People v. Brinkley

• Decision Date: 18 July 2019
• Docket Number: 110685
• Citation: 106 N.Y.S.3d 210,174 A.D.3d 1159
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Aaron J. BRINKLEY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

174 A.D.3d 1159

106 N.Y.S.3d 210

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Aaron J. BRINKLEY, Appellant.

110685

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: June 7, 2019

Decided and Entered: July 18, 2019

Danielle Neroni Reilly, Albany, for appellant.

Karen A. Heggen, District Attorney, Ballston Spa (Gordon W. Eddy of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Mulvey, Devine and Rumsey, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Mulvey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County (Murphy III, J.), rendered December 6, 2018, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of aggravated cruelty to animals.

Defendant and his adult nephew, who lived together, bought a puppy who, by the time of the incident in question, had grown to weigh approximately 30 pounds. Among other approaches to train and discipline the dog, they used negative reinforcement, including promptly "paddling" or "popping" the dog on his rear end with an open hand after an unwanted behavior, then placing him in his crate for a time out. On one occasion when the dog was approximately 15 months old, the nephew discovered that the dog had defecated in the apartment. Upon attempting to paddle him, the dog bit the nephew's thumb, causing bleeding and injury. The nephew was then able to get the dog into his crate. Approximately 10 minutes later, defendant arrived home, was told by the nephew what had happened and saw the nephew's injury. Defendant removed the dog from his crate, brought him to the nephew, put the dog's face by the injured thumb, told him that he was a bad dog (ostensibly to teach him that biting was bad) and paddled him a few times. At that point, the dog bit off a portion of defendant's thumb. Defendant then called a friend to bring him to the hospital. According to defendant, when he thereafter attempted to herd the dog onto the back porch, the dog became aggressive and continued to bite him, so defendant repeatedly kicked the dog, used a metal hammer to beat him into submission and put him out on the porch, where the dog died due to his injuries.

Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of aggravated cruelty to animals (see Agriculture and Markets Law § 353–a ). Defendant then moved for, among other things, Huntley, Mapp and Dunaway hearings. County Court granted him a Huntley hearing to challenge the voluntariness of his various statements to the police, as well as a limited Mapp hearing to address the voluntariness of his consent to search his apartment. The court ultimately determined that defendant was not entitled to a more comprehensive Mapp or Dunaway hearing due to his failure to set forth sufficient allegations in his motion papers, and that his statements and consent to search were voluntarily given. After a jury trial in which defendant contended that his actions were justified, he was convicted as charged. County Court imposed a sentence of two years in the local jail. Defendant appeals.

The verdict is not against the weight of the evidence. Initially, although defendant made a specific motion for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People's case-in-chief, he has not preserved his legal sufficiency challenge for this Court's review because he failed to renew his motion after putting on his own proof (see People v. Henry , 169 A.D.3d 1273, 1273 n, 95 N.Y.S.3d 432 [2019] ; People v. Miranda , 163 A.D.3d 1168, 1169, 80 N.Y.S.3d 544 [2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1066, 89 N.Y.S.3d 121, 113 N.E.3d 955 [2018] ). Nevertheless, in reviewing defendant's argument that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, this Court necessarily must ensure that the People proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Napoli , 167 A.D.3d 1080, 1080, 89 N.Y.S.3d 442 [2018] ; People v. Miranda , 163 A.D.3d at 1169, 80 N.Y.S.3d 544 ). In conducting such a review, where an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, we view the evidence in a neutral light and, while giving deference to the jury's credibility determinations, "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" ( People v. Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Hilton , 166 A.D.3d 1316, 1318, 87 N.Y.S.3d 399 [2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1205, 99 N.Y.S.3d 248, 122 N.E.3d 1160 [2019] ).

