People v. Charleston
| Decision Date | 12 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 316771,316771 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v KEITH ROMOND CHARLESTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court
Before: MARKEY, P.J., AND MURRAY AND BORRELLO, JJ.
Defendant appeals by right his convictions after a jury trial of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without parole for his first-degree premeditated murder conviction, three to five years' imprisonment for his felon-in-possession conviction, and two years' imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
This case arises from the murder of Charles Wall in Detroit, Michigan. Defendant first argues that he did not waive his Miranda rights1 knowingly and intelligently. We disagree.
A defendant preserves the issue of whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights by filing a pretrial motion to suppress his statement to the police. See People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 144; 854 NW2d 114 (2014). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement he made to the police, but he only argued that his statement to the police was involuntary. On appeal, defendant argues that his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing and intelligent. The issue of whether a defendant voluntarily confessed to a crime is separate from the issue of whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently,and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights although the analysis for determining voluntariness of a Miranda waiver is essentially the same. See People v Ryan, 295 Mich App 388, 396-397; 819 NW2d 55 (2012). Consequently, the issue of whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights is unpreserved. See Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App at 144.
Because defendant failed to preserve the issue of whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, we review the unpreserved claim of constitutional error for plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To prevail, defendant must show: "1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights." Id. at 763. With regard to the last element, defendant must show that the error affected the outcome in the trial court. Id. Moreover, plain error warrants reversal only if it results in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings regardless of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 763.
A defendant has a constitutional right to remain silent during custodial interrogation. Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App at 145. Thus, statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation are inadmissible at trial unless the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 707; 703 NW2d 204 (2005). This Court will conduct a bifurcated analysis and will examine whether the defendant waived his Miranda rights (1) knowingly and intelligently and (2) voluntarily. Id. "Intoxication from alcohol or other substances can affect the validity of a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, but is not dispositive." Id. With regard to whether a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent, a court will examine the defendant's level of understanding of the waiver. People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 265; 787 NW2d 126 (2010). "A defendant does not need to understand the consequences and ramifications of waiving his or her rights." Id.
In reviewing whether a defendant voluntarily confessed to a crime, this Court examines the totality of the circumstances and determines whether "the confession is 'the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,' or whether the accused's 'will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.' " Ryan, 295 Mich App at 396-397 (citation omitted). In determining voluntariness, factors to consider include:
[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988).]
A Walker2 hearing was held on defendant's motion to suppress on February 22, 2013. Detroit Police Officer Derrick Maye testified that he interviewed defendant on December 26, 2012, at approximately 8:00 p.m. Defendant was not deprived of any food or water, and defendant had a carton of juice with him during the interview. Officer Maye explained that the Second Precinct where the interview occurred had scheduled feeding times. The scheduled feeding time on that day was 6:00 p.m. Defendant did not tell Officer Maye that he was hungry during the interview. Defendant was 29 years old at the time of the interview and had completed the ninth grade. Officer Maye provided defendant with a notice of constitutional rights form, read the form aloud to defendant, and gave defendant the opportunity to read it himself. Defendant did not slur his speech. Defendant did not appear to be drunk or tired. His eyes were not bloodshot. Defendant also did not appear confused or disoriented. Defendant was coherent and was able to understand the conversation. During the interview, defendant told Officer Maye that he was living in Atlanta at the time of the incident. Defendant eventually stated that he lived on the street where the incident occurred.
Defendant also testified at the hearing. According to defendant, he was intoxicated at the time of the incident. Defendant explained that he had consumed six or seven daiquiris, which contain vodka, before the interview. He began drinking at approximately 12:30 a.m. or 1:00 a.m. on December 26, 2012. Defendant also smoked four or five blunts of "Cush," which he explained is strong marijuana; however, defendant explained that he smoked one blunt and had two daiquiris during the daytime on December 26, 2012. Defendant smoked the other blunts and drank the other daiquiris during the early morning hours of December 26, 2012. Defendant went to sleep on December 26, 2012, at 2:00 a.m. and woke up at approximately noon. Defendant did not remember the police interview at the time of the motion hearing or Officer Maye's asking him, "[D]o you know who this is?" Defendant also explained that on the day of his arrest, the police came to the house. His girlfriend Lida Love, defendant's niece, and defendant's nephew were in the house. Defendant was trying to find something in the closet when he was arrested. Defendant asked the police officers why they came to the house. The police officers told defendant that they had a warrant based on defendant's outstanding traffic tickets.
Defendant's mother, Linda Moore, also testified at the hearing. Moore explained that on December 26, 2012, police officers entered her home without her invitation. She also testified that the officers did not show her an arrest warrant. But Moore also explained that she was not at home at the time of defendant's arrest because she was at work. Defendant was awake when Moore left for work, and defendant had been drinking vodka, gin, and beer the entire day of his arrest. Defendant also smoked approximately two marijuana cigarettes. Moore explained that defendant was intoxicated at the time of his arrest, and she knew this even though she left for work at 8:00 a.m.
The trial court ruled that there was no indication that defendant was intoxicated during the interview with Officer Maye and based its decision on its observations from watching thefirst 20 minutes of the videotaped recording of defendant's interview by Officer Maye. The trial court noted that it had considered defendant's answers to Officer Maye's questions, as well as how defendant gave his answers. The court observed that defendant read and initialed the Miranda waiver form. The trial court also noted that defendant appeared to remember certain details of the interrogation while forgetting others. The court also reasoned that defendant had ingested most of the alcohol on the day before he was arrested. The court pointed out that defendant's statement to the police was cogent and that defendant slept several hours on the day of the interview. Finally, the court noted that Moore was not with defendant most of the day and could not have observed whether defendant consumed alcohol. Thus, the court ruled that defendant's statement was voluntary and denied defendant's motion to suppress.
Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent. According to Officer Maye, defendant did not appear to be drunk or tired at the time of the interrogation. Defendant did not slur his speech. His eyes were not bloodshot. Defendant also did not appear confused or disoriented, and he was coherent and was able to understand the conversation. Officer Maye was able to reason with defendant. Although defendant consumed alcohol and marijuana before the interview, defendant consumed most of the marijuana and alcohol in the early morning hours of...
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