People v. Dotson
| Decision Date | 18 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S056839,S056839 |
| Citation | 941 P.2d 56,66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423,16 Cal.4th 547 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 941 P.2d 56, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6556, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,667 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Tyrone Craig DOTSON, Defendant and Appellant |
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey, Sanjay T. Kumar, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Jaime L. Fuster and Juliet H. Swoboda, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Under the three strikes law, a trial court must sentence a defendant with two or more qualifying prior felony convictions to an indeterminate life term with the minimum term calculated as the "greater" of three options. The last of these three options is calculated, as relevant here, by adding to the term for the current offense the terms for applicable enhancements. (Pen.Code, § 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A)(iii).) 1 The issue in this case is whether when a defendant is sentenced under this third option, and his current conviction is for a serious felony, the trial court must also impose a separate determinate term for enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a). The Court of Appeal concluded the enhancements should not be added as a separate determinate term. We disagree, and therefore reverse its judgment.
On December 16, 1994, at approximately 11:30 p.m., defendant Tyrone Craig Dotson broke into the home of Victoria Patterson who was home alone. She locked herself in a bathroom and cried out to her son David, who lived next door. Defendant left the home and was chased by David and several of his friends. He was apprehended by police on December 17 at 12:45 a.m.
Defendant was found guilty of first degree burglary. (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a).) The trial court found true the allegation that he had suffered four prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of subdivision (b): a 1981 conviction for residential burglary (§ 459), a 1983 conviction for voluntary manslaughter (former § 192.1, now § 192, subd. (a)), a 1986 conviction for attempted murder (§§ 664, 187), and a 1986 conviction for residential burglary (§ 459). These were also prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court imposed a six-year upper term for the burglary. Defendant's sentence under the three strikes law was calculated by adding this six years to the four 5-year prior serious felony conviction enhancements for a minimum indeterminate term of twenty-six years to life. (Subd. (c)(2)(A)(iii).) 2 The trial court did not impose a separate determinate term of 20 years for the four 5-year enhancements. In response to the prosecutor's motion, the trial court dismissed the prior prison term allegations. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
The Court of Appeal modified the judgment in certain respects not relevant to the issue here; as modified, the judgment was affirmed.
We granted the Attorney General's petition for review.
In November 1994, California voters adopted Proposition 184, their version of the three strikes law. This proposition was codified as section 1170.12. (People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101 at p. 104, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 443, 926 P.2d 423.) Predicate prior felonies are defined in subdivision (b) as: (People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096, 1099, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 879, 938 P.2d 938.)
Under the three strikes law, a trial court must sentence a defendant with two or more qualifying prior felony convictions or strikes to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. These defendants "become eligible for parole on a date calculated by reference to a 'minimum term.' " (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 506, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.) This minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is the "greater" of three options. (Subd. (c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).) 3 Under the first option (option (i)), the defendant's minimum indeterminate term is calculated by tripling "the term otherwise provided as punishment" for the current conviction. (Subd. (c)(2)(A)(i).) Here, defendant was sentenced to six years for first degree burglary; hence his term under option (i) would be eighteen years. Option (i) generally is the "greate[st]" option of the three when the current crime is particularly serious, and thus carries a significant sentence.
Option (ii) is 25 years. (Subd. (c)(2)(A)(ii).) While the terms under options (i) and (iii) will vary from case to case, option (ii) essentially acts as a default to ensure that the defendant's indeterminate term will always be a minimum of 25 years. Thus, had defendant been sentenced under option (ii), his indeterminate term would be a minimum of 25 years.
Under option (iii), the defendant's minimum indeterminate term is calculated, as relevant in this case, by adding applicable enhancements to the term selected for the current conviction. (Subd. (c)(2)(A)(iii).) Here, defendant was sentenced to a term of six years for the current burglary conviction and had four 5-year prior serious felony conviction enhancements within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a) (section 667(a)). Adding these together, his minimum indeterminate term under option (iii) was 26 years. Option (iii) is therefore the "greater" of the three options in this case. Generally, option (iii) will be the "greate[st]" sentence when the defendant has an extensive criminal recidivist history, and hence there are numerous applicable enhancements.
Under section 667(a), 4 when the defendant is convicted of a current serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and has been previously convicted of a serious felony, the trial court must impose a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction that was brought and tried separately. The terms of the present offense and each section 667(a) enhancement must run consecutively. (§ 667, (a)(1).) The issue in this case is whether, when as here, a defendant is sentenced for a current serious felony under option (iii), which is calculated by adding the applicable enhancements to the term for the current offense, the trial court must then also impose a separate determinate term under section 667(a) for those enhancements attributable to the defendant's prior serious felony convictions. 5 If so, because defendant has 4 such prior convictions, his sentence in this case would be an indeterminate term of 26 years to life, consecutive to a determinate term of 20 years for the enhancements. (Subd. (c)(2)(B); § 669.)
Not surprisingly, the Attorney General argues the enhancements should be imposed; 6 defendant argues they should not. "[O]ur primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the voters who passed the initiative measure." (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 130, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 851 P.2d 42.) If "the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history." (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232.)
The Attorney General asserts "it is well-settled that a separate determinate term is imposed for the enhancements under options (i) and (ii)." Therefore, the Attorney General argues that not imposing enhancements under option (iii) would be inconsistent with language in section 1170.12 pertaining to all three options, and would lead to anomalous results. Defendant contends that the Attorney General's underlying premise is incorrect, and that enhancements are not imposed in addition to the indeterminate terms of options (i) and (ii). We therefore turn first to this issue.
We begin with the language of the statute. Subdivision (c) provides that the indeterminate life term must be imposed "in addition to any other enhancements or punishment provisions which may apply." This language clearly prescribes that terms of enhancement, including the five-year enhancement under section 667(a), be imposed in addition to the indeterminate term. "It is difficult to interpret the language of the statute in any other manner." (People v. Ramirez (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 559, 568, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 374; see also People v. Nelson (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 131, 136, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 361 []; People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1138-1139, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 "... ...
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