People v. Daniels
| Decision Date | 15 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-06-3514.,1-06-3514. |
| Citation | 908 N.E.2d 1104 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeanette DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Aliza R. Kaliski, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL, for Appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, and James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Abigail Siedlecki, Assistant State's Attorneys, Chicago, IL, for Appellee.
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
The following are undisputed facts. On February 28, 2004, the 29-year-old victim, Alonzo Jones, was present in defendant's apartment at 7425 South Parnell, when he was accused by codefendant Laquita Calhoun of molesting her child. As a result of this accusation, the victim was attacked, beaten and sodomized by codefendants Terrence Jones, Katherine Calhoun, and Laquita Calhoun, in the presence of Derrick Fleming, Lakesha Collins and defendant. The victim was then dragged outside and placed in the trunk of Derrick Fleming's car. His body was later found in an alley near 5630 South Michigan Avenue.
On March 3, 2004, without the benefit of an attorney and after being advised of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 (1966), defendant confessed to her participation in the crime and gave a videotaped statement to police. Soon thereafter, together with five codefendants,1 defendant was indicted on 16 charges, including: (1) five counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) through (a)(3) (West 2002)); (2) four counts of aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West 2002)); (3) two counts of kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2002)); (4) and five charges of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), (b)(8) (West 2002)).
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County defendant, Jeanette Daniels2, was found guilty of aggravated kidnaping and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her videotaped confession. She also contends that the trial court erred in barring the trial testimony of defense expert Dr. Bruce Frumkin, regarding the tests he administered to her to assess her "interrogatory suggestibility." For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
II. BACKGROUND
Although the issues in this case involve defendant's ability to comprehend Miranda warnings and the impact of her "suggestibility" in rending her videotaped confession, we begin our factual presentation with defendant's initial fitness hearing.
On April 13, 2005, a fitness hearing was held to determine whether defendant was fit to stand trial. At that hearing the parties offered the testimony of two court-appointed witnesses, Dr. Sharon L. Coleman and Dr. Roni Seltzberg. Dr. Seltzberg, a board-certified staff psychiatrist for the Cook County circuit court, was qualified as an expert in forensic psychiatry and testified that on November 3, 2004, pursuant to a court order, she evaluated defendant to determine whether defendant was fit to stand trial. Dr. Seltzberg testified that based on her interview with defendant, as well as several documents3 that she reviewed prior to speaking with defendant, it was her opinion to a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty that defendant was unfit to stand trial because she did not understand the roles of court personnel, the court proceedings or the possible outcomes of her case, and because she had limited cognitive functioning, suffering from what Dr. Seltzberg identified as "mild retardation or borderline intellectual functioning." Dr. Seltzberg, however, did not rule out the possibility of defendant's progressing to "fitness" with sufficient training.
Dr. Seltzberg specifically explained that it was apparent from her conversation with defendant that defendant did not understand basic concepts and terminology relevant to courtroom proceedings. Specifically, defendant did not understand the difference between a bench and a jury trial, or the roles of different courtroom personnel including the judge and the State's Attorney. In addition, Dr. Seltzberg was concerned with defendant's continued assertion that she understood the relevant terminology, although it was apparent that she did not have a proper understanding. Dr. Seltzberg also testified that when she attempted to teach defendant some of the relevant courtroom terminology, defendant was unable to retain the information.
According to Dr. Seltzberg, defendant also exhibited symptoms of depression, which could itself add to defendant's inability to retain information, to concentrate during trial, follow the proceedings, and cooperate with her counsel to her benefit.
On cross-examination, Dr. Seltzberg acknowledged that after her interview with defendant she had occasion to view defendant's videotaped confession, but she asserted that this videotape did not change her expert opinion regarding defendant's fitness to stand trial.
The parties next stipulated with regard to the expert testimony of clinical psychologist Dr. Sharon L. Coleman. The parties stipulated that if called to testify, Dr. Coleman would state that pursuant to a court order she evaluated defendant to determine if defendant was fit to stand trial and that in her opinion defendant was currently unfit because of cognitive limitations which seriously compromised her understanding of courtroom procedures, the roles of key courtroom personnel, and the overall workings of the legal system. According to Dr. Coleman, defendant was not capable of effectively considering possible defense strategies or collaborating with her attorney. Dr. Coleman would concur with Dr. Seltzberg that defendant also exhibited symptoms of depression, which could add to defendant's inability to understand the relevant courtroom procedures, or actively participate in the proceedings against her. Dr. Coleman would further testify that defendant can be restored to fitness within one year.
Based on the aforementioned testimony, the circuit court found defendant unfit to stand trial and remanded her to Alton Mental Health Center for appropriate treatment.
On December 12, 2005, the court held a restoration hearing.4 At that hearing the State first called, Dr. David Montani, an expert in psychiatry, who testified that as part of his work at Alton Mental Health Center, he treated defendant at that center between May 12, 2005, and October 17, 2005.
Dr. Montani testified that he initially diagnosed defendant with schizo-affective disorder of the depressed type. He explained that patients with this disorder exhibit full blown depressive episodes, in addition to symptoms of psychosis, such as, in defendant's case, hearing voices. To treat defendant, Dr. Montani prescribed her an antipsychotic medication, Risperdal.
Dr. Montani further testified that in his opinion defendant was mildly mentally retarded. He explained that the diagnosis requires three components: (1) a low IQ (less than 70); (2) onset of the low IQ prior to age 18; and (3) impaired social functioning. He stated that the tests he performed on defendant revealed that defendant had an IQ of 64, with an onset prior to age 18, and that the results of the test he administered to defendant to evaluate her basic skills indicated that she had the functional equivalent of an eight-year-old child. Specifically, according to Dr. Montani defendant was unable to write her address or recall her social security number even though her disability income was based on knowing this number. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Montani concluded that defendant was incapable of understanding basic terminology relevant to criminal court proceedings.
Dr. Montani testified that beginning in May 2005, as part of his treatment plan for defendant, he met with defendant at least once a week, both to provide therapy and to teach her the basics concepts necessary for her to become fit to stand trial. Dr. Montani testified that twice a week defendant also attended formal classes teaching general information about the criminal court system, including roles of court personnel, the stages of a criminal proceeding, and proper courtroom behavior. Dr. Montani finally averred that after his last meeting with defendant on September 23, 2005, he came to the conclusion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that defendant was fit to stand trial while on medication (Risperdal).
Dr. Roni Seltzberg, an expert in forensic psychiatry, next testified on behalf of defendant. She averred that pursuant to a court order she evaluated defendant in October 27, 2005, to determine whether defendant's mental state had improved so as to make her fit to stand trial. Dr. Seltzberg stated that it was her opinion within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty that defendant was not yet fit to stand trial because she continued to reveal confusion regarding roles of courtroom personnel and court proceedings.
Specifically, Dr. Seltzberg averred that defendant still had a poor grasp of the roles of different courtroom personnel. She explained that even though defendant could initially give a three-word memorized answer as to the roles of the judge, public defender, State's Attorney and witnesses, when she was asked to explain in her own words the role of these individuals, she became confused. For example, Dr. Seltzberg testified that when she asked defendant what a bench trial is, defendant responded that "it was 12 people and your P[ublic] D[efender] see if you were guilty or not." When Dr. Seltzberg probed defendant to explain what the public defender's job was, defendant gave the memorized answer "to help me." However, when Dr. Seltzberg asked her "so then your P[ublic] D[e...
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