People v. Davis

• Decision Date: 17 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 81358,81358
• Citation: 177 Ill.2d 495,687 N.E.2d 24,227 Ill.Dec. 101
• Parties: , 227 Ill.Dec. 101 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Darryl DAVIS, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 24

687 N.E.2d 24

177 Ill.2d 495, 227 Ill.Dec. 101

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Darryl DAVIS, Appellee.

No. 81358.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 17, 1997.

[177 Ill.2d 497] [227 Ill.Dec. 102] Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney Cook County, Crim. Appeals Div., Susan R. Schierl, Assistant State's Attorney, Jim Ryan, Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Div., Chicago, for the People.

Robert F. Nemzin, Law Offices of Hickey & Nemzin, Chicago, for Darryl Davis.

Justice NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:

We here decide the constitutionality of the statutory penalty for felons who violate the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)). The circuit court of Cook County found that the statutory penalty for felons in possession of a firearm without proper registration (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(N) (West Supp.1995)), when compared to the penalty for the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1994)), is disproportionate under section 11 of article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The circuit court also found that the sentencing disparity violated due process under both the Illinois and United States Constitutions. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV. The State appealed directly to this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 603. ¹ For reasons that follow, we agree that the statutory penalty for felons convicted of failing to register a firearm pursuant to the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act violates the Illinois Constitution. We therefore affirm the trial court.

BACKGROUND

Defendant, Darryl Davis, was charged by information with two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 1994) (one count each for a firearm and ammunition)), one count of unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 1994)), and one count of failing to have a firearm owner's card in violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 1994)).

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act charge. In his motion, defendant noted that possessing a firearm without a firearm owner's card is a nonprobationable Class 3 felony that is subject to a minimum two-year prison sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(N) (West Supp.1995). In contrast, the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon is a probationable Class 3 felony. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 1994). Defendant's motion alleged that it was irrational to make the penalty for the registration offense nonprobationable while the penalty for the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon is probationable. Thus, defendant contended that the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act sentencing provision for felons violated due process under both the Illinois and United States Constitutions. See Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV.

Defendant also argued that giving the registration offense a more serious penalty violates section 11 of article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. This provision, referred to as the proportionate penalties clause or the limitation-of-penalties provision, provides in part:

"All penalties shall be determined * * * according to the seriousness of the offense * * *." Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11.

Defendant's motion alleged that the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act sentencing provision violates this constitutional guarantee by providing a more severe penalty for that offense than for the more serious offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.

Last, defendant's motion alleged that the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act charge constituted a double enhancement. Defendant essentially suggested that his status as a felon should not be used twice to enhance the punishment for his criminal conduct. In this regard, defendant noted that because he is a felon he could not obtain a firearm owner's card. Defendant therefore reasoned that he cannot commit the lesser punished unlawful use of a weapon by a felon offense without committing the more harshly punished registration offense. Thus, defendant contended that the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act charge constituted a double enhancement based on his status as a felon.

After a hearing, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act charge. The circuit court held that the penalty provision for felons convicted of violating the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act offended both due process and the proportionate penalties clause. The court reasoned that "there is no rational basis for * * * making it non-probationable not to have the card and probationable to have the gun that requires you to have the card." The circuit court rejected defendant's contention that the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act penalty provision constituted a double enhancement. The State then appealed the dismissal of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act charge directly to this court.

During the briefing of this case, this court decided People v. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d 412, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830 (1996), which addressed the scope of the proportionate penalties clause. The State repeats here many arguments it made in Lewis. Therefore, we briefly address those arguments prior to turning attention to the merits of the present claim. Furthermore, as we find the proportionate penalties issue dispositive, the following analysis does not address the due process or double enhancement claims.

ANALYSIS

Pretrial Dismissal

The State first argues that the circuit court erred on procedural grounds. The State contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act charge prior to trial because such a ruling is premature and invades prosecutorial discretion concerning what offenses to charge.

This court rejected these exact challenges in People v. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d 412, 423, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830 (1996). In Lewis, this court observed that proportionate penalty challenges are routinely considered in a pretrial posture. See, e.g., People v. Bailey, 167 Ill.2d 210, 234-37, 212 Ill.Dec. 608, 657 N.E.2d 953 (1995); People v. Farmer, 165 Ill.2d 194, 209-10, 209 Ill.Dec. 33, 650 N.E.2d 1006 (1995); People v. Johns, 153 Ill.2d 436, 447-49, 180 Ill.Dec. 254, 607 N.E.2d 148 (1992); People v. Hamm, 149 Ill.2d 201, 218-20, 172 Ill.Dec. 179, 595 N.E.2d 540 (1992); People v. Simmons, 145 Ill.2d 264, 269-72, 164 Ill.Dec. 568, 583 N.E.2d 484 (1991).

Relying on People v. Christy, 139 Ill.2d 172, 151 Ill.Dec. 315, 564 N.E.2d 770 (1990), this court in Lewis also rejected the contention that such a pretrial dismissal improperly usurps prosecutorial discretion. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d at 417, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830. The court reasoned that where the penalty for a given offense violates the proportionate penalties clause, the prosecutor has no discretion to charge that offense. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d at 422, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830. Thus, we address the merits of the proportionate penalties issue.

Proportionate Penalties

In examining the constitutionality of a statute, we are guided by familiar standards. Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of upholding their validity. People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill.2d 482, 499, 59 Ill.Dec. 59, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981). For this reason, the party challenging a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violation. Johns, 153 Ill.2d at 442, 180 Ill.Dec. 254, 607 N.E.2d 148.

In Lewis, this court addressed the scope of section 11 of article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. At issue was whether the statutory penalties for armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994)) and armed violence predicated on robbery with a category I weapon (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1994)) constituted proportionate penalties. The two offenses had identical elements, but were subject to different sentencing ranges.

In addressing this issue, the Lewis court rejected two arguments concerning the proper scope of proportionality review that are repeated in the present appeal. First, the State argued that the proportionate penalties clause was not intended by the drafters of the Illinois Constitution to apply to the legislature. Instead, the State asserted that the true purpose of the provision was to provide a check on judicially imposed sentences. This court rejected that view and held that the proportionate penalties clause restricts the power of the legislature in establishing statutory criminal penalties. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d at 420, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830.

Second, the State argued in Lewis that, even if the proportionate penalties clause applies to the legislature, it does not provide for the comparison of penalties for different offenses. Instead, the State sought to limit review under the proportionate penalties clause to an examination of the gravity of a particular offense with the severity of its sentence. See Lewis, 175 Ill.2d at 425, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Nickels, J.). Under this review, the proportionate penalties clause is violated only where a legislative punishment for a particular offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill.2d 235, 240, 184 N.E.2d 833 (1962); Farmer, 165 Ill.2d at 209-10, 209 Ill.Dec. 33, 650 N.E.2d 1006.

The Lewis court found that review under the proportionate penalties clause is not limited to examining the gravity of a particular offense and the severity of the penalty. Instead, the court determined that comparing different offenses and their penalties is an accepted part of proportionality review. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d at 420, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830 (citing cases). The court...