People v. Booth
| Decision Date | 05 October 1982 |
| Docket Number | 2,62342,Nos. 1,Docket Nos. 62341,s. 1 |
| Citation | 324 N.W.2d 741,414 Mich. 343 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry Lee BOOTH, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Arthur LONG, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Theodore O. Johnson, Pros. Atty., Thomas C. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Atty. Gen., Pros. Attys., Appellate Service, Lansing, for plaintiff.
Norris J. Thomas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant Booth.
P.E. Bennett, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for defendant Long.
The key issue in these cases 1 of first impression is whether a defendant who is unable to recall some or all of the events surrounding the commission of a particular crime may enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill 2 to that crime, and, if so, what procedure is to be utilized at the plea-taking proceeding to establish a factual basis for the plea. In addition to our analysis of these primary issues, we touch upon other tangential contentions advanced by defendants.
We conclude that a forgetful defendant is not precluded under the terms of the statute from entering a plea of guilty but mentally ill. A trial judge presiding over the plea-taking proceeding of a defendant who wishes to plead guilty but mentally ill, but who is unable to attest to the details of the crime because of a lack of memory, may accept such a plea. The factual basis may be elicited from the defendant. If the defendant cannot recall the facts required, a transcript of the preliminary examination or trial testimony, if any, may be considered by the court. Alternatively, a factual basis may be elicited from witnesses. In all other respects, the court must adhere to the constraints of GCR 1963, 785.7 as it relates to pleas of guilty. Because there is no specific court rule designed to afford procedure for a guilty but mentally ill plea, we also adhere to those added safeguards specifically afforded by statute to defendants who tender a plea of guilty but mentally ill.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals in both cases. We reinstate defendants' plea-based convictions and sentences.
Defendants Terry Lee Booth and James Arthur Long each were charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. 3 On December 17, 1975, a joint preliminary examination was conducted, at which the two twelve-year-old female victims and the two physicians who had examined the victims subsequent to the commission of the offenses were witnesses. Defendants were bound over for trial as charged.
A review of the lower court files reflects that before the instant pleas were offered, substantial efforts were undertaken to inquire into defendants' competency to stand trial as well as their criminal responsibility at the time the crimes were committed. Each defendant had filed a timely notice of insanity defense. 4
The trial court repeatedly requested--and received--assurances that defendants were, in fact, competent to stand trial. Defendants sought and obtained independent psychiatric evaluations, 5 and were also committed to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry for ascertainment of criminal responsibility. Additionally, supplemental statements (depositions, in the case of defendant Long) specifically directed to the issue of mental illness were prepared by the various examining psychiatrists and were submitted to the trial court.
Plea negotiations took place, and on July 26, 1976, defendant Booth offered a plea of guilty but mentally ill to a single count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the remaining count. Defendant Long entered an identical plea before a different judge, in return for a similar agreement by the prosecutor, on November 3, 1976.
The plea-taking proceedings conducted in these cases were unique, both by virtue of the nature of the pleas offered and the complicating fact of defendants' undisputed loss of memory with regard to the details of the offenses. The procedure fashioned by the judge presiding over defendant Booth's plea parallels that followed at defendant Long's plea-taking. Basically, the trial judges adhered to GCR 1963, 785.7, the court rule implemented to facilitate the proper advice and information of rights in the context of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere. 6
Because defendant Booth was able only to recount some events preliminary and subsequent to the perpetration of the crime, the trial judge, who advised the parties that he had read the preliminary examination transcript, referred to that transcript for the pertinent facts and concluded that a sufficient factual basis had been established. Defendant Booth acknowledged on the record his belief, derived from the facts available to him, that he was in fact guilty of the crime to which his plea was being offered. Like facts apply to Long.
The trial judge next focused his attention upon the question of defendant Booth's mental illness at the time of the offense. The prosecutor reported that, in lieu of a hearing on the issue of mental illness, the parties had stipulated to the trial court's use of reports and letters prepared by the psychiatric examiners to ascertain mental illness (the parties also agreed that the examiners would be produced if necessary to the trial court's determination). The proffered documents were admitted into evidence without objection. On the basis of the documents presented, the trial judge found that defendant Booth had not been insane at the time of the offense, but had been mentally ill as a result of voluntary drug-alcohol intoxication.
On August 16, 1976, defendant Booth was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a recommendation that he receive alcohol and drug counselling while incarcerated. At defendant Long's sentencing on November 9, 1976, the trial judge imposed a sentence of from 15 to 25 years imprisonment, and further noted that he would oppose any early release.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals panel assigned to decide defendant Booth's appeal concluded that the lower court had erred in relying on the preliminary examination transcript to establish the factual basis for the plea, and remanded to the trial court to allow the prosecutor to supply a sufficient factual basis. 7 Dissenting, Judge Cavanagh would vacate Booth's plea-based conviction and remand for trial. A different panel of the Court of Appeals considered defendant Long's appeal. That panel also decided that it was inappropriate for the trial court to have adduced a factual basis for the plea by resorting to the preliminary examination transcript. However, instead of remanding for supplementation of the record, the Long panel set aside the plea and remanded either for negotiation of a plea of nolo contendere or for trial. 8
The foundational issue presented is whether a defendant suffering from amnesia with regard to the particulars of the charged crime is capable of entering the legislatively created plea of guilty but mentally ill. 9
We can discern no impediment to the entry of a plea of guilty but mentally ill under circumstances involving a forgetful defendant. Our conclusion is based upon several considerations: (1) the intent of the Legislature in promulgating the guilty but mentally ill statute; (2) the precise language used by the Legislature in establishing the plea of guilty but mentally ill; and (3) in conjunction with the second consideration, the equivalent functions of the more traditional pleas of guilty and nolo contendere and the relationship of these pleas to a plea of guilty but mentally ill.
The verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" 10 was introduced into the jurisprudence of this state by 1975 P.A. 180 (effective July 25, 1975), an act of the Legislature which also modified the procedures to be used in cases in which an insanity defense is asserted. The Legislature's intent in establishing a fourth verdict which might be returned by a jury presented with an insanity defense, although not without question or controversy, 11 appears to have been twofold: (1) to ensure that criminally responsible but mentally ill defendants obtain professional treatment in "the humane hope of restoring their mental health" while incarcerated or on probation, and, correlatively, (2) to assure the public that a criminally responsible and mentally ill defendant will not be returned to the streets to unleash further violence without having received necessary psychiatric care after sentencing. See People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 663-664, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980) (opinion of Ryan, J.); People v. Seefeld, 95 Mich.App. 197, 290 N.W.2d 123 (1980); People v. Philpot, 98 Mich.App. 257, 296 N.W.2d 229 (1980).
With particular reference to the first legislative objective, it is readily apparent that these defendants fall within the class of persons whose mental health needs were intended to be accommodated by the guilty but mentally ill statute. Like any other defendant who, although criminally responsible, has been found to have suffered from mental illness at the time of the offense, these defendants stand to benefit from such treatment "as is psychiatrically indicated" during the term of their incarceration. To deny these amnesic defendants the opportunity to plead guilty but mentally ill and, in so doing, to avail themselves of any treatment due them under the statute, 12 undercuts one of the perceived purposes of the Legislature. When promulgating the guilty but mentally ill statute, the Legislature intended to assist mentally ill defendants regain their mental health. In essence, the guilty but mentally ill statute should apply to those whom it was intended to assist.
We therefore conclude that, despite, and even because of, their amnesia, these...
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