People v. Castro

• Decision Date: 30 June 2022
• Docket Number: 110681
• Citation: 206 A.D.3d 1444,170 N.Y.S.3d 694
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joey M. CASTRO, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

206 A.D.3d 1444

170 N.Y.S.3d 694

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Joey M. CASTRO, Appellant.

110681

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: May 23, 2022

Decided and Entered: June 30, 2022

Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Kelly L. Egan of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.

G. Scott Walling, Special Prosecutor, Slingerlands, for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Pritzker, Ceresia and Fisher, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County (Murphy III, J.), rendered December 17, 2018, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of assault in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and failure to register an assault rifle.

On October 8, 2017, defendant and Jeffrey Castro, defendant's twin brother (hereinafter the brother), were socializing with their neighbors, Michael Desnoyers (hereinafter the victim), Rebecca Lackey, the victim's girlfriend, and Charles Miles, the victim's stepson, at Desnoyers’ home in the Town of Moreau, Saratoga County after Miles and his friend cared for defendant's dog who had gotten loose. The brother departed the victim's home after a short while, but defendant continued to socialize in the victim's garage. As the evening went on, defendant made sexually charged and vulgar remarks to Lackey and, thereafter, the victim and defendant began to bicker. Ultimately, defendant left the victim's garage stating that he was going to get the brother. It is alleged that, minutes later, defendant returned with a gun and began shooting into the victim's garage at the victim, Lackey and Miles. The victim was struck by a bullet and paralyzed. In February 2018, defendant was charged in a nine-count indictment with various crimes stemming from the shooting. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and failure to register an assault rifle. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 36²/₃ to 46 years, with a period of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.

Defendant asserts that his conviction for failure to register an assault rifle (count 9) is not supported by legally sufficient evidence as the trial evidence indicated that this firearm was owned by the brother, and was only in defendant's possession, thus, he had no registration obligation. We agree. As relevant here, pursuant to Penal Law § 400.00 (16–a) (a), an "owner" of certain assault weapons "must make an application to register such weapon with the superintendent of state police" within certain time periods (see Penal Law §§ 265.00[22][e], [f] ; 400.00 [16–a] [a], [c]). Importantly, what is required here is ownership, not possession (see Penal Law § 400.00 [16–a] ; compare Penal Law § 265.01–b ). The testimony at trial – notably, by the brother – established that, although the brother allowed defendant to use the weapon, the brother was the one who purchased it and was the owner. Thus, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence was not legally sufficient to support the conviction" for failure to register an assault rifle ( People v. McClendon, 199 A.D.3d 1233, 1235, 159 N.Y.S.3d 187 [2021] ). Accordingly, this count must be dismissed.

We turn now to defendant's next argument, that positive identification of the shooter was impossible due to the low level of illumination outside the garage and, thus, the verdict on all counts is not supported by the weight of the evidence. "[W]hen conducting a weight of the evidence review, we view the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether a different verdict would have been unreasonable; if a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence" ( People v. Campbell, 196 A.D.3d 834, 835, 149 N.Y.S.3d 720 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lvs denied 37 N.Y.3d 1025, 153 N.Y.S.3d 415, 175 N.E.3d 440, 441 [2021]; see People v. Bryant, 200 A.D.3d 1483, 1484, 161 N.Y.S.3d 399 [2021], lv granted 38 N.Y.3d 931, 164 N.Y.S.3d 39, 184 N.E.3d 860 [2022] ). At trial, the victim, Lackey, Miles and Miles’ friend testified to their observations of defendant and the brother prior to the shooting. Although testimony varied as to what color and kind of pants defendant was wearing,¹ these witnesses, as well as the brother, testified that defendant was wearing a green Boston Celtics shirt. There was also testimony, including from the brother, that the brother was not wearing the same clothing as defendant and that the two men were distinguishable both in their appearances and the way their voices sounded.

