People v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 17 January 1977
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Warren BENNETT, Jr., et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Justice Court

Page 506

391 N.Y.S.2d 506

89 Misc.2d 382

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Warren BENNETT, Jr., et al., Defendants.

Justice Court, Town of Colonie, Albany County.

Jan. 17, 1977.

Feit & Schlenker, Albany, for defendants; Michael A. Feit, Albany, of counsel.

Robert A. Heywood, Town Atty., Newtonville, for the People; Asst. Town Atty. Nicholas J. Criscione, Albany, of counsel.

DECISION

GEORGE A. ROLAND, Town Justice.

Defendants are charged with violating section 381(6) of the New York Vehicle & Traffic Law which requires that any person operating or riding upon a motorcycle shall wear a protective helmet. The introduction to Part 54 of the applicable Regulations states (15 NYCRR 54.1): 'The operation of motorcycles has been found to result in a high incidence of disabling personal injuries. The effects of such injuries extend beyond the person injured to the family of the person injured and to the people of this State. Any disabling injury may have an economic impact on the public by requiring the furnishing of medical, rehabilitative or welfare aid or assistance . . . the prevention (of such injuries) is deemed to be a legitimate concern of this State.'

There is no dispute as to the facts of non-compliance with the statute on the part of each of the defendants. They argue, however, that the statute is an impermissible invasion of their privacy and should be declared unconstitutional. In brief, their argument runs as follows:

1. The statute was enacted only to qualify the State for Federal highway construction funds.

2. The legislation is invalid because it is 'special legislation' and discriminatory.

3. There is no rational basis between the statute and the purposes intended.

4. The legislation is not a proper exercise of the police power of the State.

With respect to the first argument it is of no importance that the triggering device was the desire to qualify for Federal highway funds. Health and safety legislation usually come about because of some special event or occurrence which calls attention of the Legislature to the problem or evil to be corrected. That the Federal Government thereafter amended the Transportation Act and eliminated the requirement for a compulsory helmet law is of small significance and merely indicative of a change of mind by Congress for reasons known only to them.

The argument respecting 'special legislation' does not appear to be substantial. The class upon which the statute falls is a large one, clearly identifiable, and the statute operates upon all of them equally and without exception. Health and safety regulations usually point to certain groups, such as labor in dangerous employment, businesses that affect the public interest, transportation vehicles, etc. So long as the statute operates with like effect upon all in the class for a public purpose it does not come within the 14th Amendment. (Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed.2d 923; Engelsher v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 184 N.Y.S.2d 640, 157 N.E.2d 626).

Respecting the third point the court has read all of the statistical exhibits submitted by the parties and has come to the conclusion that the legislation could have gone either way. But it was certainly not unreasonable for the Legislature to come to a belief that a cyclist falling to the ground at great speed will sustain greater personal injuries to his head without helmet than with one. Although the courts at times may differ with the Legislature, they may not substitute their judgment and reject the legislation unless it is clearly in excess of the legislative power under the Constitution. Such excess of power is far from proven even if the court considers the facts and opinions submitted by the defendants. On this point see the opinion in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed.2d 643 referred to below, with reference to the effer of proof. The law is clear that the Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of the legislation and every possible presumption is in favor of its validity. (Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579, 149 N.E.2d 869).

In Jacobson the court cited Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E. 97 in which the court referred to conflicting opinions as to whether vaccination was harmful or would tend to eliminate smallpox but concluded that the Legislature need not be 100 per cent certain of a desired result. It would be sufficient if the legislation was believed to have such a result and common knowledge was supportive of such belief.

Also in Jacobson the court observed, 197 U.S. at page 30, 25 S.Ct. at page 363: 'We must assume that when the statute in question was passed, the legislature of Massachusetts was not unaware of these opposing theories, and was compelled, of necessity, to choose between them.'

The police power has been defined as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property', but to be regarded as a valid exercise of governmental power in the interest of health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare, it must be exercised within constitutional limits. In Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 5 S.Ct. 357, 359, 28 L.Ed. 923, Mr. Justice Field spoke of the police power as the power 'to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.'

Defendants argue however that their health and safety affects only them and that the public and the public welfare is not involved. They claim the right of privacy, the right 'to be let alone' (Mr. Justice Brandeis, in ...