People v. Cintron

• Decision Date: 27 November 2020
• Docket Number: 19-382
• Citation: 134 N.Y.S.3d 123 (Table),69 Misc.3d 148 (A)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David CINTRON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

69 Misc.3d 148 (A)

134 N.Y.S.3d 123 (Table)

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.David CINTRON, Defendant-Appellant.

19-382

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, New York, First Department.

Decided November 27, 2020

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Michael Gaffey, J.), rendered February 26, 2019, affirmed.

In full satisfaction of two separate dockets, including the underlying accusatory instrument charging, inter alia, assault in the third degree (see Penal Law § 120.00 ), attempted assault in the third degree (see Penal Law §§ 110, 120.00 ), and harassment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26[1] ), defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20 ), a violation.

Since defendant did not waive prosecution by information, we assess the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument based on the standard applicable to an information (see People v. Hatton , 26 NY3d 364, 368 [2015] ). So viewed, the information was jurisdictionally valid at least with respect to the charge of attempted third-degree assault, since it contained "nonconclusory factual allegations that, if assumed to be true, address[ed] each element of the crime charged, thereby affording reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed that offense" ( People v. Middleton , 35 NY3d 952, 954 [2020], quoting People v. Matthew P. , 26 NY3d 332, 335-336 [2015] ). At the pleading stage, defendant's intent to cause physical injury, i.e., "substantial pain," a term which simply means "more than slight or trivial pain" ( People v. Chiddick , 8 NY3d 445, 447 [2007] ; see Penal Law § 10.00[9] ), could be readily inferred from allegations that he struck one Randy Anderson in the face with a closed fist, causing bruising to the left side of Anderson's face (see Matter of Edward H. , 61 AD3d 473, 473 [2009] ). Since at least one of the charged misdemeanor offenses was jurisdictionally valid, the court had jurisdiction to accept defendant's plea to the uncharged lesser offense of disorderly conduct (see People v. Keizer , 100 NY2d 114, 117-119 [2003] ).

The plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Defendant confirmed that he was pleading guilty voluntarily, that he had the opportunity to discuss the plea with his attorney, and that he understood he was giving up various rights, including his right to a trial, to call witnesses, to question the People's witnesses, and to testify on his own behalf (see People v. Conceicao , 26 NY3d 375, 383 [2015] ). Since defendant pleaded guilty to an uncharged lesser offense, no factual basis for the plea was necessary (see People v. Johnson , 23 NY3d 973, 975 [2014] ). Defendant, when initially asked whether he acted disorderly, responded "as far as being defensive, yes." The plea court then directed defendant to confer with counsel, after which defendant indicated that he had nothing further to say. Under these circumstances, defendant's vague "defensive" comment did not cast significant doubt on the plea, and a further inquiry was unnecessary (see People v. Lopez , 71 NY2d 662 [1988] ; People v. Bermudez , 228...