People v. Clyburn-Dawson

• Decision Date: 01 May 2015
• Docket Number: 386 KA 08-00886
• Citation: 7 N.Y.S.3d 770,2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03642,128 A.D.3d 1350
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lazarus CLYBURN–DAWSON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

128 A.D.3d 1350

7 N.Y.S.3d 770

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03642

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent

v.Lazarus CLYBURN–DAWSON, Defendant–Appellant.

386 KA 08-00886

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

May 1, 2015.

Charles T. Noce, Conflict Defender, Rochester (Kathleen P. Reardon of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, CARNI, and SCONIERS, JJ.

OpinionMEMORANDUM:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3] [felony murder] ). We reject defendant's contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must in the context of a legal sufficiency analysis (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that defendant forcibly stole marihuana from the victim and that, during the course and commission of that robbery, he shot the victim to death. We reject defendant's further contention that County Court erred in refusing to suppress his statements to the police (see People v. Gutierrez, 96 A.D.3d 1455, 1455, 946 N.Y.S.2d 375, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 997, 951 N.Y.S.2d 473, 975 N.E.2d 919 ). Even assuming, arguendo, that the police misled defendant by the representation that one of the investigators had been “trained in the mental health field,” we conclude that such deception did not “create a substantial risk that the defendant might falsely incriminate himself” (People v. Alexander, 51 A.D.3d 1380, 1382, 857 N.Y.S.2d 418, lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 733, 864 N.Y.S.2d 392, 894 N.E.2d 656 [internal quotation marks omitted] ), and it cannot be said that the alleged deception was “ ‘so fundamentally unfair as to deny [defendant] due process' ” (People v. Brown, 39 A.D.3d 886, 887, 835 N.Y.S.2d 451, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 873, 842 N.Y.S.2d 785, 874 N.E.2d 752, quoting People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188 ). We likewise conclude that the circumstances and length of defendant's detention and questioning, spanning a period of approximately eight hours, did not render defendant's statement involuntary (see People v. McWilliams, 48 A.D.3d 1266, 1267, 852 N.Y.S.2d 523, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 961, 863 N.Y.S.2d 145, 893 N.E.2d 451 ).

Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury with respect to the voluntariness of defendant's statements to the police. Such a charge is required only if defendant raises the issue of voluntariness at trial “by a proper objection, and evidence sufficient to raise a factual dispute [is] adduced either by direct [examination] or cross-examination” (People v. Cefaro, 23 N.Y.2d 283, 288–289, 296 N.Y.S.2d 345, 244 N.E.2d 42 ; see People v. Medina, 93 A.D.3d 459, 460, 939 N.Y.S.2d 455, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 999, 951 N.Y.S.2d 475, 975 N.E.2d 921 ). Because defendant did not submit any evidence presenting a genuine issue of fact concerning the voluntariness of his statements, the court was not required to instruct the jury on that issue (see People v. Canfield, 111 A.D.3d 1396, 1396, 974 N.Y.S.2d 859, lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1087, 981 N.Y.S.2d 673, 4 N.E.3d 975 ; People v. Nathan, 108 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 969 N.Y.S.2d 332, lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 966, 988 N.Y.S.2d 573, 11 N.E.3d 723 ).

Defendant failed to preserve his contention that one of the People's witnesses improperly referred to a written statement of an eyewitness to the crime (see CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, the court properly permitted the People to elicit, during the testimony of a police investigator, that an eyewitness to the crime made a written statement, the contents of which were not revealed to the jury, and that the statement was shown to defendant during interrogation. The investigator did not testify that the out-of-court statement led him to arrest defendant. Rather, the investigator merely conveyed the circumstances under which defendant's own statement was given to the police (see People v. Gonzalez, 249 A.D.2d 24, 24, 670 N.Y.S.2d 852, lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 1049, 685 N.Y.S.2d 427, 708 N.E.2d 184 ). To the extent that defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective in eliciting testimony about the written statement, we conclude that the record establishes that defense counsel pursued a legitimate strategy of implicating the party that had given the written statement as “the shooter.” Thus, defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating “ ‘the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations' for [defense] counsel's alleged shortcomings” with respect to the written statement (People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 ; see People v. Loret, 56 A.D.3d 1283, 1283, 867 N.Y.S.2d 649, lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 927, 874 N.Y.S.2d 12, 902 N.E.2d 446 ).

Defendant failed to preserve his contention with respect to the admissibility of the photographs marked as People's exhibits Nos. 37 and 39 (see CPL 470.05[2] ). Although defense counsel initially objected to the admission of the...