People v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 03 November 1969
• Docket Number: Cr. 3303
• Citation: 81 Cal.Rptr. 675,1 Cal.App.3d 367
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dale Leroy DANIELS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 675

81 Cal.Rptr. 675

1 Cal.App.3d 367

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dale Leroy DANIELS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 3303.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Nov. 3, 1969.

Hearing Denied Dec. 23, 1969.

[1 Cal.App.3d 370] Gary Bellow, McFarland, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jeffrey T. Miller, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

TAMURA, Acting Presiding Justice.

Following a jury trial defendant was found guilty of two counts of forcible rape and three counts of incest. He was denied probation and sentenced to state prison on each count, sentences to run concurrently. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.

Defendant was charged with forcing his 16-year old daughter to have sexual intercourse with him on two different occasions. Those acts constituted the bases for two counts of incest and two counts of forcible rape. He was also charged with coercing his wife, through fear of physical force, to engage in an act of sexual intercourse with their 18-year old son. This was the basis for a separate count of incest. Defendant's wife and 16-year old daughter (the victim of the incest) testified to the commission of the acts charged. In addition the prosecution was permitted to introduce a tape recording of statements taken from defendant in which he admitted the acts charged. Defendant took the stand and denied committing any of the offenses.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. His principal contention on appeal is that the taped confession should have been excluded because it was obtained in violation of the principles enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. We therefore limit our review of the evidence to that portion pertaining to the admissibility of the confession.

The offense which culminated in defendant's arrest occurred on May 13. The evidence reveals that on the evening of May 13, while defendant's wife and other children were absent from the house, defendant engaged in an act of intercourse with his 16-year old daughter. That evening the sheriff's office received a call from an unidentified source that a rape had been committed at the street address of defendant's home. Officer Hardy went to defendant's house, spoke to him and observed defendant's 16-year old daughter, but nothing nothing unusual, left. Later that evening defendant's wife and children appeared at the sheriff's office and reported what had been going on in their home. At about 9:30 p.m., a deputy sheriff went to defendant's house and picked up the 16-year old daughter so she could be questioned. Later at about 10:00 p.m. Hardy returned to defendant's house and took him to the Barstow substation of the sheriff's office. Defendant testified that at the time he was taken into custody Hardy informed him that his wife and children were all at the station and had reported that he had been molesting his daughter.

About 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. on March 14 Hardy talked to defendant. He advised defendant of his constitutional rights and defendant stated that he did not wish to waive them. According to defendant, he told Hardy that because of the seriousness of the charge, he did not wish to talk until he consulted an attorney. At the same meeting, after defendant had asserted his rights, Hardy informed defendant that his wife and son had been arrested for incest, that his other children (defendant had 8 children) were at juvenile hall, and that his 16-year old daughter had been examined and that the doctor thought she was 10 or 12 weeks pregnant. The record is silent as to whether the information was furnished in response to defendant's inquiry or was volunteered by Hardy. Defendant was not questioned and was permitted to go back to sleep.

About 12:00 noon on March 14 a deputy sheriff informed Hardy that defendant wished to see him. Hardy testified that defendant stated that he was concerned about his family and wished to make 'the tape' so he could clear his family. Hardy then readvised defendant of his rights and defendant stated that he waived them and did not desire an attorney. In the course of the ensuing interview defendant admitted that he had committed the offenses charged.

Hardy testified that neither he nor any other officer interrogated defendant after the 3:00 a.m. meeting; that he never told defendant that his family would be released or that it would help them if he made a statement; and that 'the only thing I told the defendant was that I would have to submit the whole case to the district attorney before my decision would be made whether his family would be released.'

Defendant testified that from a criminal law course he had taken at Riverside City College it was his impression that any person forced to commit a crime under threat of death is not legally responsible for the commission of the crime, and that he confessed because he thought that if he told the officers he forced members of his family to engage in the acts charged, they would be absolved and released from custody. He also testified that his daughter had told him of an act of sexual intercourse with a teenage boy friend, that he thought her pregnancy resulted from that act, and believed that if he admitted an incestuous relationship with his daughter, she would be able to obtain a legal abortion. ¹

Defendant urges (1) that his initiation of the interview at which he confessed and his waiver of Miranda rights were induced through coercive psychological influence exerted by the police in violation of his Miranda rights and were therefore involuntary; and (2) that his confession was involuntary in the traditional sense.

