People v. Castro

• Decision Date: 11 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. F046915.,F046915.
• Citation: 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 533,138 Cal.App.4th 486
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Conrado Ramos CASTRO, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

41 Cal.Rptr.3d 533

138 Cal.App.4th 486

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Conrado Ramos CASTRO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. F046915.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

April 11, 2006.

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Daniel G. Koryn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Brian Alvarez and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

OPINION

WISEMAN, Acting P.J.

The main question presented in this case is whether an anonymous 911 call was constitutionally sufficient to support the traffic stop that led to defendant Conrado Ramos Castro's arrest and conviction for possession of a firearm by a person with a qualifying prior conviction. We hold in the published part of this opinion that an exigent circumstance—the anonymous caller's allegation of a threat by defendant against the life of defendant's wife—rendered the tip sufficient even if it was not sufficient otherwise.

Defendant's remaining contentions pertain to jury instructions and the trial court's comments to the jury. Perceiving no prejudicial error, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES

Christine Achen, a Kern County Sheriff's Department dispatcher, took a 911 call at 10:23 p.m. on July 30, 2004. A caller who did not give his name spoke to the dispatcher.¹ The caller gave defendant's name and said defendant came to the caller's house and stated he was going to shoot his (defendant's) wife. The caller said defendant had a "steel colored" revolver and that it was "strapped to his back." He described defendant as about 40, thin, Hispanic, and wearing a white shirt and dark pants. The caller was calling from his car and indicated that he had been following defendant's truck, although he could no longer see it. He described the truck as a full-size white Ford with a green stripe and a long bed and "the letters GTO painted on the side." He gave defendant's wife's address and claimed that defendant was driving toward her street. He also gave the wife's name, described her as Hispanic and in her forties, and stated that she was then at home with her daughters. The caller's wife had just called defendant's wife to warn her. The dispatcher asked whether defendant and his wife were "going through a divorce or something." The caller replied that "apparently they were split up," but he did not "know the whole details about it." When the dispatcher asked for the caller's name, he declined to give it and said, "I just don't want her hurt and I don't want to get involved."

The contents of the call were relayed to deputy sheriffs. Achen testified that in an "officer safety situation" like this one, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) would also normally receive the dispatch.

Shortly after the information was dispatched, CHP officers located and stopped defendant's truck. Deputy sheriffs arrived after the stop had taken place. Defendant had been driving with two passengers, Debra Walker and Felix Marrufo. The three were ordered out of the truck. Officers then saw the butt of a .22 caliber handgun protruding from Walker's purse, which she had left inside. They also found 10 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition in defendant's pocket. The ammunition was later found to fit the gun.

The District Attorney filed an information charging defendant with one count of possession of a firearm by a person with qualifying prior offenses. (Pen.Code, § 12021, subd. (c)(1).) As qualifying offenses, the information alleged two convictions of willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant causing a traumatic condition. (Pen.Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).)

Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress all the fruits of the traffic stop, arguing that the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it was based solely on the anonymous tip. At the suppression hearing, the dispatcher testified and the tape was played. The CHP officers who executed the traffic stop, however, were not present at the hearing. The only law enforcement testimony was by a deputy sheriff who arrived at the scene after the truck had been pulled over. The deputy testified that he responded to a dispatch describing defendant and his truck and stating that defendant had "a firearm strapped to his back ...." He also said he believed the dispatch included defendant's name. When he arrived, he saw that the truck the CHP had pulled over was a white pickup with a green stripe, like the one described in the dispatch, and that both Marrufo and defendant matched the description of the suspect. The prosecutor asked the deputy whether the CHP officers said they had heard the dispatcher's description before pulling the truck over, but the court sustained defendant's hearsay objection.

The magistrate denied the suppression motion. He said:

"The Court's going to make a finding that there certainly was a reasonable suspicion. And to get an anonymous call that somebody has a weapon, that certainly would provide some kind of reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer to make the stop. And the vehicle description is in the report and has been corroborated by the officer who was there and had—at the scene. So the—there was not an unlawful detention and, therefore, the stop was correct and proper, reasonable under the circumstances.

"In today's world when you start having weapons involved in this sort of thing, especially in matters involving domestic problems, such as apparently was the case here, it's important that the police agencies carry out their responsibilities in the manner in which the circumstances dictate, and that's what occurred in this matter.

"There's no reasonable basis for this Court to support in any way your—your motion, Counsel. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Evidence Pursuant to Penal Code Section 1538.5 is—is, therefore, denied."

At trial, Walker testified that the gun found in her purse belonged to defendant. She said that when the police pulled the truck over, defendant reached down to the floor and fumbled with her purse and appeared to be putting something in it. Defendant also testified, denying that the gun belonged to him. He also denied that police found any ammunition in his pocket.

The jury found defendant guilty of the firearm possession charge and the court sentenced him to the middle term of two years.

DISCUSSION

I. Anonymous tip

Defendant argues that the magistrate erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He relies on the Supreme Court's discussion of stops based on anonymous tips in Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254. We reject defendant's argument. As we will explain, even if the other information in the anonymous tip was insufficient on its own, it did suffice in combination with the caller's additional assertion that defendant was on his way to shoot his wife.

A defendant moving to suppress evidence because it was obtained via an unreasonable, warrantless search or seizure has the initial burden of raising a Fourth Amendment issue by showing that the search or seizure was conducted without a warrant and explaining why it was unreasonable. The burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove reasonableness by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127-129, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52; People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106, 137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.) In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the magistrate's ruling, and we defer to the court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. We then independently review the determination of whether the search or seizure was reasonable in light of those facts. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673-674, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 846, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.)

Our review of the suppression ruling is based solely on the facts before the court when it ruled, not on any additional evidence developed during the trial. (In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 77, fn. 18, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 38 P.3d 433.) If the record of the hearing supports the ruling on any grounds, however, we must sustain the ruling even if the magistrate did not rely on the proper grounds. (People v. Gurley (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 536, 539, fn. 1, 100 Cal.Rptr. 407.)

Preliminarily, we conclude that the magistrate must have inferred that the CHP officers who pulled defendant over did so on the basis of information from the anonymous tip that was dispatched to them, as opposed to some other cause. This inference was adequately supported by the dispatcher's testimony that the CHP would normally receive a dispatch of this kind and because the officers pulled defendant's truck over a short time after the tip was received and dispatched. Defendant does not challenge the inference and we have no reason to disturb it.

We must answer two questions. First, did the officers know specific and articulable facts that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity? (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1; United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 [applying reasonable-suspicion standard to investigative stop of automobile]; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [establishing reasonable-suspicion standard for stop and frisk].) Second, even if the information the officers possessed would not give rise to a reasonable suspicion, was the stop justified by exigent circumstances? (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Meyer) (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 579, 585, 173 Cal.Rptr. 544["[T]he exigency of the situation may justify action on information of less than ideal quality"].)

With respect to...