People v. Caruso

• Decision Date: 12 December 1977
• Citation: 400 N.Y.S.2d 686,92 Misc.2d 559
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Henry CARUSO, Appellant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 686

400 N.Y.S.2d 686

92 Misc.2d 559

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Henry CARUSO, Appellant.

Onondaga County Court.

Dec. 12, 1977.

Richard A. Hennessy, Jr., Dist. Atty. of Onondaga County, John A. Cirando, Syracuse, of counsel, for the People.

Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Gerald T. Barth, Syracuse, of counsel, for appellant.

WILLIAM J. BURKE, Judge.

MEMORANDUM DECISION/ORDER

This is an appeal from the Syracuse City Court where the lower court judge refused to treat the appellant as a Youthful Offender.

The facts briefly indicate that the appellant was charged in the Syracuse City Court with having committed the crimes of Resisting Arrest and Obstructing Governmental Administration. However, after plea negotiations, the appellant was allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the violation of Disorderly Conduct and was sentenced to a $25.00 fine and a one-year Conditional Discharge. A request for Youthful Offender treatment was denied.

The appellant contends basically that the defendant was a 'youth' within the definitions of § 720.20(1) in that he was a person charged with a crime. He further contends that § 720.20(1) and (1)(b) does not preclude Youthful Offender treatment by virtue of his plea to a violation, rather than a crime. In support of this contention, he cites § 720.20(1)(b) which states in part:

"(1) Upon conviction of an eligible youth the court must order a pre-sentence investigation of the defendant . . .

(b) where the conviction is had in a local criminal court and the eligible youth had not prior to the commencement of trial or entry of a plea of guilty been convicted of a crime or found a youthful offender, the court must find he is a youthful offender. " (Emphasis added)

The appellant, therefore, contends that § 720.20 speaks in terms of a conviction of an eligible youth in a local criminal court, without any designations that the convictions must be for a crime and that by virtue of this fact, any "eligible youth" must be accorded Youthful Offender treatment, notwithstanding the fact that he may ultimately plead guilty to a violation.

The Youthful Offender procedure under Article 720 of the Criminal Procedure Law contains a number of significant innovations intended to remedy those aspects of the former Code provisions which proved to be cumbersome, inadequate and in some instances obsolete. However, the essential purpose of the Youthful Offender process remains unaltered: to enable a Youthful wrongdoer to avoid a conviction for a "crime". (See N.Y. Criminal Practice, Vol. 2, by Marvin Waxner, § 16.1).

Additionally, Prof. Richard G. Denzer (now J. Denzer) states in his Practice Commentary to Art. 720 that:

"In appraising the scheme, one must bear in mind the aforementioned proposition that the primary purpose of the youthful offender process is avoidance of the stigma and practical consequences of a conviction for a crime." (Emphasis added). (Denzer Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL Art. 720, pp. 316-317).

The Court of Appeals stated in People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580 at p. 584, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1 at p. 3, 350 N.E.2d 377 at p. 379:

"The youthful offender provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law emanate from a legislative desire not to stigmatize youths between the ages of 16 and 19 with criminal records triggered by hasty or thoughtless acts which, although crimes, may not have been the serious deeds of hardened criminals.

There is no constitutional right to youthful offender status and such treatment is entirely a gratuitous creature of the Legislature subject to such conditions as the Legislature may impose without violating constitutional guarantees . . ." (Emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals, itself, is concerned with the stigma that derives itself from the acts of individuals which constitute the commission of crimes.

This court is of the opinion that Art. 720 of the CPL, which followed the former Code in its basic theory, is concerned with affording those individuals convicted of crimes with the benefits of its provisions, and does not mandate Youthful Offender treatment to those who are convicted of offenses, which are not crimes, even if those individuals were in the first instance "eligible youths".

Our Penal Law defines in § 10.00(6) the term "crime" to mean a misdemeanor or a felony. Our CPL defines in § 1.20(39) the term "petty offenses" and it means a violation or traffic offenses.

Therefore, in the instant case, the conviction for disorderly conduct is what is controlling in the determination of mandatory or discretionary Youthful Offender treatment in the local criminal court and by virtue of the fact that such conviction is not for a "crime" but for a petty offense, Youthful Offender treatment is not mandated.

The CPL shifted the determination of Youthful Offender status from the pre-pleading stage to the post conviction stage, thus eliminating the proliferation of unnecessary and futile probation reports and if the appellant was correct in this contention, it would apparently mean that probation reports would be required in the countless thousands of cases wherein defendants are allowed to enter pleas of guilty to violations, this would not be a...