People v. Christman

• Decision Date: 10 September 2014
• Docket Number: A138287
• Citation: 229 Cal.App.4th 810,176 Cal.Rptr.3d 884
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles Leroy CHRISTMAN, Defendant and Respondent.

229 Cal.App.4th 810

176 Cal.Rptr.3d 884

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Charles Leroy CHRISTMAN, Defendant and Respondent.

A138287

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Filed September 10, 2014

See 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 173.

San Francisco Superior Court Hon. Garrett L. Wong. (San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. 103687)

Counsel for Appellant: Mark A. Peterson, San Francisco District Attorney, Derek Butts, Deputy District Attorney

Counsel for Respondent: First District Appellate Project, Jonathan Soglin, Executive Director, Richard Such, Staff Attorney

RUVOLO, P.J.^*

I.INTRODUCTION

The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6600 et seq.) ¹ provides that, under certain circumstances, a person who has been committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) may thereafter be conditionally released into the community under a program of outpatient supervision and treatment. (See § 6608–6609.3.) The SVPA also provides that certain conditionally released SVPs who have a history of sexual misconduct with children “shall not be placed within one-quarter mile” of a school providing instruction to children from kindergarten to grade 12. (§ 6608.5, subd. (f).) ² However, the statute does not specify the method a court should use to measure the distance between the SVP's placement, or residence, and the school.

In the sole assignment of error, Contra Costa County asserts the trial court incorrectly used the “closest practical walking distance” instead of using a straight line to measure the distance between the residence of Charles Leroy Christman (Christman), an adjudicated SVP who falls within the provisions of section 6608.5, subdivision (f), and a nearby elementary school. Computing the distance between Christman's residence and the school using a pedestrian-route method resulted in the location of Christman's residence being compliant with section 6608.5, subdivision (f), and the trial court approving his residential placement over Contra Costa County's objection.

We hold, as a matter of first impression, that in determining compliance with the residency restriction contained in section 6608.5, subdivision (f), the distance between Christman's residence and the elementary school should have been calculated using the straight-line method rather than a pedestrian-route method. Consequently, we reverse, because calculations using the straight-line method place Christman's residence less than one-quarter mile from the nearby elementary school.

II.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The SVPA was enacted to identify incarcerated individuals who suffer from mental disorders that predispose them to commit violent criminal sexual acts, and to confine and treat such individuals until it is determined they no longer present a threat to society. (See generally Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143–1144, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584.) After Christman served his prison term for multiple sex offenses against boys under the age of 15 in public parks, he was determined to be a SVP on January 30, 1997, and thereafter was committed to Atascadero State Hospital.

On February 10, 2012, after approximately 15 years of in-patient treatment, the court heard Christman's petition for conditional release brought under section 6608. That section provides that if the court determines the committed person would no longer be a danger to others while under supervision and treatment in the community, the court “shall order the committed person placed with an appropriate forensic conditional release program operated by the state for one year.” (§ 6608, subd. (e).) Following the hearing the trial court granted Christman's section 6608 petition for outpatient status after finding that he could be safely and effectively treated in an outpatient program. The court ordered the Department of State Hospitals (the Department) to locate housing for him. That ruling itself is not challenged by Contra Costa County in this appeal.

The Department's designee, Liberty Healthcare Corporation (Liberty Healthcare), attempted to find suitable housing for Christman in San Francisco, the county where Christman was originally tried for his sexual crimes against minors. On or about June 27, 2012, Liberty Healthcare advised the court that it had exhausted all housing stock San Francisco, but had been unsuccessful in finding an appropriate residence. On June 27, 2012, the court found good cause to expand the housing search to other Bay Area counties. On November 8, 2012, the court determined that outpatient treatment and supervision could properly occur in Contra Costa County, as this was Christman's last county of domicile at the time of his commitment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (See § 6608.5, subd. (a).)

In December 2012, Liberty Healthcare located housing at a particular address in Bay Point in Contra Costa County and recommended placement there. Notice was given to the Contra Costa County District Attorney so that the county could “weigh in on the placement itself.”

The court held a hearing on February 26, 2013, during which evidence was taken and arguments were made concerning Christman's proposed placement, which was near the Willow Cove Elementary School (the school). Among the issues in dispute was how the residency restriction in section 6608.5, subdivision (f), should be measured. Contra Costa County argued the appropriate method to measure whether Christman's residence was farther than one-quarter mile from the school was by a straight-line measurement. It is undisputed that using the straight-line method to calculate the distance put Christman's residence within a prohibited area and would compel his relocation elsewhere.

The court ultimately rejected the straight-line method, and held the appropriate measurement was to use a pedestrian route traveled, a method of measurement that took intervening structures and obstacles into account. Using this method increased the distance between Christman's residence and the school, and placed his residence more than one-quarter mile away from the school. Therefore, the court ordered that Christman's placement be implemented on or before March 12, 2013. This appeal followed.³

III.DISCUSSION

The facts giving rise to this appeal are undisputed. Christman concedes he “has the requisite convictions and sexual history to fall within the provisions of [section 6608.5] subdivision (f).” Given this concession, the only question concerns whether Christman's new residence in Contra Costa County is located within a quarter-mile of a nearby elementary school. The answer hinges upon how the distance from the residence to the school is to be measured.

Statutory interpretation is necessary to resolve this issue because the provisions of section 6608.5, subdivision (f), are silent on the question of how “one-quarter mile” is to be measured. (See Waterman Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 [“When a statute is silent on a point, the courts resort to statutory interpretation”].) The proper interpretation of a statute and its application to undisputed facts is a question of law, and thus also subject to de novo review. (Lozada v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 209.) Therefore, this court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation of section 6608.5, subdivision (f), but instead must make an independent judgment as to the proper statutory interpretation. (See Union Bank of California v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 484, 488, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 137 [“The proper interpretation of statutory language is a question of law which this court reviews de novo, independent of the trial court's ruling or reasoning”].)

“The cardinal rule governing statutory interpretation is to ‘ascertain the legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1856, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 626.) If the statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the courts look to “extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]” (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.) We interpret the statute using “ ‘reason, practicality, and common sense to the language at hand.’ [Citation.]” (Ailanto Properties, Inc. v. City of Half Moon Bay (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 572, 583, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 340.) We must give the words of the statute a workable and reasonable interpretation keeping in mind the consequences that will flow from our interpretation. ( Watkins v. County of Alameda (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 320, 336, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 847.)

There is no question that the legislative intent behind the passage of section 6608.5, subdivision (f), was to create “ ‘predator free zones around schools ... to prevent sex offenders from living near where our children learn and play.’ [Citation.]” (In re E.J. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258, 1271, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 165, 223 P.3d 31 [analyzing similar residency restriction for paroled sex offenders].) As noted by an out-of-state court examining a similar statute, “it is reasonable to believe that a law that prohibits child sex offenders from living within [a measurable distance] of a school will reduce the amount of incidental contact child sex offenders have with the children attending that school and that consequently the opportunity for the child sex offenders to commit new sex offenses against those children will be reduced as well.” (People v. Leroy (2005) 357 Ill.App.3d 530, 293 Ill.Dec. 459, 828 N.E.2d 769, 781.)

Christman maintains...