate her identification. During this time, defendant's voice trembled, she seemed reluctant to answer questions, raised her voice, and generally exhibited an attitude toward the officer. After about two minutes, Officer Sardegna asked defendant for her name and date of birth so he could run it in his computer to see if defendant had a valid driver's license. The officer also asked defendant to exit the vehicle because he did not feel safe with her sitting in the vehicle. Officer Sardegna explained that defendant's initial refusal to roll down the window, her strange demeanor, and because he could not see inside the vehicle all caused him to feel the situation would be better controlled with defendant out of the car.

After questioning the officer as to why she had to exit the vehicle, defendant swung the door open and looked down at the floorboard. Defendant again began to argue with the officer and was reluctant to get out of the vehicle. As defendant stepped out from the vehicle, Officer Sardegna saw a red clear one-inch by one-inch plastic baggie on the floorboard on the driver's side. Defendant placed her foot on the baggie and tried to slide it under the seat as she exited the vehicle. Defendant then "dove back into the driver's seat" and wrapped her arms around the seatbelt and headrest. While holding onto the car, defendant screamed profanities and demanded to know the reason for herarrest. Officer Sardegna grabbed defendant by her arm and told her that she needed to exit the vehicle. Based on his training and experience, Officer Sardegna believed the baggie to be associated with narcotics packaging and that the baggie contained controlled substances.²

Other officers arrived to assist Officer Sardegna. Officer Sardegna told defendant to let go of the headrest and to stop resisting. Defendant cursed at the officers and said that she was pregnant and that they were hurting her. After a few minutes, the officers pried defendant's hands from the headrest, untangled them from the seat belt, and placed her in handcuffs. The officers escorted defendant to the back of the vehicle and had her sit on the curb. The officers also called paramedics because defendant had claimed she was pregnant.³ Officer Sardegna asked defendant if she had any form of identification and whether he could look inside the vehicle for her identification. Defendant responded that she did not know, cursed at the officer, and did not give a "good response."

Officer Sardegna thereafter searched inside the vehicle for defendant's identification and told his partners that he also believed the vehicle contained narcotics. Defendant's open, unzipped purse was on the passenger seat near the center console with the contents on the seat and hanging outside the purse. Officer Sardegna observed other similar red one-inch baggies in defendant's open purse near a black makeup bag. OfficerSardegna looked inside defendant's purse but did not find defendant's identification. Meanwhile, Officer Sardegna's partner, Officer Liu, removed the makeup bag from the purse. Officer Sardegna told him to look inside the bag for defendant's identification. Officer Liu opened the makeup bag and removed several baggies matching the one Officer Sardegna saw on the driver's side floorboard.⁴ The baggies contained methamphetamine. The makeup bag also contained two glass pipes, a digital scale, and a day planner. Defendant was thereafter placed under arrest.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

The trial court twice denied defendant's suppression motion, finding the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the totality of the circumstances relating to defendant's actions, the presence of the baggie on the driver's side floorboard, defendant's active attempt to conceal it, and Officer Sardegna's training and experience.⁵Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion because there was no justification to search defendant's makeup bag without a warrant.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's express or implied factual findings where supported by the evidence and exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924.) "The trial court also has the duty to decide whether, on the facts found, the search was unreasonable within the meaning of the Constitution. . . . [I]t becomes the ultimate responsibility of the appellate court to measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness." (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160, fn. omitted.)

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." However, "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable." (Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 250.)

The Fourth Amendment prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative detentions, when they are "'unreasonable.'" (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229.)In order to pass constitutional muster, a detention must be "based on 'some objective manifestation' that criminal activity is afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity." (Id. at p. 230.) Thus, as specific to a vehicle stop, "a police officer can legally stop a motorist only if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law." (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926, italics omitted.) Here, it is undisputed that Officer Sardegna lawfully stopped defendant for traffic violations.

Warrantless searches, although usually per se unreasonable, are considered reasonable in various contexts. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357.) The warrantless search of an automobile, for instance, can be justified on a variety of grounds, among them: (1) probable cause to believe the car contains contraband (Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 149); (2) the search is incident to the arrest of an occupant of the vehicle (New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 460, overruled on another ground in Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 343); and (3) the search is part of the inventory of a lawfully impounded vehicle (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 375-376).

Under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches, a vehicle, because of its mobility, may be searched without a warrant when police have probable cause to believe it contains contraband. (Maryland v. Dyson (1999) 527 U.S. 465, 466-467.) "The probable cause determination 'must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate andnot merely on the subjective good faith of the police officers.' [Citation.] 'If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.' [Citation.]" (People v. Carvajal (1988) 202...