People v. Cameron, 330876
| Decision Date | 04 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 330876,330876 |
| Citation | 319 Mich.App. 215,900 N.W.2d 658 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Shawn Loveto CAMERON, Jr., Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark Kneisel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Marilena David-Martin) for defendant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and O'Connell and Borrello, JJ.
In this criminal proceeding, defendant Shawn Cameron, Jr., comes before this Court in an appeal of right for a second time. At issue in the instant appeal is whether the imposition of court costs under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) constitutes an unconstitutional tax. Defendant is not the first person to challenge the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) on this basis; however, there are no published opinions on the issue. We conclude that although it imposes a tax, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) is not unconstitutional, and we affirm the trial court's assessment of court costs.
Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, for his role in an attack on a woman over a dispute regarding the payment of babysitting fees. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve 13 months’ to 20 years’ imprisonment. The court also ordered defendant to pay certain costs and fees, including $1,611 in court costs.
Defendant appealed by right, arguing that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to impose court costs and that the Legislature's retroactive grant of such authority was unconstitutional. See 2014 PA 352, enacting § 1. Relying on binding precedent, a panel of this Court disagreed.
People v. Cameron , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued July 28, 2015 (Docket No. 321387, 2015 WL 4599186). However, the panel remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the court costs imposed were " ‘reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court[.]’ " Id . at 2, quoting MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ).
On remand, the trial court explained the basis for the imposition of $1,611 in court costs:
The Washtenaw County Trial Court previously established a factual basis for the court costs it has imposed on each felony case at the time of sentencing. The costs were computed based on the ten year average annual total court budget of $16,949,292 multiplied by the average annual percentage of all filings which are felonies, i.e., 22%, which revealed the average annual budget for the Washtenaw Trial Court's handling of all of its criminal felony cases. This amount was then divided by the average annual number of felony filings over [the] last 6 years (2,217) which resulted in the average court costs of handling each felony case as $1,681. The state costs were subtracted ($68) as well as an additional $2, resulting in the sum of $1,611 being assessed per felony case.
On this basis, the trial court concluded that the amount of court costs imposed on defendant was reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court.
Defendant argues that the court-cost-assessment provision set forth in MCL 769.1k constitutes a tax, as opposed to a fee, because it raises revenue and criminal defendants do not pay court costs voluntarily. Defendant maintains that the costs cannot be considered a proportionate fee for services because criminal defendants are not being provided a service when they are subjected to prosecution in a court of law. As a tax, defendant contends that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) is unconstitutional because it violates Const. 1963, art. 4, § 32, which provides that "[e]very law which imposes, continues or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax." Moreover, defendant claims that there is no limit on the amount of costs that might be imposed under the statute. Defendant also argues that MCL 769.1k violates the separation-of-powers provision of Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2.
"Whether a charge is a permissible fee or an illegal tax is a question of law." Dawson v. Secretary of State , 274 Mich.App. 723, 740, 739 N.W.2d 339 (2007) (opinion by WILDER , P.J.) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo.1 People v. Conat , 238 Mich.App. 134, 144, 605 N.W.2d 49 (1999). "Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and must be construed as such unless it is clearly apparent that the statute is unconstitutional." In re RFF , 242 Mich.App. 188, 205, 617 N.W.2d 745 (2000). "[T]he burden of proving that a statute is unconstitutional rests with the party challenging it." In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71 , 479 Mich. 1, 11, 740 N.W.2d 444 (2007).
The assessment of court costs against a convicted defendant is governed by MCL 769.1k(1), which provides:
As defendant points out in his brief, separate panels of this Court have come to different conclusions in unpublished opinions with respect to whether court costs imposed under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) constitute a fee or a tax. Upon review of the issue, we agree with the analysis and conclusions set forth in People v. Bailey , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 15, 2015 (Docket No. 323190, 2015 WL 8959447 ).2
As this Court in Bailey pointed out, "[t]he first step in examining the constitutional muster of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) is to determine whether it assesses a ‘governmental "fee" ’ or a tax." Bailey , unpub. op. at 3, quoting Dawson , 274 Mich.App. at 740, 739 N.W.2d 339.3
A tax is an "exaction[ ] or involuntary contribution[ ] of money the collection of which is sanctioned by law and enforceable by the courts." Dukesherer Farms, Inc. v. Director of the Dep’t of Agriculture (After Remand) , 405 Mich. 1, 15, 273 N.W.2d 877 (1979) (quotation marks omitted). "Taxes have a primary purpose of raising revenue, while fees are usually in exchange for a service rendered or a benefit conferred." Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 255 Mich.App. 589, 612, 662 N.W.2d 784 (2003), aff'd sub nom American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 545 U.S. 429, 125 S.Ct. 2419, 162 L.Ed.2d 407 (2005) and Mid–Con Freight Sys., Inc v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 545 U.S. 440, 125 S.Ct. 2427, 162 L.Ed.2d 418 (2005). "Taxes are designed to raise revenue for the general public, while a fee confers benefits only upon the particular people who pay the fee, not the general public or even a portion of the public who do not pay the fee." Westlake Transp. , 255 Mich.App. at 613, 662 N.W.2d 784 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
When determining whether a charge constitutes a fee or a tax, a court must consider three questions: "(1) whether the charge serves a regulatory purpose rather than operates as a means of raising revenue, (2) whether the charge is proportionate to the necessary costs of the service to which it is related, and (3) whether the payor has the ability to refuse or limit its use of the service to which the charge is related." Id. , at 612, 662 N.W.2d 784. We will consider each of these questions in turn.
This factor looks at the purpose of the charge. We agree with defendant that the purpose of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) is to raise revenue. The plain language of the statute does not reveal a regulatory concern with the public health, safety, and welfare because court costs "are not a form of punishment." People v. Konopka (On Remand) , 309 Mich.App. 345, 370, 869 N.W.2d 651 (2015). Rather, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) expressly allows a trial court to impose costs for "the actual costs incurred by the trial court," including the compensation of court personnel and the recovery of necessary operational expenses. MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii )(A) to (C). Thus, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) focuses on the trial court's revenue, i.e. "the income of a government from taxation and other sources, appropriated for public expenses." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1996).
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