People v. Coker

• Decision Date: 09 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. C041997.,C041997.
• Citation: 120 Cal.App.4th 581,15 Cal.Rptr.3d 553
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Chester Allen COKER, Defendant and Appellant.

15 Cal.Rptr.3d 553

120 Cal.App.4th 581

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Chester Allen COKER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. C041997.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

July 9, 2004.

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Review Denied October 13, 2004.

Mark Alan Hart, Northridge, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Angelo S. Edralin, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SIMS, Acting P.J.

Chester Allen Coker (defendant) appeals after a jury convicted him, inter alia, of two counts of robbery and found true firearm use enhancements. Sentenced to prison for a lengthy term, defendant argues the court erred in admitting an incriminating letter he wrote and by imposing an unauthorized sentence. Since these contentions lack merit, we shall affirm the judgment. In the published portion of the opinion, we discuss why the trial court lawfully sentenced defendant.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The crimes arose from a plan devised by defendant and Ruben Puga to rob a drug dealer with the hope he would not report the crime to law enforcement. Puga induced the drug dealer — Eric Rodriguez — to go to a residence on Eldridge Avenue in Sacramento with the promise of a set of Dayton tire rims at a low price. Rodriguez was enticed. He and his girlfriend, Alicia McPeters, arrived at the residence around 11:00 p.m. on August 27, 2000. Puga met them at the door and invited Rodriguez to a back room. While en route, defendant — who was wearing latex gloves — appeared out of nowhere and struck Rodriguez on the face with a handgun. Defendant and Puga took $1,300 in cash from Rodriguez and McPeters. When Rodriguez resisted, defendant struck him again in the face with the handgun, and Puga swung at him with a bat. Rodriguez managed to break free and attempted to escape, but defendant fired two shots near his head and Puga hit him again with the bat.

Eventually Rodriguez and McPeters were permitted to leave the residence and get in their car. As he was pulling out, Rodriguez informed defendant and Puga that they would not get away with it. Defendant responded by firing two shots at the car, one of which struck Rodriguez in the hip. Rodriguez managed to drive away, but summoned help at a nearby residence.

Law enforcement officers searched the Eldridge Avenue residence and recovered a .45-caliber shell casing, two baseball bats, and a ripped pair of bloody latex gloves that bore one of defendant's fingerprints. On the floor of the residence, they found blood that was consistent with that of Rodriguez.

Rodriguez testified that, after the crime was committed, he received an anonymous letter he believed was from defendant containing what appeared to be an apology for the crimes and a threat that Rodriguez would face retaliation if he cooperated with the prosecution.

The defense was premised on alibi. Defendant, two of his sisters, and defendant's former girlfriend testified defendant spent the night of August 27, 2000, giving tattoos at the Westwood Motel in West Sacramento. One of defendant's sisters, Sheri Castro testified she rented the room that night.

A third sister of defendant's testified that she had questioned McPeters about the events of August 27, 2000, and that McPeters had admitted she was high on ecstasy that night.

Defendant testified he wore latex gloves "all of the time," and that he might have touched the gloves found at the Eldridge Avenue residence, but he never wore them.

Puga testified he robbed Rodriguez and fired shots at him, but he denied that defendant was his accomplice. Puga testified his accomplice was named "Nick," who wore a bandana around his face during the robbery.

In rebuttal, the People called the owner of the Westwood Motel who testified that Sheri Castro had checked into the motel on the night of August 26, 2000 — the day before the crimes — but that she had checked out the next day, and the room she had stayed in was vacant on the night of August 27, 2000.

The People also called an investigator with the district attorney's office who had interviewed Puga at Pelican Bay State Prison prior to trial. Puga told the investigator that defendant was his accomplice during the robbery and that defendant had pistol-whipped Rodriguez and shot him when he was getting into his car.

Defendant was charged by information with two counts of robbery (Pen.Code, § 211¹ — counts one and two), willful discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246 — count three), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2) — count four), and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a) — count five). The information alleged defendant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a) (§ 667(a))) and, as such, came within the provisions of the "Three Strikes Law." (§§ 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12.) The information included allegations of discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c) (section 12022.53(c))) as to count two, discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d) (section 12022.53(d))) as to counts one and three, and firearm use (§ 12022.5, subds.(a) & (d)) and infliction of great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) as to count four.

The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found true each of the associated allegations. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true the prior conviction allegations.

The court sentenced defendant to a 100-years-to-life indeterminate term in prison consecutive to a 30-year determinate term.

DISCUSSION

I.^**

II. Sentencing

Defendant argues his sentence on counts one and two was improperly calculated with respect to the enhancements imposed pursuant to section 12022.53(c) and section 12022.53(d). He proposes that section 12022.53, subdivision (j) (section 12022.53(j)) limits imposition of the enhancements where, as here, defendant's sentence pursuant to the Three Strikes Law results in a longer term of imprisonment than that provided for under section 12022.53.³ This contention fails to withstand scrutiny.

The court calculated defendant's minimum term of his indeterminate life sentences pursuant to so-called "Option (iii)" of the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(iii); People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 553, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56 (Dotson)). Where a court uses Option (iii), it selects the term for the underlying conviction in accordance with section 1170, and then adds applicable enhancements (whether count specific or status-based) to calculate the minimum indeterminate life term. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(iii); Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 553, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56; People v. Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378-1381, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 (Byrd).)

To this indeterminate life term, the court adds count-specific enhancements (e.g., gun-use enhancements) and status enhancements (such as prior serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a) (667(a))) as a determinate term to achieve the final sentence. (Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th 547, 557-558, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56.)

Where, as here, there are multiple third strike convictions, the court repeats the calculation of the minimum indeterminate life term as to each conviction. (People v. Byrd, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380-1381, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 243.) After the addition of count-specific enhancements, each count must then be made to run fully consecutively. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(B), 1170.12, subd. (a)(6); Byrd, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1379-1380, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 243.) Status enhancements are added at the conclusion of this process (rather than to each count) to reach the final term. (Byrd, supra, at p. 1380, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 243.)

The court's calculations in the present case were in accord with this sentencing template. On count one, the court began with a five-year term for the robbery of Rodriguez, to which the court added 25 years to life based on the intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53(d)), as well as 10 years for defendant's two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667(a)), for an aggregate minimum term of 40 years to life. To this indeterminate life term, the court added a 25-years-to-life indeterminate term based on the section 12022.53(d) enhancement, for an aggregate term of 65 years to life.

On count two, the court began with a five-year term for the robbery of McPeters, to which the court added 20 years based on the section 12022.53(c) enhancement, as well as 10 years for defendant's two prior serious felony convictions for an aggregate minimum term of 35 years to life. To this indeterminate life term, the court added a 20-year determinate term based on the section 12022.53(c) enhancement.

Counts one and two were ordered to run consecutively for an aggregate indeterminate term of 100 years to life and a determinate term of 20 years to life. To this sentence, the court added a 10-year determinate term based on defendant's two prior serious felony convictions under section 667(a), which increased the total determinate term to 30 years (and increased the aggregate sentence to 130 years to life).

Defendant contends the court should not have added the count-specific sections 12022.53(c) and (d) enhancements to counts one and two because the court already had used these enhancements once in calculating his minimum indeterminate life term under Option (iii). He proposes that this is mandated by reason of section 12022.53(j), which requires the court to impose punishment pursuant to sections 12022.53(c) and (d) rather than under any other provision of law, "unless another provision of law provides for a greater penalty or a longer term of imprisonment." In defenda...