People v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 23 April 2020
• Docket Number: 108844
• Citation: 123 N.Y.S.3d 236,182 A.D.3d 862
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Olaijaide CHAPMAN, Also Known as Buddha and Buddha Luv, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

182 A.D.3d 862
123 N.Y.S.3d 236

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Olaijaide CHAPMAN, Also Known as Buddha and Buddha Luv, Appellant.

108844

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 11, 2020
Decided and Entered: April 23, 2020

123 N.Y.S.3d 237

Lucas G. Mihuta, Albany, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Emily Schultz of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Aarons, Pritzker and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.

182 A.D.3d 862

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Lynch, J.), rendered June 22, 2016, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of attempted murder in the first degree, conspiracy in the second degree (two counts), attempted murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree (two counts).

Defendant was charged in an eight-count indictment with attempted murder in the first degree, conspiracy in the second degree (two counts), attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree (two counts) and attempted robbery in the first degree (two counts) arising from allegations that he hired two individuals to shoot and rob the victim. Following a

182 A.D.3d 863

jury trial, defendant was convicted of all charges except the attempted robbery charges. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms, the greatest of which was 25 years to life. Defendant appeals.

Defendant argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence as there was no independent witness testimony except for the coconspirators who, he contends, significantly contradicted one another. He further argues that the corroborating evidence established a very weak circumstantial case. In determining whether a verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence, we must first consider whether a different verdict would have been unreasonable and, if it would not, we "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (

123 N.Y.S.3d 238

People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Lang, 164 A.D.3d 963, 966, 82 N.Y.S.3d 229 [2018] ). "A defendant may not be convicted of any offense upon the testimony of an accomplice unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of such offense" ( CPL 60.22[1] ; see People v. Jones, 166 A.D.3d 1394, 1395, 88 N.Y.S.3d 688 [2018], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 950, 100 N.Y.S.3d 166, 123 N.E.3d 825 [2019] ). "The corroborating proof does not need to demonstrate [the] defendant's guilt; instead, when read with the [coconspirators'] testimony, the proof makes it more likely that the defendant committed the offense, and thus tends to connect him [or her] to it" ( People v. Fields, 160 A.D.3d 1116, 1117, 75 N.Y.S.3d 617 [2018] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1116, 81 N.Y.S.3d 376, 106 N.E.3d 759 [2018] ).

As relevant here, for a defendant to be found guilty of attempted murder in the first degree, the People have to prove that the defendant, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person," attempted to "cause[ ] the death of such person or a third person" and did so by "procur[ing the] commission of the killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value" ( Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.27[a][vi] ). "[A] conviction for attempted murder in the second degree requires the People to prove that, with intent to cause the death of another, the defendant engaged in conduct that tended to effect the commission of that crime" ( People v. Demellier, 174 A.D.3d 1120, 1121, 105 N.Y.S.3d 218 [2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 980, 113 N.Y.S.3d 657, 137 N.E.3d 27 [2019], citing Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25[1] ). "A person is guilty of conspiracy in the second degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony be performed, he [or she] agrees with one or

182 A.D.3d 864

more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct" ( Penal Law § 105.15 ). "A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when ... [w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he [or she] causes such injury to such person ... by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument" ( Penal Law § 120.10[1] ). " ‘Serious physical injury’ means a physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death" ( Penal Law § 10.00[10] ), and " ‘[d]angerous instrument’ means any instrument, article or substance ... which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury" ( Penal Law § 10.00[13] ; see People v. Pine, 126 A.D.3d 1112, 1114, 4 N.Y.S.3d 746 [2015], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1004, 38 N.Y.S.3d 113, 59 N.E.3d 1225 [2016] ). "As relevant...