People v. Bloxton

• Decision Date: 21 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1-18-1216,1-18-1216
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward BLOXTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2020 IL App (1st) 181216

178 N.E.3d 766

449 Ill.Dec. 159

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Edward BLOXTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-18-1216

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Opinion filed December 21, 2020

DePaul University Legal Clinic, of Chicago (Aliza R. Kaliski, of counsel, and Abigail Horvat, law student), for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Jon J. Walters, and Victoria L. Kennedy, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Police arrested Edward Bloxton for possessing a firearm, although they had no idea if he possessed it legally. Police then learned of Bloxton's criminal record and charged him with multiple counts of possessing a firearm by a felon and possession of a defaced firearm. After denying Bloxton's motion to quash and suppress evidence, the trial court found Bloxton guilty and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.

¶ 2 Bloxton contends his attorney failed to argue his possession alone did not give the police probable cause to arrest. He asserts that, had the arrest been quashed, evidence the police obtained, namely the gun and his criminal record, would have been suppressed and the State could not have proven him guilty. We agree. In light of People v. Aguilar , 2013 IL 112116, 377 Ill.Dec. 405, 2 N.E.3d 321, Bloxton's attorney should have argued that the police did not have probable cause to arrest when they did not know whether he possessed it legally. Bloxton was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to make that argument, as the motion to suppress evidence likely would have been successful and the evidence relied on to convict him would have been suppressed. We reverse.

¶ 3 Background

¶ 4 The State proceeded on one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and possession of a weapon with a defaced serial number. Before trial, Bloxton's counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing the police obtained the weapon through an unlawful search and seizure because (i) Bloxton was neither involved nor believed to have been involved in the commission of a crime at the time of his arrest and (ii) the police had no reasonable suspicion that he was armed or dangerous. Bloxton waived a jury trial, and the trial judge held the hearing simultaneously with his bench trial.

¶ 5 On the evening of November 24, 2017, Chicago police officers Caulfield, Spacek, and Byrne were on routine patrol in the 6000 block of South Hermitage Avenue, a residential neighborhood consisting of single-family homes and two-flat apartment buildings. While driving westbound on 61st Street, the officers saw a group of about 10 people standing in the street in the 6000 block of Hermitage. The officers saw some people drinking out of clear plastic cups. They stopped to investigate whether alcohol was being consumed on a public way. The officers wore plain clothes and black bullet-proof vests, with stars and nametags on the outer cover and "police" on the back.

¶ 6 The officers approached the group and asked them what they were drinking. Bloxton was not holding a cup. Caulfield made eye contact with Bloxton, who then began walking toward a house at 6016 South Hermitage Avenue. Caulfield saw a large bulge in Bloxton's front right pants pocket. Caulfield did not know what caused the bulge, but testified that he thought it might be a firearm. Caulfield identified himself as a police officer and told Bloxton to stop multiple times. Bloxton continued walking toward the house. Bloxton entered the front yard and attempted to close the gate behind him. Caulfield, directly behind Bloxton, followed up the steps and onto the porch. According to Caulfield, Bloxton then reached into his pocket, exposing the handle of a gun, and attempted to pull it from his pants. Caulfield grabbed Bloxton's right hand and shoved the hand and the gun into the pocket. Caulfield called for assistance. Officer Spacek responded and placed handcuffs on Bloxton. Caulfield then took the gun from Bloxton's pocket. Caulfield noticed the serial number had been filed off.

¶ 7 On cross-examination, Caulfield acknowledged that, aside from seeing some people in the group drinking out of plastic cups that might have contained alcohol, he witnessed no one engaging in possible criminal activity. Caulfield had never seen Bloxton before that night and never saw him do anything illegal. He had not checked if Bloxton had a criminal record or determined Bloxton's status to legally possess a firearm. And there were no warrants for Bloxton. Further, Caulfield said the bulge in Bloxton's pocket appeared to be a gun, but he did not know what it was.