As relevant here, "[a] person is guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals when, with no justifiable purpose, he or she ... intentionally causes serious physical injury to a companion animal with aggravated cruelty" ( Agriculture and Markets Law § 353–a [1 ] ). That statute defines "aggravated cruelty" as "conduct which: (i) is intended to cause extreme physical pain; or (ii) is done or carried out in an especially depraved or sadistic manner" ( Agriculture and Markets Law § 353–a [1 ]; see People v. Napoli , 167 A.D.3d at 1080, 89 N.Y.S.3d 442 ). Although not defined in Agriculture and Markets Law article 26, a serious physical injury is ordinarily considered to be any "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ" ( Penal Law § 10.00[10] ; see Agriculture and Markets Law § 108[29] ; CJI2d[NY] Agriculture and Markets Law § 353–a ). As charged to the jury here, conduct that would otherwise be criminal may nevertheless be justifiable when "[s]uch conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent ... private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue" ( Penal Law § 35.05[2] ). Where the jury is presented with a justification charge, the People bear the burden of disproving that defense (see People v. Steele , 26 N.Y.2d 526, 528, 311 N.Y.S.2d 889, 260 N.E.2d 527 [1970] ; People v. Walrad , 22 A.D.3d 883, 883, 802 N.Y.S.2d 535 [2005] ).

Here, the dog was clearly a companion animal (see Agriculture and Markets Law § 350[5] ) and defendant does not dispute that he caused the dog serious physical injury. Instead, defendant argues that he did not act with aggravated cruelty, he had a justifiable purpose and the People failed to disprove his justification defense. Although defendant testified that he did not want to hurt the dog and that he only did so because he was in shock from the injury to his thumb and was trying to protect himself and his nephew, other evidence contradicted that testimony. On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that the dog was in the crate when defendant arrived home, and defendant could have left him there rather than taking him out to discipline him at that time. After being bitten but before attacking the dog, defendant called his friend; he had time to call the police or animal control, but did not do so. He also could have closed the dog in the bathroom, rather than hitting him with a hammer in that room and then carrying him to the porch. These acknowledgements disprove his justification defense, in that defendant was at least partially at fault for creating the situation that led him to react in a violent manner (see Penal Law § 35.05[2] ). In his statements to the police, defendant said that he was "angry" and "in defense mode" not only because of his injury but because his nephew was hurt; that he was so shocked from the severity of his injury that he "went after [the dog]" and hit him in his face and wherever else he could; and that he was "going to put [the dog] down, not ... bring him somewhere, just do it," meaning that he "was going to kill him." Thus, the jury could have reasonably determined that defendant acted intentionally and without a justifiable purpose when he repeatedly kicked the dog and beat him with a hammer.

The veterinarian who performed the necropsy testified regarding the numerous lacerations, tremendous bruising, compressed cervical vertebra, blood spattering and staining around the dog's face, blood behind one eye and visible destruction of the dog's mouth, such that almost all of the dog's teeth were fractured or missing. Contrary to defendant's assertion that the dog bit onto the hammer with such force that he broke his own teeth, the veterinarian opined that a dog would not cause itself that much pain, and tremendous force would be required to damage the strong teeth of a young dog. She further opined that the cause of death was traumatic internal damage to the main organs of the dog's chest and abdomen, including a macerated liver and significantly bruised spleen. The free blood in the chest cavity and two collapsed lungs indicated that the dog struggled to breathe and likely suffered a difficult death. This testimony, along with pictures of the deceased dog, support the conclusion that defendant's kicking and attack with a hammer not only caused the dog serious physical injury but constituted aggravated cruelty, in that it was "carried out in an especially depraved or sadistic manner" ( Agriculture and Markets Law § 353–a [1 ]; see People v. Degiorgio , 36 A.D.3d 1007, 1009, 827 N.Y.S.2d 342 [2007], lv denied 8 N.Y.3d 921, 834 N.Y.S.2d 511, 866 N.E.2d 457 [2007], cert denied 552 U.S. 999, 128 S.Ct. 506, 169 L.Ed.2d 354 [2007] ). Although an acquittal would not have been unreasonable had the jury believed defendant's contention that he was justified in protecting himself and his nephew from a crazed dog, the jury was free to reject defendant's self-serving testimony. Accordingly, the conviction is not against the...