People v. Caden N.

• Decision Date: 22 October 2020
• Docket Number: 111696
• Citation: 189 A.D.3d 84,133 N.Y.S.3d 107
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. CADEN N., Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

189 A.D.3d 84

133 N.Y.S.3d 107

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.CADEN N., Appellant.

111696

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: September 16, 2020

Decided and Entered: October 22, 2020

Schlather, Stumbar, Parks & Salk, LLP, Ithaca (Raymond M. Schlather of counsel), for appellant.

Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (William D. Vandelinder of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch, Mulvey and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ.

OPINION AND ORDER

Lynch, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Rich Jr., J.), rendered August 16, 2019, which sentenced defendant upon his adjudication as a youthful offender.

In July 2018, defendant, then 18 years old, was driving his vehicle on Westinghouse Road in the Village of Horseheads, Chemung County with three passengers. As he was turning left from the southbound lane of Westinghouse Road onto Westlake Street, he collided with a motorcycle approaching in the northbound lane of Westinghouse Road, resulting in the deaths of the motorcycle's driver and passenger (hereinafter collectively referred to as the victims). A blood test taken a little less than three hours after the accident revealed the presence of THC in defendant's blood. He was thereafter charged by indictment with vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, two counts of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree and driving while ability impaired by drugs.¹

Prior to trial, defendant requested a hearing under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923) to determine the admissibility of certain evidence pertaining to his alleged impairment at the time of the accident. County Court granted the request and, following the hearing, permitted a police sergeant and a state trooper to testify about their observations of defendant after the accident and his performance on certain field sobriety tests (hereinafter FSTs). However, the court precluded them from giving their "opinion regarding ... the level of defendant's impairment" due to their failure to perform the full 12–step Drug Recognition Evaluation protocol. The court also limited testimony from any witness about "[a] correlation between blood levels of THC which may have been taken at the [emergency room] and [defendant's] impairment at the time of the crash."

Following a bench trial, County Court found defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, adjudicated him a youthful offender, sentenced him to a prison term of 1 to 3 years and ordered him to pay restitution.² Defendant appeals.

Defendant contends that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and is against the weight of the evidence because the People failed to prove that he operated his vehicle while impaired by marihuana and caused the victims' deaths as a result. We disagree. When assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and evaluate whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the [factfinder] on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged" ( People v. Rudge, 185 A.D.3d 1214, 1215, 126 N.Y.S.3d 247 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1070, 129 N.Y.S.3d 393, 152 N.E.3d 1195 [2020] ; see People v. Ramos, 19 N.Y.3d 133, 136, 946 N.Y.S.2d 83, 969 N.E.2d 199 [2012] ).

When undertaking a weight of the evidence analysis, we must "view the evidence in a neutral light and determine first whether a different verdict would have been unreasonable and, if not, [then] weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence" ( People v. Henry, 173 A.D.3d 1470, 1473, 103 N.Y.S.3d 656 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 932, 109 N.Y.S.3d 699, 133 N.E.3d 399 [2019] ).

As relevant here, "[a] person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree ... [and] causes the death of more than one other person" ( Penal Law § 125.13[4] ). A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when, in pertinent part, "he or she causes the death of another person, and ... operates a motor vehicle in violation of [ Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(4) ], and as a result of ... impairment by the use of a drug ... operates such motor vehicle ... in a manner that causes the death of such other person" ( Penal Law § 125.12[1] ). Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(4) provides that "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to [do so] is impaired by the use of a drug."

The term "impairment" as used in Penal Law § 125.12(1) is not statutorily defined. The Court of Appeals has defined that term in the limited context of the prohibition against driving while one's ability to do so is impaired by alcohol (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[1] ). In that situation, the question of impairment focuses on "whether, by voluntarily consuming alcohol, [the] defendant has actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which he [or she] is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver" ( People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 427, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d 513 [1979] [emphasis added], appeal dismissed 446 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1825, 64 L.Ed.2d 254 [1980] ; accord People v. Keener, 152 A.D.3d 1073, 1075, 61 N.Y.S.3d 158 [2017] ). However, as noted by the Court of Appeals, driving while intoxicated by alcohol is a more serious offense (a misdemeanor) than driving while impaired by alcohol (a traffic infraction) and, therefore, requires a showing of "a greater degree of impairment," focusing on whether "the driver has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the extent that he [or she] is incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which he [or she] is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver" ( People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d at 428, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d 513 [emphasis added]; see Matter of Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403, 408–409, 554 N.Y.S.2d 88, 553 N.E.2d 566 [1990] ). Although the parties both rely on the Court of Appeals' definition of "impairment by alcohol" as set forth in Cruz to supply the relevant definition of "impairment by the use of a drug" as used in Penal Law § 125.12, we conclude that this definition is misplaced in the context of assessing whether a person has committed the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree. The focus of these provisions is on whether a driver's ability to operate a motor vehicle has been compromised by the consumption of alcohol or drugs and to what extent. In effect, the greater a driver's ability to function has been compromised the greater the penalty imposed (see People v. Litto, 8 N.Y.3d 692, 705, 840 N.Y.S.2d 736, 872 N.E.2d 848 [2007] ). For this reason, "the scheme of [Vehicle and Traffic Law §] 1192 provides for different levels or kinds of proof to establish violations of the statute" ( id. ).

Notably, under Penal Law § 125.12(1), one who operates a motor vehicle and causes the death of another while impaired by alcohol is not subject to a conviction for vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, whereas one who causes such death while intoxicated by alcohol or impaired by a drug (or a combination of alcohol and drugs) falls within the statute's reach (see Penal Law §§ 125.13, 125.12[1] ). This statutory scheme imposes equal sanctions upon motorists who cause death while intoxicated by alcohol or while impaired by a drug (see People v. Litto, 8 N.Y.3d at 702, 840 N.Y.S.2d 736, 872 N.E.2d 848 ). Such a distinction between impairment by alcohol and impairment by a drug (or a combination of both) can only be deemed consistent with the legislative scheme if the same standard is applied to each misdemeanor category included in the vehicular manslaughter statute. Accordingly, in our view, the degree of impairment necessary to convict a motorist of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree based upon a death that was caused while such motorist was under the influence of one of the drugs enumerated in Public Health Law § 3306 (which includes marihuana) is the same degree of impairment as would be necessary to sustain a conviction of driving while intoxicated by alcohol – namely, the People must prove that such motorist was "incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which he [or she was] expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver" ( People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d at 428, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d 513 [emphasis added] ). To the extent that this Court's decision in People v. Rossi, 163 A.D.2d 660, 662, 558 N.Y.S.2d 698 [1990], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 943, 563 N.Y.S.2d 73, 564 N.E.2d 683 [1990] can be read as holding that a conviction of vehicular manslaughter in second degree based upon a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(4) only requires proof that the motorist was impaired "to any extent," it should no longer be followed.

With respect to causation, the People were required to prove that defendant "set in motion the events that led to the victims' deaths" and "was a sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing deaths" ( People v. Ballenger, 106 A.D.3d 1375, 1377, 968 N.Y.S.2d 610 [2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 995, 981 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 N.E.3d 1169 [2013]. "[A] defendant's conduct constitutes a sufficiently direct cause of death when the People prove (1) that [the] defendant's actions were an actual contributory cause of the death, in...