People v. Beasley

• Decision Date: 19 April 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 210668.
• Citation: 609 N.W.2d 581,239 Mich. App. 548
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jermaine Tyrone BEASLEY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

609 N.W.2d 581

239 Mich. App. 548

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jermaine Tyrone BEASLEY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 210668.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 8, 1999, at Lansing.

Decided February 1, 2000, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication April 19, 2000.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Lenore M. Ferber, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Don Ferris, Ann Arbor, for the defendant.

Before: WILDER, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and ZAHRA, JJ.

WILDER, P.J.

The prosecution appeals as of right from the circuit court's final order of acquittal/dismissal/remand of the charges against defendant. We reverse and remand.

I. Facts

Defendant was charged with two counts of open murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; MSA 28.548, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). At the preliminary examination, the district court rejected defendant's challenge to the admissibility of a statement made by codefendant Andre Freeman. It is undisputed that this statement, made by Freeman to Darnia Townsend, his ex-girlfriend and the mother of his son, is the primary evidence against defendant in the charged offenses. Townsend testified during the preliminary examination that Freeman called her and told her that he and defendant had gone to the victims' house to purchase drugs and that, when they arrived, they discovered more drugs than expected. Townsend further testified that Freeman told her he and defendant decided to take advantage of this "opportunity," and Freeman shot the man and woman in the house. Freeman allegedly further related that after he shot the woman but before he believed she had died, his gun jammed, and that defendant then shot the woman "because she was still alive." Townsend testified that Freeman told her he discussed the killings with her because he needed to get it off his chest and she was the only one he could talk to.

At the completion of the preliminary examination, the district court bound defendant over for trial. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to quash the information, contending that the codefendant's statement was inadmissible hearsay and that, without the statement, the prosecution could not establish probable cause that defendant committed the crimes charged. The circuit court found that the statement was hearsay not otherwise admissible against defendant under MRE 804(b)(3) and held that admission of the statement as substantive evidence would violate defendant's right to confrontation. The circuit court further found that, without the statement, the prosecution failed to show "probable cause to believe Beasley committed the charged crime...." Accordingly, the circuit court entered an order of acquittal/dismissal/remand ordering that the information against defendant be quashed and defendant be released from custody immediately.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the prosecution first argues that the circuit court erred in determining that defendant's statement was inadmissible as substantive evidence pursuant to MRE 804(b)(3). Specifically, the prosecution contends the circuit court erroneously applied Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), to the facts presented, rather than follow Michigan Supreme Court precedent established by People v. Poole, 444 Mich. 151, 506 N.W.2d 505 (1993). We agree.

Whether federal or Michigan law governs the admissibility of a hearsay statement involves mixed questions of fact and law. A trial court's factual findings are reviewed on appeal for clear error, while application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. People v. Barrera, 451 Mich. 261, 269, 547 N.W.2d 280 (1996).

The decision to bind a defendant over is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich. 334, 344, 562 N.W.2d 652 (1997); People v. Orzame, 224 Mich.App. 551, 557, 570 N.W.2d 118 (1997). In reviewing a district court's decision to bind over a defendant for trial, a circuit court must consider the entire record of the preliminary examination, and it may not substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate. Id. Reversal is appropriate only if it appears on the record that the district court abused its discretion. Id. This Court reviews the circuit court's decision de novo to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. Id.

In Poole, supra, the defendants were bound over on charges of first-degree felony murder and assault with intent to rob while being armed. During the preliminary examination, prosecution witness Andre Berry, who was defendant Kevin Downer's cousin, testified Downer initiated a conversation with him during which Downer admitted killing someone in an attempted robbery in which the other defendants participated. Poole, supra at 155-156, 506 N.W.2d 505. The trial court ruled that Downer's statement to Berry inculpating himself as well as his accomplices Edward Poole and Zina Dhue was properly admitted as substantive evidence under MRE 804(b)(3) because "`[t]he circumstances in which Downer gave his [statement] attests to its inherent trustworthiness and indicia of reliability.'" Poole, supra at 156, 506 N.W.2d 505. The court reasoned that Downer voluntarily and spontaneously confessed to the killing because he confessed while still under the stress from the event, he told a family member as opposed to a law enforcement officer, he was not yet under suspicion for the offense and therefore had no motive to lie or mitigate his own liability, and he made no effort to exonerate himself to the detriment of his accomplices. Id. This Court reversed in part the trial court's ruling, finding that Downer's statement inculpating the other defendants was not admissible as substantive evidence because it was not against Downer's interest to inculpate the others. People v. Poole, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 28, 1992 (Docket No. 139161).

On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that Downer's statement inculpating the other defendants satisfied the requirements of MRE 804(b)(3) and the Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const., Am. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded for trial. Poole, supra at 157, 506 N.W.2d 505. The Supreme Court first concluded that the self-inculpatory portion of Downer's statement to Berry was clearly against Downer's penal interests at the time it was made, tended to subject to him to criminal responsibility, and therefore clearly satisfied the requirements of MRE 804(b)(3). Id. The Supreme Court then held that while MRE 804(b)(3) did not directly address the non-self-inculpatory portions of Downer's statement "where, as here, the declarant's inculpation of an accomplice is made in the context of a narrative of events, at the declarant's initiative without any prompting or inquiry, that as a whole is clearly against the declarant's penal interest and as such is reliable, the whole statement— including portions that inculpate another— is admissible as substantive evidence at trial pursuant to MRE 804(b)(3)." Poole, supra at 161, 506 N.W.2d 505.

In Williamson, supra, the defendant was charged with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and traveling interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine. At trial, the prosecution's chief witness, the defendant's accomplice, Reginald Harris, refused to testify against the defendant. The district court ruled that the officer in charge of the investigation, who had interrogated Harris, could testify regarding statements Harris made during the interrogation that inculpated the defendant. The defendant was ultimately convicted and he appealed his conviction, claiming that the admission of Harris' statements violated FRE 804(b)(3) and the Confrontation Clause. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. U.S. v. Williamson, 981 F.2d 1262 (C.A.11, 1992).

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruling and remanded, holding:

In our view, the most faithful reading of [FRE] 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. [Williamson, supra, 512 U.S. at 600-601, 114 S.Ct. 2431.]

The Williamson Court thus remanded for an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of Harris' non-self-inculpatory statements. The Court noted that out-of-court statements made by codefendants traditionally have been viewed with suspicion and are deemed less credible than other hearsay evidence because of the strong motivation of the codefendant to implicate the other defendant and exonerate himself. Id. at 601, 114 S.Ct. 2431. However, "confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor." Id. at 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431. Therefore, whether a statement is truly self-inculpatory, and thus clearly admissible, can be determined only by viewing it in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 603-604, 114 S.Ct. 2431. The Court ultimately concluded that while some of Harris' confession would be clearly admissible—those statements that were truly self-inculpatory—other statements that implicated the defendant did little to subject Harris himself to criminal liability, and were, therefore, not clearly admissible under FRE 804(b)(3). Williamson, supra, 512 U.S. at 604,114 S.Ct. 2431.

We find that Freeman's statement to Townsend satisfies the Poole criteria for admission of substantive evidence. First, Freeman was unavailable to testify in this case.¹ MRE 804(a)(1). Second, Freeman's statement to Townsend "as a...