As to the shooting, Miles testified that he was in the basement of the victim's residence when Lackey yelled that "there was going to be a fight." Miles ran back to the garage where he observed an individual wearing a green Celtics shirt and black sweatpants shoot a gun three times and say "Do you still think it's funny? Do you want to get f* * * * * * shot?" Although Miles testified that he could not see the shooter's face, he identified the shooter as defendant based upon his clothes and his voice.

Lackey testified that, soon after defendant left, as she and the victim were cleaning up in the garage, she "heard jingling and leaves crunching" and then observed defendant "running across [the] front yard with a gun." Lackey verified that she was able to observe defendant's face and his clothing at this time. The victim attested that, after defendant departed, he heard someone coming across the lawn and Lackey stated "he's got a gun"; the victim then observed a gun in defendant's arms and defendant began shooting. The victim continued that he "saw [defendant's] face light up every time [defendant] shot the gun" and that he was further able to identify defendant because he was dressed in the same clothing that he had been in previously that night. The brother, while examining photographs taken of defendant upon his arrest, verified that defendant was wearing a Celtics shirt and Nike sweatpants that appeared black and, moreover, maintained that he had never worn these clothes. The brother also testified that he returned home approximately two hours before the shooting to go to bed because he had to work the next day.

Given the foregoing, since the jury could have discredited the eyewitness testimony establishing defendant as the shooter, another verdict would not have been unreasonable. Nevertheless, each eyewitness testified that, despite being twins, defendant and the brother were distinguishable both in how they looked and how their voices sounded. Moreover, each eyewitness verified that they had spent an extended amount of time with defendant preceding the shooting and all testified consistently as to what defendant was wearing at that time – clothing that the brother maintained he had never worn. Although defendant argues that lighting conditions would have made it impossible to identify the shooter, this issue was explored during trial and posed a credibility issue for the jury to resolve (see People v. Campbell, 196 A.D.3d at 837, 149 N.Y.S.3d 720 ; see also People v. Demellier, 174 A.D.3d 1120, 1123, 105 N.Y.S.3d 218 [2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 980, 113 N.Y.S.3d 657, 137 N.E.3d 27 [2019] ). Thus, "viewing the evidence in a neutral light and giving deference to the jury's credibility determinations," the verdict as to the remaining counts is not against the weight of the evidence ( People v. Campbell, 196 A.D.3d at 837, 149 N.Y.S.3d 720 ; People v. Banks, 181 A.D.3d 973, 975, 121 N.Y.S.3d 381 [2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1025, 126 N.Y.S.3d 21, 149 N.E.3d 859 [2020] ).

Defendant next alleges that County Court erred in denying his motion to reopen the Huntley hearing. A court may permit a defendant to renew his or her suppression motion and reopen a suppression hearing if, "after a pre-trial determination and denial of the motion the court is satisfied, upon a showing by the defendant, that additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he [or she] could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion" ( CPL 710.40[4] ; see People v. Newell, 148 A.D.3d 1216, 1219–1220, 48 N.Y.S.3d 800 [2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1035, 62 N.Y.S.3d 304, 84 N.E.3d 976 [2017] ). Here, after a Huntley hearing, County Court found that the People had established that defendant's statements during his initial interaction with law enforcement and the subsequent transfer to the State Police barracks were voluntary and that, in rebuttal, defendant failed to establish that these statements were "elicited unlawfully[ ] or were involuntary." Thereafter, defendant moved to reopen the hearing on the basis that the People had submitted a video recording of an interview of defendant conducted by the State Police during which law enforcement made comments "concerning the time period during which defendant ... allegedly made the oral statements" and defendant continued to be questioned "after he asserted his right to an attorney." The court denied defendant's motion. Given that "defendant's motion here was premised entirely upon events that allegedly occurred at the time that he was initially questioned by law enforcement, i.e., events to which defendant could have testified or otherwise brought to light at the initial Huntley hearing," County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reopen the Huntley hearing ( People v....