Preliminarily, we review the principles by which we must be guided in resolving the issues thus framed.

Once a defendant asserts his Miranda rights, interrogation must cease. (Miranda v. Arizona, Supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473--474, 86 S.Ct. 1602; People v. Ireland, 70 A.C. 557, 571, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580.) If a suspect says he wants an attorney, he may not be interrogated until an attorney is present. (Miranda v. Arizona, Supra, 384 U.S. p. 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602; People v. Ireland, Supra, 70 A.C. p. 571, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580.) A confession obtained as a result of a continuance of the 'interrogation process' is, under the 'stern' Miranda principles, deemed to be the product of compulsion and is inadmissible. (People v. Ireland, Supra, p. 572, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580.) 'The form of the renewed queries, however subtle or gentle, cannot be considered in determining whether there has been a violation of the stern principles prescribed by the Supreme Court in Miranda.' (People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal.2d 714, 720, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 820, 441 P.2d 625, 628; People v. Ireland, Supra, p. 573, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580.)

But notwithstanding an initial assertion of the right to remain silent, statements thereafter made as a result of defendant's own initiative are not subject to the exclusionary rule of Miranda. (Miranda v. Arizona, Supra, 384 U.S. p. 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see People v. Ireland, Supra, 70 A.C. p. 572, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580; People v. Fioritto, Supra, 68 Cal.2d p. 719, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625; People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 392, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202; People v. Treloar, 64 Cal.2d 141, 147, 49 Cal.Rptr. 100, 410 P.2d 620; People v. Tomita, 260 Cal.App.2d 88, 92--93, 66 Cal.Rptr. 739.) However, the initiation of the confession must be free and voluntary; it must not be the product of coercive official conduct. (See People v. Fioritto, Supra, 68 Cal.2d 714, 719, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625; People v. Milton, 270 A.C.A. 438, 446, 75 Cal.Rptr. 803.)

Waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness of a confession are matters to be determined initially by the trial judge outside the presence of a jury. (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908.) However, the defendant may consent to a hearing on the issue of voluntariness in the presence of the jury. (Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31.) The burden is on the prosecution to establish waiver and voluntariness by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Stroud, 273 A.C.A. 709, 717, 78 Cal.Rptr. 270 (hearing denied); see People v. Davis, 66 Cal.2d 175, 180--181, 57 Cal.Rptr. 130, 424 P.2d 682.) An express finding on the record on those issues need not be made; such findings will be implied from the court's order admitting the confession into evidence. ² (People v. Smith, 270 A.C.A. 791, 797, 76 Cal.Rptr. 53; see People v. Stroud, Supra, 273 A.C.A. p. 718, 78 Cal.Rptr. 270.)

On appeal, the trial judge's findings on the question of waiver of rights and voluntariness will not be set aside unless they are 'palpably erroneous.' (People v. Robinson, 274 A.C.A. 555, 561, 79 Cal.Rptr. 213; People v. Pierce, 260 Cal.App.2d 852, 858, 67 Cal.Rptr. 438; People v. Carter, 258 Cal.App.2d 628, 634, 65 Cal.Rptr. 845.) It is not the function of the reviewing court to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to reweigh it, or to make an independent determination as to whether the prosecution has sustained its burden beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Stroud, Supra, 273 A.C.A. 709, 714, 78 Cal.Rptr. 270; see People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, 907, 59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869.) It is the duty of an appellate court, however, to make an independent examination of the uncontradicted evidence to determine whether a confession has been obtained in compliance with Miranda requirements and was voluntarily made. (People v. Sanchez, 70 A.C. 598, 608, 75 Cal.Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74.) Those issues must be reviewed in light of the whole record and 'the totality of circumstances.' (Greenwald v Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 88 S.Ct. 1152, 20 L.Ed.2d 77; Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d...