People v. Bonaparte

• Decision Date: 18 May 1987
• Citation: 515 N.Y.S.2d 599,130 A.D.2d 673
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Joshua BONAPARTE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 599

515 N.Y.S.2d 599

130 A.D.2d 673

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Joshua BONAPARTE, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

May 18, 1987.

Philip L. Weinstein, New York City (Gary Solomon, of counsel), for appellant.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Barbara D. Underwood, Brian D. Foley and Sherry Chase-Conant, of counsel), for respondent.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and BROWN, NIEHOFF and KOOPER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pesce, J.), rendered July 2, 1985, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence as a juvenile offender. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by him to the police.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, a juvenile offender, contends that his confession should have been suppressed because his mother was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, prior to his questioning. Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree.

Late in the evening on April 9, 1984, the defendant, then age 15, surrendered to the police, admitting involvement in a fatal shooting. The detective investigating the shooting immediately notified the defendant's mother that her son was in custody, charged with murder, and asked her to come to the precinct (see, CPL 140.20[6] ). According to the detective, the mother refused, stating that she had no money and was too upset and nervous to leave her home. She also declined the detective's offer to send a car for her. Approximately 15 minutes later, the detective placed a second call to the defendant's mother, asking her once more to come to the precinct or, in the alternative, to send a relative or friend in her stead. She again declined to go, and she told the detective that her other son was in prison, and that nobody else was available. At no time was the mother advised over the telephone that her son had the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. The defendant was advised, however, and he thereafter submitted to questioning without a parent or any other person present on his behalf; his resulting confession was recorded on videotape.

On these facts, suppression of the defendant's confession was properly denied. Because the defendant was arrested as a juvenile offender, the police discharged their statutory duty (see, CPL 140.20[6] ) by immediately notifying his mother of the arrest and the place of detention. Even if we were to apply the greater protections afforded to juvenile delinquents (see, Family Ct.Act § 305.2; People v. Ward, 95 A.D.2d 351, 354, 466 N.Y.S.2d 686; People v. Susan H., 124 Misc.2d 341, 345, 477 N.Y.S.2d 550), we would reach the same conclusion. Under the Family Court Act, an officer who takes a juvenile delinquent into custody must immediately notify the parent of that fact (Family Ct.Act § 305.2[3] ), and the statute directs that the officer make "every reasonable effort" to provide such notice (Family Ct.Act § 305.2[4] ). However, the...