¶ 8 At the police station, after reading Bloxton his Miranda warnings, Caulfield asked him about the gun. See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).Caulfield said Bloxton told him he bought it for $250 earlier that night because he knew the neighborhood was bad and that "the youngins have been shooting everybody up." The interview was documented in the police report but it was not recorded, and Bloxton did not sign a handwritten statement.

¶ 9 Neither Officer Byrne nor Bloxton testified. The parties stipulated that Bloxton had a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. After denying Bloxton's motion for a directed finding and before hearing closing arguments, the trial court heard arguments on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Bloxton's counsel argued that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Bloxton based on his refusal to heed Caulfield's order to stop. Counsel also disputed that the gun was in plain view, questioning whether Bloxton would pull out a gun knowing he was being followed by an officer. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Bloxton was not seized until he took the gun out of his pocket, and that the weapon was in plain view for Caulfield to observe, giving the officers probable cause to arrest Bloxton.

¶ 10 After closing arguments, the trial judge found Bloxton guilty of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and possession of a weapon with a defaced serial number and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.

¶ 11 Analysis

¶ 12 Bloxton argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue during the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him based solely on his possession of a firearm when they did not know at the time whether he was legally permitted to carry it.

¶ 13 Strickland Standard

¶ 14 We evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test first announced in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See People v. Henderson , 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 11, 370 Ill.Dec. 804, 989 N.E.2d 192. To satisfy Strickland , a defendant must show (i) counsel's performance was deficient and (ii) the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The prejudice prong requires defendant show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive him or her of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. In assessing the first Strickland prong, we show great deference to counsel's strategic decisions, making every effort " ‘to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight *** and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.’ " People v. Fields , 2017 IL App (1st) 110311-B, ¶ 23, 412 Ill.Dec. 523, 75 N.E.3d 503 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).

¶ 15 We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo . People v. Demus , 2016 IL App (1st) 140420, ¶ 21, 399 Ill.Dec. 914, 47 N.E.3d 596.

¶ 16 Bloxton argues his attorney provided ineffective of assistance by failing to argue that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest him based solely on his possessing a firearm. Bloxton argues that under Aguilar , 2013 IL 112116, 377 Ill.Dec. 405, 2 N.E.3d 321, mere possession no longer constitutes a crime, and the officers were unaware of his criminal record that made his possession illegal. Relying on People v. Fernandez , 162 Ill. App. 3d 981, 114 Ill.Dec. 211, 516 N.E.2d 366 (1987), Bloxton contends his attorney's misapprehension of the law cannot be considered trial strategy and led to her failing to seek to quash and suppress. Bloxton asserts this argument would have succeeded, and her failure to raise it constituted ineffective assistance.

¶ 17 Probable Cause

¶ 18 An arrest made without probable cause violates the United States and Illinois Constitutions' prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Lee , 214 Ill. 2d 476, 484, 293 Ill.Dec. 267, 828 N.E.2d 237 (2005). The police's determination of probable cause focuses on the facts known to the police at the time of the arrest. Id. "A warrantless arrest cannot be justified by what is found during a subsequent search incident to the arrest." Id. We apply an objective analysis and do not consider a police officer's subjective belief as to the existence of probable cause. Id.

¶ 19 In Aguilar , the Illinois Supreme Court held that the provisions of the unlawful use of a weapon statute that prohibited public possession of a gun were facially unconstitutional under the second amendment to the United States Constitution. Aguilar , 2013 IL 112116, ¶¶ 15-21, 377 Ill.Dec. 405, 2 N.E.3d 321. Because those provisions imposed a blanket ban on an individual's right to possess a gun for self-defense outside of the home, they contradicted the essence of the second amendment right to bear arms. Id. Thus, post- Aguilar , the possible observation of a handgun is not in itself, without any other evidence of a crime, sufficient to provide an officer with probable cause for arrest. See id. ¶ 20.

¶ 20 Police had no probable cause based on the facts known at the time of Bloxton's arrest. The evidence showed that the officers were on patrol when they saw a group of...