People v. Bugarin
| Decision Date | 05 March 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 25030,25030 |
| Citation | 181 Colo. 57,507 P.2d 879 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse S. BUGARIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Denver, Patricia W. Robb, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Pueblo, for plaintiff-appellee.
H. D. Reed, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
Jesse S. Bugarin was convicted by a jury of the crimes of aggravated robbery, 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40--5--1, and conspiracy to commit robbery, C.R.S.1963, 40--7--35. Two men, acting in concert, held up a drug store in Denver. Witnesses to the robbery identified the defendant in a photographic display as the robber who had the gun. After the defendant was arrested, a lineup was held, and the defendant was again identified by the eyewitnesses. At the time of trial, these same witnesses identified the defendant as one of the robbers. The primary theory of defense was alibi. The jury determined that the identification testimony ruled out the alibi and established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentence imposed in this case was to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in People v. Bugarin, Colo., 507 P.2d 875 (). Following the defendant's conviction and sentence, he appealed to this Court claiming that the identification testimony and procedures violated constitutional standards. We disagree and affirm the conviction.
The photographic displays which the police prepared after the robbery occurred were not suggestive and were used by the police to ascertain the identity of the robbers. Our Court has upheld the use of photographic displays as a part of police investigative procedure. People v. Knapp, Colo., 505 P.2d 7 (1973); People v. Barker, Colo., 501 P.2d 1041 (1972); Brown v. People, Colo., 494 P.2d 587 (1972).
Moreover, counsel is not required at a photographic display or lineup which takes place during the investigative stage of the criminal proceeding. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); People v. Knapp, Supra; People v. Barker, Supra; Brown v. People, Supra.
The defendant also asserts that the identification which occurred at the lineup was tainted. He predicates his claim on the fact that he had not been taken before a magistrate in accordance with the requirements of Crim.P. 5, and had, therefore, not been properly advised of his rights. His assertion overlooks the fact that he signed advisement forms which fully complied with the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He was also represented by the public defender at the lineup. Our opinion in Jaggers v. People, 174 Colo. 430, 484 P.2d 796 (1971), upholds the trial court and refutes the defendant's claim that Crim.P. 5 requires reversal.
As a further attack on the identification testimony, the defendant claims that reversible error occurred when the trial court permitted witnesses to bolster their in-court identification of the defendant by testifying that they had previously picked the defendant out of fifteen people who were in the courtroom when they were originally subpoenaed to testify. The behavior of a witness at an earlier confrontation with the defendant bears on the credibility of the witness's identification of the defendant at the trial. Arthur v. People, 165 Colo. 63, 437 P.2d 41 (1968). Prior to the time that identification testimony was permitted, a proper In camera hearing was held, and the trial court determined that the identification procedures met constitutional standards. People v. Lovato, Colo., 506 P.2d 361 (announced February 13, 1973). Moreover, no contemporaneous objection was made to the testimony of the previous inadvertent viewing of the defendant by the witnesses, and, in fact, defense counsel developed the circumstances of the confrontation by cross-examination. For the reasons herein stated, we find no error in the identification phase of this case.
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People v. Thorpe
...by the admission of police photographs into evidence for identification purposes. Defendant cites the cases of People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 57, 507 P.2d 879 (1973) (Bugarin I), and People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 62, 507 P.2d 875 (1973) (Bugarin II), to support his contention that the use of s......
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People v. Pickett
...array shown to the victim, Janet Little, should not have been admitted as an exhibit for the jury to view. In People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 57, 507 P.2d 879, we disapproved giving the jury "classic mug shots" with both full face and profile pictures because of the danger of alerting them to ......
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People v. York
...could have resulted by the use of the photograph of his confederate and codefendant under these circumstances. Cf. People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 57, 507 P.2d 879. In our view, the record indicates that appellant received a fair trial and that his conviction was supported by ample competent T......
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People v. Anders
...face and profile view of Anders of the type which is widely known to be used by police identification bureaus. See People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 57, 507 P.2d 879 (1973). While police identification information on the face of the photograph was masked by tape, the reverse side of the photogra......