People v. Bryant

• Citation: 8 N.Y.3d 530,869 N.E.2d 7
• Decision Date: 03 May 2007
• Docket Number: 50.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Arthur BRYANT, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

869 N.E.2d 7

8 N.Y.3d 530

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Arthur BRYANT, Appellant.

50.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 3, 2007.

Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New York City (Kristina Schwarz

and Steven Banks of counsel), for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York City (Victoria E. Phillips and Eleanor J. Ostrow of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, J.

The issue on appeal is whether Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing on the ground that defendant failed to present sufficient information to obtain a hearing where defendant denied acting as the principal or accomplice, raised a question of fact regarding the timing of his arrest and challenged the reliability of the alleged witness. Based on defendant's factual allegations, it was error to deny the hearing. We therefore reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remit the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings.

On May 30, 2003 at 12:10 P.M., in the vicinity of 132nd Street and 7th Avenue in Manhattan, Johnny Speller (decedent) was stabbed to death. Defendant was arrested for the crime later that day and subsequently indicted for second-degree murder (see Penal Law § 125.25[1]). After indictment, the People served defendant with a Voluntary Disclosure Form (VDF), which stated, in part, that a "[w]itness picked out [defendant's] photo" on May 30, 2003 at 12:45 P.M.

Defendant moved to suppress all evidence proffered against him. In his supporting affirmation, defendant claimed that he was seized and arrested without a warrant sometime after 12:30 P.M. and transported to the 32nd precinct where he was interrogated for approximately six hours and property was removed from his person. Defendant denied that he acted as either principal or accomplice in the stabbing and stated that he had no knowledge of what, if any, information the police relied upon to seize, interrogate and place him in lineups. Based upon the information available to him, defendant averred that the only information known to the police at the time of his arrest was that (1) a stabbing had occurred on May 30, 2003 in the area of 132nd Street and 7th Avenue and (2) his photograph had been picked out by an unknown witness whose source of information—whether the alleged witness actually observed the crime, or only relied on hearsay—was uncertain. It is undisputed that defendant sought the informant's name and that the People refused to provide the information.

Further, defendant alleged that it was unclear whether he was identified as (1) having engaged in any criminal activity, (2) a person who frequented the area, (3) a person associated with the victim or (4) a person seen in the area at the time of the incident. Defendant argued that "[n]one of the People's written or oral communications have set forth facts constituting probable cause justifying his seizure" and that he was "therefore unable to proffer factual allegations as to the lack of probable cause."

In opposition, the People argued that defendant did not establish a factual dispute that required a hearing. They argued that defendant failed to "dispute the facts set forth in the complaint," VDF and/or the indictment and that, in fact, those sources specified that at least one witness identified defendant "and that he also made admissions to having committed the crime."

Supreme Court denied the Mapp/Dunaway¹ hearing, stating, in part:

"I'm denying a Mapp/Dunaway.

"The V.D.F. makes clear that the defendant was identified in a photo array prior to the arrest and that subject will be the issue of a Wade Hearing, in any event.

"And the other matters which are referred to as unknown in the defense motion could have been discovered through a proper demand.

"So I'm granting a Huntley and a Wade Hearing."

Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, holding that, given the information available to defendant, his conclusory assertions were insufficient to create a factual issue requiring a hearing (30 A.D.3d 1131, 815 N.Y.S.2d 460 [2006]). A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal and we now reverse.

Pursuant to CPL 710.60(1), a suppression motion must contain sworn allegations of fact stating the ground or grounds for the motion. "Hearings are not automatic or generally available for the asking by boilerplate allegations" (People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415, 422, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922, 624 N.E.2d 1017 [1993]). The sufficiency of the factual allegations should be (1) evaluated by the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion and (3) evaluated by defendant's access to information (id. at 426, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922, 624 N.E.2d 1017). Applying the Mendoza factors, we conclude that defendant's motion for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing should have been granted.

In determining the sufficiency of a defendant's factual allegations, a court must read defendant's suppression motion in the context of the case. Further, "[w]hether a defendant has raised factual issues requiring a hearing can only be determined with reference to the People's contentions" (Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d at 427, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922, 624 N.E.2d 1017). Here, defendant alleged that he was arrested at sometime after 12:30 P.M. in a building where he resides and away from where the crime took place. The People disputed this allegation and stated in their disclosure forms that defendant was not arrested until 7:30 P.M., after he had been identified by their witness and had made statements to the police. The time of arrest is, thus, in dispute because if defendant was arrested before his arrival at the police station, the only basis for probable cause was the witness identification.

Moreover, a court must consider "the degree to which the pleadings may reasonably be expected to be precise in view of the information available to defendant" (id. at 429, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922, 624 N.E.2d 1017). In People v. Hightower, 85 N.Y.2d 988, 629 N.Y.S.2d 164, 652 N.E.2d 910 (1995), defendant was charged with the sale of drugs. In his motion papers, defendant denie...